George L. Borja
Constitutional Constitutiona l Law II
Case: MIGUEL BELUSO VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), G.R. no. 153974 August 7, 2006 Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resoluti on No. 95-29 author izing izing the municipal gover nment nment through the mayor to initiate expropr iati iati on proceedings. A petition for expropr iati iation was ther ea eaf te ter f iled iled on Apr ilil 14, 1997 by the r esp espondent Municipality of Panay befor e the Regional Tr ial ial Cour t (RTC), B r anch anch 18 of Roxas City. Petiti oner s f iled iled a Motion t o Dismiss alleging that the taking is n ot for public use but only for the benef it it of cer tain tain individuals; that it is p olitically m otivated because petitioner s vo ted against the incumbent mayor and v ice-mayor ; and that some of the supposed benef icia iciar ies ies of the land sought to be expropr iated iated hav e not actually signed a petition asking for the proper ty ty but their signatur es es wer e for ged ged or they wer e misled int o signing the same. The tr ial ial cour t denied petitioner s¶ s¶ M otion t o Dismiss and declar ed ed that the expropr iati iation in this case is for "public use" and the r esp o f r o ro r o esp ndent has the law ul ul ight ight t take the p pe ty ty up n payment of just compensation. Petitioner s then f iled iled a Petiti on for Certiorari be Certiorari befor e the CA claiming that they wer e denied due process when the tr ial ial cour t declar ed ed that the taking was for public pur pose without r ecei eceiving evidence on petitioner s¶ s¶ claim that the May or of Panay was motivated by politics in expropr iating iating their proper ty ty and in denying their Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hear ing ing of the Cour t Appointed Commissi oner s; s; and that the tr ial ial cour t also committed gr av e abuse of discr eti etion when it disr ega egar ded ded the aff ida idavits of per sons denying that they signed a petition addr essed essed to the municipal gover nment nment of Panay. Then CA r ende ender ed ed its Decisi on dismissing the Petiti on for Certiorari . It held that the petiti oner s wer e n ot denied due process as they wer e able t o f ile ile an answer to the complaint and wer e able to adduce their def enses enses ther ein; ein; and that the pur pose of the taking in this case constitutes "public use". Issue: Whether the Municipal Gover nment nment of Panay exer cise cise the power of Eminent Domain is being exer cised cised in accor dance dance with the delegating law under the existence of legislative g r ant ant in f avor of local gover nments nments. Decision: The petition is gr anted anted. Rationale: The Cour t in no uncer tain tain ter ms ms have pronounced that a local gover nment nment unit cannot . A. No. author ize ize an expropr iati iation of pr iv ate proper ty ty through a mer e r es esolution of its lawmaking body. R A 7160 other wise wise known as the Local Gover nment nment Code expr essly essly r equi equir es es an or dinance dinance for the pur pose and a r es esolution that mer ely ely expr esses esses the sentiment of the municipal council will n ot suff ice ice. A r es esoluti on will n ot suff ice ice for an LGU to be able to expropr iate iate pr ivate proper ty; ty; and the r eas eason for this is settled: A municipal or dinance dinance is diff er ent ent from a r es esolution. An or dinance dinance is a law, but a r es esoluti on is mer ely ely a declar ati ation of the sentiment or opini on of a lawmaking body on a specif ic ic matter. An or dinance dinance possesses a gener al al and per manent manent char acte acter , but a r es esoluti on is tempor ar y in natur e. Additionally, the two ar e enacted diff er ently ently -- a thir d r eading eading is necessar y for an or dinance, dinance, but not for a r es esoluti on, unless decided other wise wise by a maj or ity ity of all the Sanggunian member s. If Congr ess ess intended to allow LGUs to exer cise cise eminent domain through a mer e r es esoluti on, it would hav e simply adopted the language of the pr ev ious L ocal Gover nment nment Code. But Congr ess ess did not. In a clear diver gence gence from the pr evious Local Gover nment nment Code, Sec. 19 of R A .A. [No.] 7160 categor ically ically r equi equir es es that the l ocal chief executive act pur suant suant to an or dinance dinance. As r esp espondent¶s expropr iati iation in this case was based mer ely ely on a r es esolution, such expropr iati iati on is clear ly ly def ecti ective. While the Cour t is awar e of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the cour t cannot gr ant ant judicial sancti on t o an LGU¶s exer cise cise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contr aventi on of the ver y law giving it such p ower.
George L. Borja
Constitutional Law II
Case: JULITA P. TAN v s. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. no 170740 May 25, 2007 Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner her ein, is the r egister ed owner of a par cel of land consisting of 7,161 squar e meter s l ocated at the souther n bank of the Zapote River in Siti o Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City. She acquir ed this proper ty from the San Antonio Dev elopment Cor por ation (SADC). Pr ior to the tr ansf er of the proper ty to petiti oner by SADC, or on Mar ch 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC r equesting per mission t o enter the latter ¶s p roper ty, for the pur pose of constr uction of road. PEA also proposed to SADC to star t their negotiati on for its acquisiti on of the latter ¶s proper ty. The Public Estates Auth or ity (PEA) is a g over nment-owned and controlled cor por ation, or ganized and existing pur suant to Pr esidential Decr ee (P.D.) N o. 1084. SADC r eplied author izing PEA to enter the proper ty, subject to the condition that the latter should pay a monthly r ental of P10,000.00. PEA then dir ected its contr actor , the Philippine National Constr uction C or por ation, to enter the proper ty and begin the necessar y engineer ing wor ks on the Coastal Road. Then PEA r equested SADC either to donate or sell the proper ty to the gover nment. SADC r eplied by off er ing to sell the proper ty to PEA. SADC¶s asking pr ice was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house and other improvements ther eon that wer e destroyed dur ing the constr uction of the Coastal Road. PEA infor med SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but only the 1,131 squar e meter por tion above sea lev el. PEA then asked SADC t o submit proof s of owner ship and costs of the improvements which wer e demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the par ties. Howev er , for the past twenty (20) year s, they f ailed to r each an agr eement. Petiti oner in her desper ation, wrote PEA expr essing her willingness to be compensated through a land swapping arr angement. She proposed that PEA¶s Fishe r man¶s Wharf be given to her in exchange for her proper ty. The PEA Boar d approved the exchange of a por tion of petiti oner ¶s lot. The par ties enter ed into a Memor andum of Agr eement wher ein PEA agr eed to execute a Deed of Exchange by way of compensation for petitioner ¶s proper ty aff ected by the Coastal Road but withdr aw later on then f ile a complaint of expropr iation to the cour t. petiti oner f iled with the RTC a m otion to or der PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal v aluati on of the BIR. Then the tr ial cour t gr anted the petition. Then PEA f iled for cer tior ar i to the Cour t of Appeals, and it was gr anted. Issue: Whether the just c ompensation of the taking of the proper ty is proper ly applied. Decision: The decision of CA is r ever sed and the RTC decision Aff ir med. Rationale: While PEA has been ear ning huge toll f ees, it has r ef used to pay petitioner any compensation for the use of her proper ty in violation of her r ight as an owner. The abov e cir cumstances clear ly show that when PEA enter ed petitioner ¶s land in 1985, it was n ot for the pur pose of expropr iating it. We str ess that af ter its entr y, PEA wrote SADC r equesting to donate or sell the land to the gover nment. Indeed, ther e was no intention on the par t of PEA to expropr iate the subject proper ty. Why did it ask per mission from SADC t o enter the proper ty? Ther eaf ter , why did it r equest SADC to donate or sell the land to the gover nment? It could hav e simply exer cised its power of eminent domain. Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropr iation) of the same Rules prov ides, among other s, that upon the f iling of the complaint or at any time ther eaf ter and af ter due notice to the def endant, the plaintiff shall have the r ight to take or enter upon the possession of the r eal proper ty involved if he deposits with the author ized gover nment depositar y an amount equivalent to the assessed v alue of the proper ty. It bear s r eiter ating that in R epublic v. Vda. de Castellvi , we r uled that just c ompensation is deter mined as of the date of the taking of the proper ty or the f iling of the complaint, whichev er came f ir st. We hav e made it clear that ther e was no taking of the proper ty in 1985 by PEA for pur poses of expropr iation. As shown by the r ecor ds, PEA f iled with the RTC its petiti on for expropr iation on September 22, 2003. The tr ial cour t, ther efor e, was c orr ect in or der ing r espondent, through PEA, upon the f iling of its complaint for expropr iation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of the subject proper ty at P20,000.00 per squar e meter.
George L. Borja
Constitutional Law II
Case: CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. v s. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. no 173863 September 15, 2010 Facts: Clar k Development Cor por ation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clar k Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) which the petiti oner protest the assessment for royalty f ees claiming that nothing in the law author izes CDC t o impose royalty f ees or any f ees based on a per unit measur ement of any commodity sold within the special economic zone. Petitioner elev ated its protest befor e r espondent Bases Conv er sion Dev elopment Author ity (BCDA) ar guing that the royalty f ees imposed had no r easonable r elation t o the probable expenses of r egulation and that the impositi on on a per unit measur ement of f uel sales was for a r ev enue gener ating pur pose, thus, akin to a "tax". The protest was howev er denied by BCDA. Petiti oner appealed to the Off ice of the Pr esident which dismissed the appeal for lack of mer it and denied m otion for r econsider ation ther eof. The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which likewise dismissed the appeal for lack of mer it and denied the motion for r econsider ation.The CA held that in imposing the challenged royalty f ees, r espondent CDC was exer cising its r ight to r egulate the f low of f uel into CSEZ, which is b olster ed by the f act that it possesses exclusiv e r ight to dist r ibute f uel within CSEZ pu r suant to its Joint Ventur e Agr eement (JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Author ity (SBMA) and C oastal Subic Bay Ter minal, Inc. (CSBTI) . The appellate cour t also found that royalty f ees wer e assessed on f uel deliv er ed, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such impositi on was petitioner ¶s deliver y r eceipts to Nanox Philippines. The f act that r ev enue is incidentally also obtained does n ot make the impositi on a tax as l ong as the pr imar y pu r pose of such impositi on is r egulation. Issue: a. b.
Whether the royalty f ee imposed by CDC r egulator y in natur e. Whether the Policy Guidelines of Clar k Development Cor por ation is v alid gover nmental r egulation
Decision: The petition is DENIED for lack of mer it and the Decision of the Cour t of Appeals is her eby AFFIRMED. Rationale: In distinguishing tax and r egulation as a for m of police power , the deter mining f actor is the pur pose of the implemented measur e. If the pur pose is pr imar ily to r aise r ev enue, then it will be deemed a tax ev en though the measur e r esults in some for m of r egulation. On the other hand, if the pur pose is pr imar ily to r egulate, then it is deemed a r egulation and an exer cise of the police power of the state, ev en though incidentally, r evenue is gener ated. Thus, in Gerochi v. Depar tment of Ener gy, the Cour t stated: The conserv ative and pivo tal distincti on between these two (2) power s r ests in the pur pose for which the char ge is made. If gener ation of r evenue is the pr imar y pur pose and r egulation is mer ely incidental, the impositi on is a tax; but if r egulation is the pr imar y pur pose, the f act that r evenue is incidentally r aised does not make the imposition a tax. In the case at bar , we h old that the subject royalty f ee was imposed pr imar ily for r egulator y pur poses, and not for the gener ation of income or prof its as petiti oner claims. The need for r egulation is m or e evident in the light of the 9/11 tr agedy consider ing that what is being moved from one locati on to another ar e highly combustible f uel products that could cause loss of liv es and damage to proper ties, hence, a set of guidelines was promulgated on 28 June 2002. It must be emphasized also that gr eater secur ity measur e must be observed in the CSEZ because of the pr esence of the air por t which is a vital public infr astr uctur e. Administr ativ e issuances hav e the for ce and eff ect of law. They benef it from the same pr esumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two pr ecepts place a heav y bur den upon any par ty assailing gover nmental r egulations. Petiti oner ¶s plain allegati ons ar e simply not enough to over come the pr esumption of v alidity and r easonableness of the subject impositi on.
George L. Borja Law II
Constitutional
Case: CITY OF ILOILO vs . REMEDIOS SIAN VILLANUEVA and EUSEBIO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. L-12695, March 23, 1959 Facts: The Municipal Boar d of Iloilo City enacted Or dinance No. 86, amending Or dinance No. 33, wher ein the following was provide: (1) tenement house (casa de v ecindad), P25 annually; (2) tenement house par tly or wholly engaged in or dedicated to business in the str eets of J.M. Basa, Iznar t and Aldeguer , P24 per apar tment; (3) tenement house par tly or wholly engaged in business in any other str eets, P12.00 per apar tment. Remedi os Sian Villanuev a and Eusebio Villanueva, spouses, ar e the owner s of four apar tment houses for r ent situated in Il oilo City, to which the city sought to collect from the spouses an annual license tax f ee of P24 for each of their 34 apar tments, or the total sum of P1,610 allegedly due dur ing the per iod from the four th quar ter of 1946 to the thir d quar ter of 1948, plus the sum of P332 r epr esenting 20% penalty. The spouses having r ef used to pay the same, the City of Iloilo f iled in the municipal cour t action to r ecover the tax and penalty. Def endant spouses answer ed the complaint contending that the or dinance under which the tax is sought to be c ollected infr inges the power s gr anted to the city by its Char ter and that said or dinance is violative of the constituti onal provisions r equir ing unifor mity of taxation upon the theor y that it is oppr essiv e, unr easonable and discr iminator y. Because of the issue of constitutionality r aised, the case was elev ated to the Cour t of Fir st Instance of Iloilo. The CFI r ender ed judgment upholding the legality of the or dinance and or der ing def endants to pay the taxes claimed, with inte r est and costs. Def endants appealed from this decision to the Cour t of Appeals, but this case was elev ated to this Cour t because it involves only questions of law. Issue: Whether the Or dinance no. 86 is unconstitutional. Decision: The decision appealed from is r ever sed. The complaint is dismissed. Rationale: It is well-settled that a municipal c or por ation, unlike a sover eign state, is cl othed with no inher ent power of taxation. "The char ter or statute must plainly show an intent to conf er that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power when gr anted is to be constr ued strictissimi juris . Any doubt or ambiguity ar ising out of the ter m used in gr anting that power must be r esolv ed against the municipality. Inf er ences, implications, deductions ² all these ² ha v e no place in the inter pr etation of the taxing power of a municipal cor por ation." And it not appear ing that the power to tax owner s of tenement houses is one among those clear ly and expr essly gr anted to the City of Iloil o by its Char ter , the exer cise of such power cannot be assumed and hence the or dinance in question is ultra vires insof ar as its taxes a tenement house such as those belonging to def endants.
George L. Borja
Constitutional Law II
Case: HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991 Facts: Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which to conf ir m or to r atif y the ongoing Bur ial Assistance Progr am Qualif ied benef iciar ies, under the Bur ial Assistance Progr am, ar e ber eaved f amilies of Makati whose gross f amily income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a m onth. The benef iciar ies, upon f ulf illment of other r equir ements, would r eceiv e the amount of f ive hundr ed pesos (P500.00) cash r elief from the Municipality of Makati. Metro Manila Commissi on approved the r esolution. Ther eaf ter , the municipal secr etar y cer tif ied a disbur sement f ir ed of four hundr ed thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Bur ial Assistance Progr am. The r esolution was r ef err ed to r espondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its pr eliminar y f indings, r espondent COA disapproved the r esolution and disallowed in audit the disbur sement of f inds for the implementation ther eof. Petiti oner , through its Mayor , was constr ained to f ile this special civil acti on of cer tior ar i p r aying that COA Decisi on be set aside as null and void. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exer cise of police power under the gener al welf ar e clause. Decision: Petiti on is her eby GRANTED and the C ommissi on on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is her eby SET ASIDE. Rationale: COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public pur pose is not unconstitutional mer ely because it incidentally benef its a limited number of per sons. As c orr ectly pointed out by the Off ice of the Solicitor Gener al, "the dr if t is towar ds social welf ar e legislation gear ed towar ds state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the gener al welf ar e , social justice, as well as human dignity and r espect for human r ights. The car e for the poor is gener ally r ecognized as a public duty. The suppor t for the poor has long been an accepted exer cise of police power in the promotion of the common good. Ther e is no v iolati on of the equal protection clause in classif ying pauper s as subject of legislation. Pauper s may be r easonably classif ied. Diff er ent groups may r eceive var ying tr eatment. Pr ecious t o the hear ts of our legislator s, down t o our local councilor s, is the wel f ar e of the pauper s. Thus, statutes hav e been passed giving r ights and benef its to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-f ar mer from the bondage of the soil, housing the ur ban poor , etc. Resolution No. 60, r e-enacted under Resoluti on No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a par agon of the continuing progr am of our gover nment towar ds social justice. The Bur ial Assistance Progr am is a r elief of pauper ism, though not c omplete. The loss of a member of a f amily is a painf ul exper ience, and it is m or e painf ul for the poor to be f inancially bur dened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivif ies the v er y wor ds of the late Pr esident Ramon Magsaysay 'those who hav e less in lif e, should hav e mor e in law." This decision, howev er must not be taken as a pr ecedent, or as an off icial go-signal for municipal gover nments to embar k on a philanthropic or gy of inor dinate dole-outs for motives political or other wise.
Geor ge L. Bor
ja
onstitutional Law II
Case: HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE A. RUFINO, VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-23979
August 30, 1968
Facts: This is an acti on, against the Municipal Boar d and the Mayor of the City of Manila, for a declar ator y r elief. It was brought by the Homeowner s' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its Pr esident, Vicente A. Ruf ino, t o nullif y Municipal Or dinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila, approved on December 31, 1963, to take eff ect on Januar y 1, 1964. Which is an or dinance r egulating r entals of lots and building for r esidential pur poses. Af ter appropr iate proceedings, the Cour t of Fir st Instance of Manila r ender ed judgment declar ing said or dinance "ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio without pronouncement as to costs. The lower cour t st r uck down the questioned or dinance upon the ground that the power to "declar e a state of emer gency ... exclusively per tains to Congr ess"; that "ther e is no longer any state of emer gency" which may justif y the r egulation of house r entals; that said or dinance disconstitutes an unr easonable and unjustif ied limitation on the use of pr ivate proper ties and ar bitr ar ily encroaches on the constitutional r ights of proper ty owner s"; that the power of the City of Manila to "r egulate the business of ... letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does n ot include the author ity to prohibit what is for bidden in said or dinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the gener al welf ar e clause in the City Cha r ter. Hence, this appeal by the Mayor of Manila Said O r dinance. Issue: Whether or not or dinance 4841 is unconstitutional Decision: the decision appealed from should be as it is her eby aff ir med, with costs against the appellant. Rationale: The pr actical r eason for the r equir ement that a statute passed t o meet a giv en emer gency, should limit the pe r iod of its eff ectivity, is that, other wise, a new and di ff er ent law would be necessar y t o r epeal it, and said per iod would, accor dingly, be "unlimited, indef inite, negative and uncer tain", so that 9 "that which was intended to meet a tempor ar y emer gency may become a per manent law", because "Congr ess might not enact the r epeal, and, ev en if it would, the r epeal might not meet with the app roval of the Pr esident, and the Congr ess might not be able t o overr ide the v eto". In line with the basic phil osophy under lying the author ity to aff ect individual r ights, this Cour t f elt that Commonwealth Act No. 671, other wise known as the Emer gency Power s Act, was meant t o be and "became inoper ative when Congr ess met in r egular session on May 25, 1946," and that Executive Or der s Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 ² p romulgated subsequently ther eto ² "wer e issued without author ity of law", because, other wise, said emer gency r egulations would pur por t to be in for ce for an indefinite and unlimited period of time, and, hence, would be unconstitutional . The same consider ations impelled the Cour t to invalidate Executive O r der Nos. 545 and 546, issued on November 10, 1952. Indeed, other wise "the r esult would be obvious unconstitutionality", by making permanent a law intended to affor d a r elief for a temporary emer gency, the length of which should be "fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the ar bitr ar y or elastic will of either Congr ess or the Pr esident". We hav e not over looked the f act that the cases adv er ted to r ef er par ticular ly to the constituti onal provision author izing Congr ess, "in times of war or other national emer gency", to delegate to the Pr esident, "for a limited per iod", and subject to specif ied "r estr ictions", the power "to promulgate r ules and r egulations t o carr y out a declar ed national policy". We ar e inclined to believ e, howev er , that in p roviding that the lif etime of the author ity given must be "for a limited per iod", the fr amer s of our Char ter wer e inf luenced by the f act that power s wer e being delegated to the Executive, as much as by the ci r cumstance that, since the cause for the gr ant of power was tempor ar y, so should the gr ant be, for the eff ect cannot r emain in existence upon the r emoval of its cause. In f act, Congr ess has, in actual pr actice, accepted this limitati on upon its exer cise of police power to meet a condition of emer gency. Thus, Commonwealth Act No. 499 r egulated the tr ansf er of vessels and of shipping f acilities, eff ectiv e until adjour nment of the next r egular session of the National Assembly. This was followed by Commonwealth Act No. 689 which penalized speculation on r ents of buildings destined for dwelling pur poses, but only "for a per iod of two (2) year s af ter its approv al." This Act was amended by Republic Act No. 66 which, inter alia, extended its per iod of eff ectivity to "four (4) year s af ter it approval." Needless to say, the power s of municipal cor por ations delegated ther eto by the National Gover nment cannot escape the inher ent limitati ons t o which the latter ² as the sour ce of said power s ² is subject. Then, again, since our law on municipal cor por ations is, in pr inciple, patter ned af ter that of the United States, the r ule ther ein, to the eff ect that "in a proper case, emer gency legislation, limited in time, may be enacted under the police power " of a municipal cor por ation, should be consider ed a par t of our legal system .
