PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO FACTS: – Au Augu gust st 20, 20, 1920 1920,, Fern Fernan ando do Guer Guerre rero ro whos whose e Sec. Sec. of the the Phil Phil.. Sena Senate te disc discov over ered ed that that docu docume ment nts s constituted the records of testimony by witnesses in the oil company investigation disappeared from his office. – Septem September ber 7, 1920, 1920, La Nacio Nacion, n, edited edited by GREGO GREGORIO RIO PERFEC PERFECTO TO publis published hed the news news about about the disappearance of the said records of testimony from the office of the Senate and stated there certain issues about the credibility of the senate. – September 9, 1920, authorized the committee on elections by a resolution to report the action to be taken against La Nacion. – Septembe Septemberr 15, 1920, the senate president president was authoriz authorized ed to endorse endorse to the atty-gen. atty-gen. the actions made made by La Nacion Nacion and Perfecto Perfecto.. As a result, result, an informati information on was filed to the mun. court of manila manila alleging the violation of Art. 256 of the penal code. – Perfecto was found guilty in the mun. court and in the court of first instance. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Art. 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force. Ruling: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous previous political political relations relations of the ceded ceded region region are totally totally abrogate abrogated d -- "politica "political" l" being being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. officio. So ordered.
PAMATONG VS. COMELEC FACTS:
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December 17, 2003, Rev. Elly V. Pamatong filed hi COC for President. January 17, 2004, COMELEC refused to give due course to his COC in its resolution no. 6558.
– Two commissioners (Luzviminda Tancangco & Mehol Sadain) voted to include Pamatong as they believed he had parties or movements to backup his candidacy.
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February 11, 2004, COMELEC denied the motion for recon. filed by Patong on January 15, 2004 under the aegis omnibus res. No. 6640.
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Pamatong filed for writ of certiorari before the SC alleging to reverse the resolutions of COMELEC that violated equal access to opportunities for public service (Sen. 26, Art. II of 1987 COnsti.) Issue/s: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? Is the SC authorized to review such case alleged by the petitioner? Ruling: 1.
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort. An inquiry into the intent of the framers 5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." 6Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise: I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the
opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied) Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.
2. However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED.
MANILA MOTORS CO. INC. VS. FLORES FACTS:
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May 1954, Manila Motors Co. Inc. filed a complaint before the mun. court of manila to recover the amount of P 1,047.98 from MANUEL T. FLORES as chattel mortgage installments w/c is due in September 1941. Flores pleaded for prescription: 1941-1954 and the complaint was dismissed. On appeal before the CFI, the court saw the plaintiff’s sustaining contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period & that deducting the time during which said laws were in operation- 3 yrs. And 8 months- the 10 yr. term had not yet elapsed when the complainant sued for collection in 1954. CFI ordered the return of the case to the mun. judge for trial on the merits.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the period due to unconstitutionality as declared in the Rutter vs. Esteban case. Ruling: 1. In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held that the moratorium laws suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court4
2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute — "confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) Judgment affirmed, without costs.
TY VS. TRAMPE FACTS: – ALEJANDRO TY (petitioner), resident and owner of lands and buildings in Pasig. – MVR Picture Tube, Inc. (petitioner) is a corporation also a registered owner of building and lands in Pasig. – AURELIO TRAMPE (respondent), sued as the presiding judge of branch 163 of RTC Nat’l Capital Judicial Region in Pasig. He decided on July 14, 1994 and September 30, 1994 the case to be set aside. – January 6,1994, respondent assessor sent notice of assessment respecting real properties in Pasig of the petitioners. – March 18,1994, petitioners requested the Mun. Assessor to reconsiderthe subject assessments. – March 29, 1994, petitioners filed before RTC of NCJR, Branch 163 by respondent judge a PROHIBITION WITH PRAYER FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIM. INJUNCTION TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID the new tax assessments. – July 14,1994, respondent judge denied the petition for lack of merit.
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September 30, 1994, subsequent motion for recon.by the petitioners were also denied by respondent judge.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the R.A No. 7160, otherwise known as the local gov’t. code of 1991, repealed the provisions of P.D No. 921; 2. Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief; and 3. Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional.
RULING: 1. Since it is now clear that P.D. 921 is still good law, it is equally clear that this Court's ruling in the Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases (supra) is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And, applying the said ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.
2. Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252. We do not agree. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. 20 In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal" 21 , and thus, no evidence was presented in said court. Because there were factual issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a fact-finding body to assist the Court in resolving said factual issues. But in the instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues. Therefore, there is no reason to require petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in R.A. 7160, nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said Board. 3.
In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to real estate tax payments already made prior to its promulgation and finality? Under the law 26 , "the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests . . . ." Finally, this Tribunal would be remiss in its duty as guardian of the judicial branch if we let pass unnoticed the ease by which the respondent Judge consigned "to the statutes' graveyard" a legislative enactment "together with the (three) decisions of the Supreme Court" promulgated jointly and unanimously en banc. An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have constrained him to be more circumspect in rendering his decision and to spell out carefully and precisely the reasons for his decision to invalidate such acts, instead of imperiously decreeing an implied repeal. He knows or should have known the legal precedents against implied repeals. Respondent Judge, in his decision, did not even make an attempt to try to reconcile or harmonize the laws involved. Instead, he just unceremoniously swept
them and this Court's decisions into the dustbin of "judicial history." In his future acts and decisions, he is admonished to be more judicious in setting aside established laws, doctrines and precedents. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the questioned Decision and Order of respondent Judge, DECLARING as null and void the questioned Schedule of Market Values for properties in Pasig City prepared by respondent Assessor, as well as the corresponding assessments and real estate tax increases based thereon; and ENJOINING the respondent Treasurer from collecting the real estate tax increases made on the basis of said Schedule and assessments. No costs. SO ORDERED.
JOYA VS. PCGG FACTS:
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August 9, 1990, MATEO CAPARAS (Chair. Of PCGG) wrote Pres. Aquino a letter requesting her for authority to sign the Consignment Agreement between RP through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods Int’l. Inc for the scheduled Jan. 11, 1991 auction of 82 paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang during Marcos time. August 14, 1990, Pres. Aquino through Exec. Sec. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR. authorized CAPARAS to sign the Consignment agreement. Aug. 15, 1990, CAPARAS signed the agreement with the agreement that PCGG will consign CHRISTIE’s for sale at public auction the said items. Oct. 26, 1990, COA through EUFEMIO DOMINGO (COA Chair.) submitted the audit findings to the pres. And observations that CAPARAS’ authority to the consignment was of doubtful legality; the contract was disadvantageous to the gov’t; PCGG has poor track record in asset disposal and the assets subj. to auction were historical relics with cultural significance, hence the disposal was prohibited.
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Nov. 15, 1990, the new PCGG chair DAVID CASTRO wrote the president defending the consignment authority and refusing the allegations of COA.
– The petition was originally filed by Joya et al. – January 9, 1991, a resolution denying the application for prelim. Injunction was issued on the ground that petitioners had not presented clear legal right to the restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. Issue/s: Whether or not the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case. Ruling: On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2 , Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Actual Controversy For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic. At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
MONTESCLAROS VS. COMELEC FACTS: – Dec. 4, 1992, first SK elections took place. – RA 7808 reset SK elections to first Monday of May of 1996 and every 3 yrs thereafter. – RA 7808 mandated COMELEC to supervise the conduct of the said SK elections. – February 18, 2002, ANTONIETTE MONTESCLAROS (petitioner) sent COMELEC a letter demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. She also urged COMELEC to respond to the said letter within 10 days upon receipt or she will see judicial relief.
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Feb. 22,2002, ALFREDO BENIPAYO (COMELEC Chair.) wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and Senate President about the pending bills on SK & Barangay elections.
March 6,2002, the Senate and House of Reps. Passed the bill postponing the SK elections. – March 11, 2002, recommendation for approval of the bill was passed. On the same date, petitioners filed the instant petition. And the senate approved the bill on March 13, 2002. – March 19, 2002, the bill became a law. Issue/s: Whether or not there is an actual controversy in the case which seeks to prevent a postponement of the6 May 2002 SK elections, and which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK. Ruling: The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.21
In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative bill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.23 In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003] Facts: – Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The controversy in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. 2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Held:
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.SO ORDERED.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: -Anti-Graft League of the Philippines (petitioner) charges DOJ Sec. Sedrfrey Ordonez for rendering opinion declaring that cabinet members, their deputies and assistant secretaries may hold other public office including membership in the board of gov’t corp. - petitioners argue about the interpretation of the said DOJ Sec. about the phrase “ unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” regarding the EO that allows Cabinet members and other secretaries to hold other positions other than their original position. - the Solicitor General counters the DOJ opinion no. 73 regarding Sec. 13, Art. VII and par. 2 of Sec. 7, Art. I-XB of the constitution saying that the said order is “reasonably valid and “constitutionally firm” and that EO 284 is constitutional.
Issue/s: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional? Ruling: In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, under secretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987Constitution itself. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
PEOPLE VS. TANI FACTS: – March 30, 1944, JACOB TANI Y TANI (defendant/appellant) was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms committed on Feb. 12, 1944 in SORSOGON. – The court also ordered the confiscation of the revolver and six rounds of ammunition illegally possessed. – The conviction was based on the violation of EO 226. Issue/s: Whether or not the punitive sentence imposed upon the appellant after the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippine Islands was of a political complexion. Ruling: In the case of Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 494), this court defined a punitive or penal sentence of a political complexion as one which "penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than for private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant."
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to he good and valid upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. In view of the foregoing, the present action against the accused and appellant is hereby dismissed with costs de oficio. So ordered.
