SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
FACTS:
the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against petitioner Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children]. the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, filed this complaint because he incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. The trial court granted the easement Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order. RULING With respect to the first issue, petitioners are already barred from raising the same. For failure to o appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred o in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant , and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. injuria .
RULING: In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering. Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. In other words, in order that t he law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to t he claim of private respondents, petitioners coul d not be said to have violated the principle pri nciple of abuse of right. r ight. In order that the t he principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
FACTS: A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the all egation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it or dered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it di d was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious. RULING:
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
FACTS: In 1984, Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. was sued by Manuel Tiong before the Quezon City RTC. In the body of his complaint, Tiong claimed damages amounting to Php50 million. But said amount was not mentioned in his prayer. He paid a docket fee of Php210.00 therefor. At that time, courts in Quezon City were being investigated by the Supreme Court for under-assessment of docket fees. In 1986, Judge Maximiano Asuncion ordered Tiong to amend his complaint so that the proper docket fee may
be computed. Tiong complied and in his amended complaint, the body thereof discussed a damage amounting to Php44 million but the prayer asked for damages “not less than Php10 million”. Based on the “not less than Php10 million” prayer, the clerk of court assessed a docket fee of P39,786.00 which Tiong paid. Later, Tiong filed a supplemental complaint where he was asking an additional Php20 million in damages. e later paid an additional docket fee therefor of Php80,396.00. The same was admitted by Judge Asuncion. Sun Insurance invoked the ruling in Manchester Development vs CA where it was ruled that the court does not acquire jurisdiction over a case if the proper docket fee was not paid; that the defect cannot be cured by a supplemental complaint because if the proper docket fee was not paid in the first place, then there is no original complaint to supplement nor amend. The issue raised the Court of Appeals where the CA ruled that Judge Asuncion is correct but Tiong must pay an additional docket fee of Php62,432.90, which Tiong complied. ISSUE: whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. HELD: Yes. The ruling in Manchester was relaxed in this case because Tiong showed his willingness to pay the additional docket fees unlike in the case of Manchester where Manchester Development intended to defraud the government by intentionally omitting the amount of damages it claimed in the prayer of their complaint.
The Supreme Court also laid down the following rules on docket fees: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court acquir es jurisdiction over a claim by the fili ng of the appropriate p leading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the j udgment awards a clai m not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
