APPELLANTS Case facts
Reliance indudtries v uoi (1) Two Production Sharing Contracts (“PSC”) were executed in this matter. Since, certain disputes and differences arose between the Union of India and Reliance Industries Limited sometime in 2010, the Union of India invoked the arbitration clause. On 12.9.2012, the Arbitral Tribunal passed a final partial award, which became the subject matter of a Section 34 of the Act petition filed in the Delhi High Court by the Union of India. The essential dispute between the parties is as to whether Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable to the arbitration agreement irrespective of the fact that the seat of arbitration is outside India. To find a conclusive answer to the issue as to whether applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has been excluded, it would be necessary to discover the intention of the parties. Delhi hc held that the petition under sec 34 is maintainable which was later reversed by b y the SC.
NTPC v. Singer, (1992) (2) NTPC entered in two contracts with the respondent Singer Co for the supply of equipment and commissioning of certain works in India, the General Terms and Conditions of which provided for arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).the substantive law had been specified as Indian law, but the contract was silent on the applicable arbitration law. Court said that the parties intended for Indian law to govern the agreement and mere fact that the award was handed down in London was not enough to supersede the overriding jurisdiction and control of Indian courts.
TDM Infrastructure (1) two parties to the dispute were companies registered under the Companies Act of 1956. However, the directors and the shareholders of the petitioner company were residents of Malaysia and the Board of Directors of the petitioner also sat in Malaysia. The respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner, which also contained an arbitration clause. This arbitration clause mandated that the law applicable in case of a dispute would be the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 and amendments thereafter. The Court held that if both the companies are incorporated in India, the arbitration agreement concluded between them shall be construed to be a domestic arbitration agreement and not an International Commercial Arbitration. The Court limited the application of Section 2(1)(f)(iii) to cases where the body corporate is an association or a body of individuals unregistered or unincorporated under Indian Companies Act, 1956.
Sasan (2) (1) Sasan entered into an association agreement with North American Coal Corporation(NACC) in 2007. The Agreement, inter alia, provided for resolution of disputes by way of arbitration to be administered by ICC in London, England, under laws of the United Kingdom. Kingdom. Thereafter, as per the understanding of Sasan Power Ltd. and NACC India, disputes arose only between Sasan Power Ltd. and NACC India being two
Indian parties, and NACC India initiated arbitration proceedings which was opposed by Sasan Power Ltd. by way of a suit and then appeal to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. HC held that two Indian parties may conduct arbitration in a foreign seat under English law.
Atlas v Kotak (2) In Atlas, the SCI considered the applicability of sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act and held that merely because the arbitration is situated in a foreign country would not by itself be enough to nullify the arbitration agreement that the parties entered into on their own volition. Atlas entered into a contract with M/s Oceandale Company Limited, Hongkong (hereinafter`Oceandale', for short). The agreement was for the supply of groundnut . The price was agreed at US $200 per M.T. The goods were to be supplied through M/s Kotak and Co (`Kotak'). Kotak were at all times responsible for the performance on behalf of the final buyers Oceandale. The Apex Court responded to the objection on enforcement of an award stating that merely because the arbitrators are situated in a foreign country (London) cannot by itself be enough to nullify the arbitration agreement when the parties have with their eyes open willingly entered into the agreement.
Kumud Agarwalla v. Fertilizer Corporation of India, Ltd.
(1)
Petitioner that she entered into four contracts with the respondent for supply of polythene Lined Jute Bags. Each of the said contract contained an arbitration clause. The only point pressed by the respondent in this application was the jurisdiction clause contained in the contracts which said that all causes of action in relation to the contract will thus be deemed to have arisen only within the jurisdiction of Gorakhpur Court. The court held the clause valid and binding upon the parties.
Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd v. Jasjit Singh (5) A vessel belonging to the appellant company arrived at Calcutta on Oct. 29, 1957. It was rummaged by Calcutta Customs Officers and several openings discovered in wall panellings and from a hole in the wall panelling behind the back batten of a wooden seat screwed to a wall in the sailor's accommodation a large quantity of gold in bars was discovered. An order was passed by the Additional Collector of Customs confiscating the vessel under Section 167(12A) of the Customs Act, and giving the appellant the option under Section 183 of paying a fine of Rs. 25 lakhs in lieu of confiscation. The Board considered the matter in appeal and expressed its concurrence with the conclusions of the Additional Collector that the offence under Section 52A of the Customs Act had been proved. The appellant's attempt to move the Government of India in its revisional jurisdiction also failed. The appellant then moved the Supreme Court for special leave and with special leave being granted the appeal came before the Hon'ble Court. A preliminary objection was raised by the Additional Solicitor-General that since none of the Customs authorities was a tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution, the appeal preferred was incompetent. The contentions raised by the appellant related to the true scope and effect of Section 52A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra (9) Constitution - writ against judicial Order - Order 35 Rule 12 and Order 39 Rule 1 of Code of civil Procedure, 1908 - in a defamation case instituted against publisher of English Weekly Blitz Judge made oral Order forbidding publication of evidence of a witness such Order was passed to prevent witness from risk of excessive publicity - aggrieved by said Order petitioners who were reporters filed writ petition before High Co urt which was dismissed on ground that impugned Order was judicial Order of High Court and was not amenable to writ under Article 226 - petitioners then moved Supreme Court under Article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (a) and (g) of Constitution - impugned Order prevented publication of evidence of witness during course of trial and not thereafter - Courts possess inherent jurisdiction to hold trial in camera if satisfied that ends of justice so require - pith and substance of impugned Order was to give protection in order to obtain true evidence with a view to do justice - its incidental effect does not invalidate it under Article 19 (1) (g) - when judicial Order made by High Court binds strangers they may challenge Order in appeal under Article 136 but not under writ proceedings - judicial Orders of High Court are not amenable to be corrected by Supreme Court by issuing writ of certiorari - petition dismissed.
The State Of Bombay vs R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala ( The case discussed the situation under which the prize competitions could be of a gambling nature and whether the taxing the promoters of such competition by the legislature could be valid - It was held that while testing the validity of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act, 1948, it would be necessary to decide whether it was with respect to the topic assigned to the legislature, if it was so then whether there was sufficient territorial nexus to validate such operation and whether the powers of the legislature were in any other way fettered by the Constitution - After judging the said situation, the impugned Act would be considered valid legislation and its constitutionality was beyond the question RBI v palai central bank(1) Banking - winding up - Section 38 of Banking Companies Act, 1949 - appellant filed winding up petition against banking company - application was opposed by creditors business of company not in sound lines - appellant issued several notices to directors but to no avail - company under financial crisis - appellant came to conclusion that running of company is prejudicial to public interest - appellant gave number of opportunity to company to remove defects prevailing in company - company should be wound up.
State of kerala v N.M. Thomas (7) A governmental order granted provisional promotions to members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who did not have the requisite qualifications to be eligible for such promotion,
along with a two year grace period for them to gain such qualifications. This was challenged. The key contention of the aggrieved parties was that the classification was clearly void u nder Articles 16(1) and (2), and not covered by Article 16(4). Under existing precedent, this ought to have been a simple case. If Article 16(4) did not apply, then special provisions for SCs and STs clearly did violate Articles 16(1) and (2) Harjinder Singh vs Punjab State Warehousing Corporation(2) Harjinder Singh was employed with the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (PSWC) as work charge motor mate from March 5, 1986. On October 3 that year, he was appointed work munshi in the pay scale of Rs.350-525 for a period of three months. On February 5, 1987, his pay scale was upgraded to Rs.400-600 for a period of three months. Though his specified tenure ended on May 4, 1987, he was continued in service until July 5, 1988, when the Managing Director of the PSWC issued one month’s notice seeking to terminate his service by way of retrenchment. Harjinder Singh moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court and obtained a stay on the notice. The High Court vacated the stay when Harjinder Singh wanted to avail himself of remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), 1947, and withdraw his petition with th e High Court.
