Özer Barış Tunçel
09.01.2014
Hannah Arendt's Understanding of Truth, Judgment and Politics
Introduction
Hannah Arendt is one of the most significant thinkers of 20th century.
The power and originality of her thinking is evident in her works such as
The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, On Revolution and The
Life of the Mind. In these works and in numerous essays she grappled with
the most crucial political events of her time, trying to grasp their
meaning and historical import, and showing how they affected our categories
of moral and political judgment. Her conception of politics is based on the
idea of active citizenship, that is, on the value and importance of civic
engagement and collective deliberation about all matters affecting the
political community.[1]
In this paper, I will present Arendt's understanding of Truth, Judgment
and Politics, and will try to find an answer to the question "Is truth
possible in politics?" from an Arendtian and Wittgensteinian point of view.
I will at first start with what Arendt understands from politics by
outlining her key concepts of Action and Speech, which without politics is
not possible. Then I will present her thoughts on Judgment (political
judgment) and Validity on the basis of Kant's aesthetic judgment in the
Third Critique, and finally, analyze her understanding of truth and
politics relationship in her essay on Truth and Politics and try to find an
answer to my question by also using Ludwig Wittgenstein's and thoughts.
Action, Speech and Politics
In her famous book The Human Condition, Arendt bases her theory of Vita
Activa on the three fundamental human activities: Labor, Work and Action.
[HC, 7]. In this section, I will focus on Action (and Speech), instead of
Labor and Work, for it is the key concept of politics for Arendt.
Arendt analyzes the vita activa by three categories which correspond to
the three fundamental activities of man-kind; Labor, Work and Action. Labor
is the activity that corresponds to the biological process of the human
body, which is the human condition of life, work corresponds to the
unnaturalness of human existence (worldliness), that is, providing
artificial world of things which are different than natural surroundings.
And finally, action, is "the only activity that goes on directly between
men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human
condition of plurality." Plurality, according to Arendt, is the condition
of action because we are all the same by being human but also distinct in a
way that "nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or
will live" [HC, 7-8].
It is action, what distinguishes men from animals and also from other
humans. According to Arendt, joining to the public realm through action and
speech is the only way to become human, since only the activity of action
is the privilege of the men that "neither a beast nor a god is capable of
it" [HC, 22]. The two central features of action are freedom and plurality.
Freedom, for her is the capacity to begin something new, to do the
unexpected, as action has the closest connection with the human condition
of natality. Every newcomer has the capacity of beginning something anew,
doing something unexpected by acting. The newness of every human being
shows itself in a political relationship that is itself not only new but
also proceeds by a continuous and improvisatory creativity[2].
As I mentioned above, plurality is the condition for both action and
speech. Arendt claims that plurality has a twofold character of equality
and distinction. If men were not equal on being human, they could not
understand each other and make plans for the future, and if they were not
distinct (distinguished from each other by who they are), they would not
need action and speech to understand each other [HC, 175].
According to Arendt, action and speech are so closely related because the
agent discloses himself through them. By acting and speaking, men show who
they really are, reveal their unique identities and appear to the human
world. As she states, "the disclosure of who is implicit in everything
somebody says and does" [HC, 178-9]. Thus, without speech action is not
possible, for it would lose its revelatory quality and there would no
longer be an actor. Arendt claims that the revelatory quality of speech and
action occurs only when people are with others in a mere human
"togetherness", for "only action cannot even be imagined outside the
society of men" [HC, 22]. In this sense, Arendt's understanding of politics
is that individuals appearing in the public realm through acting and
speaking and showing their uniqueness among their peers "by word and deed",
thus, "acquiring and sustaining personal identity and beginning something
entirely new[3]" [TP, 574].
Arendt on Political Judgment
In her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Arendt creates a
relationship between aesthetic judgments and political judgments. According
to her, aesthetic judgments in Kant's Third Critique provides a model for
political judgments.
In Arendt's account, political and aesthetic claims are examples of
Kant's "reflective judgments". According to Kant, reflective judgment is in
contrast with "determinate judgment", in which the rule is given (for
judging)[4]. As Arendt states; "If you say, 'What a beautiful rose!' you do
not arrive at this judgment by first saying, 'All roses are beautiful, this
flower is a rose, hence this rose is beautiful.'[5]" Thus, in reflective
judgment, we do not confront with the general category (rule), but with the
particular, that the beauty of that rose is not given in the universal
nature of roses. Hence, the claim about the beauty of that particular rose
is subjective, rather than objective, since, according to Kant, the beauty
is not the property of the rose, but only an expression of the pleasure
felt by the judging subject in reflective mode[6].
For synthesizing political and aesthetic judgments, Arendt has been
criticized, especially by Jürgen Habermas, who blames Arendt for
aestheticizing politics and taking its rational process of validation. Her
turn to aesthetic judgments, according to Habermas, is her refusal to
provide a "cognitive foundation" for politics[7].
According to Zerilli, Arendt's first place problematic was not validity
in political judgment, but was the affirmation of human freedom. In
contrast to Habermas, Arendt thought that our practices of justification
has a strong tendency towards compulsion, which destroys the space that
political speech can appear. As she states in Truth and Politics; "… every
claim in the sphere of human affairs to an absolute truth, whose validity
needs no support from the side of opinion, strikes at the very roots of all
politics and governments."[8]
Zerilli states that, the term judgment, in the widest sense, is "the
faculty that allows us order or make sense of our experience. According to
Kant, we could not have any knowledge, for every object comes into being as
such through recognition in a concept[9]. As this recognition works in
determinate judgment, which is cognitive, the problem for Arendt is that
how can we expect new objects or events, which cannot be explained as the
continuation of something already known (or so to say, given)? According to
Arendt, the kind of judgment which is relevant to politics requires
understanding. As she states, "understanding makes knowledge
meaningful."[10] And by trying to understand, instead of trying to know (by
the given rules), our judgments become free. Thus, a freedom based judgment
cannot be reached by determinate judgment.
Arendt claims that, if something is not an object of knowledge, then it
is an occasion for improving the critical aspects of our faculty of
judgment. In this sense, where determinate judgment fails, "true" judgment
begins (I used true in quotation marks in here, for the term truth is
already a problematic itself for Arendt). When a concept is not already
given, our faculties (of judgment) go into "free play", thus our
imagination is no longer bound to recognition. Imagination, when it is not
bound to causality, is "productive and spontaneous, generative of new forms
and figures[11]".
According to Arendt, when people judge things, they also disclose
themselves, what kind of people they are (or rather who they are,
consistent with her theory of Action), and this disclosure "gains in
validity to the degree that it has liberated itself from individual
idiosyncrasies[12]." Thus, in this sense, as Zerilli states, Arendt
introduces two crucial ideas: first, the act of judging creates significant
relations between the judging people, relations that disclose a public
figure, and second, the disclosure of the judging person obtains validity
when it attains impartiality [Zerilli, 164]. Arendt's political judgments
are based on the fundamental reality human condition, that is, plurality.
As I mentioned above, plurality is one of the main features of politics,
and when we consider it with political judgments, it is something we need
to take account when we decide what will count as part of our common world,
that it the public realm. According to Arendt, the validity in political
judgments requires of being able to "think in everybody else's place", what
Kant calls "enlarged mentality". She states that;
"Judgment, Kant says, is valid 'for every single judging person,' but the
emphasis in the sentence is on 'judging'; it is not valid for those who do
not judge or for those who are not members of the public realm where the
objects of judgment appear."[13]
Thus, the capacity of judging is a specifically political ability, in the
sense that being able to see things not only from one's point of view but
in the perspectives of all those who are present (in the public realm).
According to Zerilli, by making plurality the condition of
intersubjective validity, Arendt shifts the question of political judgment
from the epistemological realm to the political realm. Politics involves
the exchange of arguments in the sense of "opening up" the world, which is
disclosed to through language, our criteria or concepts (or our forms of
life, form a Wittgensteinian perspective). This opening up creates the
context in which a change in perspective can happen, hence, can save us
from "being hold captive by a picture". For Arendt, loosen our sense of
timeless Truth in human affairs is the central task of judgment, and this
loosening requires different images and practices[14].
Truth and Politics: Is Truth Possible?
In Truth and Politics, Arendt distinguishes two kinds of truth; Rational
and Factual truths. According to Arendt, the formation of valid opinions
requires a public space where individuals can test their views. She claims
that "truth" (rational truth) belongs to the realm of cognition, and always
carries and element of coercion, for it excludes debate and must be
accepted as it is by every single individual. Truth gains a despotic
character, as it compels a universal assent against the plurality of
opinions, and leaves the mind (and imagination) little freedom of movement,
eliminates the diversity of views. In this sense, truth is anti-political
by its very essence, for opinion and debate are the key elements of the
political realm, and as Arendt writes; "All truths- not only the various
kinds of rational truth but also factual truth- are opposed to opinion in
their mode of asserting validity.[15]"
But, it must be stated that, although Arendt is certain about the
negative consequences of the rational truth when it is applied to political
realm, she gives importance to factual truth for the preservation of the
past for the existence of political communities. As she writes;
"Factual truth… is always related to other people: it concerns events and
circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses
and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken
about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by
nature. Facts and opinions, though they must be kept apart, are not
antagonistic to each other; they belong to the same realm.[16]"
According to Arendt, what must be done, instead of searching for a
timeless truth in political realm, is formulated by her as representative
thinking. She claims that political thought is representative. We form an
opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making
present to our minds the standpoints of those who are absent, thus, we
represent them[17]. But, this representation is not adopting blindly the
actual views of those who stand somewhere else, neither is it an empathy,
as if we are trying to be or feel like somebody else. The more people's
points of view we present in our minds with a given issue, we can imagine
better how would we think if we were in their place, thus, our capacity for
representative thinking and our final opinions (or so to say judgments),
will be stronger. This is the capacity for what Kant calls the "enlarged
mentality", which enables us to judge. And the only condition for this
effort of imagination is liberation from our own private interests. If we
refuse to do this and form our opinions on our own interests, or the
interests of the group we belong to, then we will be in lack of imagination
and fail to judge by our "aspect captivity".
Thus, Arendt's formulation of the faculty of political judgment relies on
the ability to see the same object from multiple perspectives. As Zerilli
states, for Arendt, what it means to see differently, is to form a
different picture, considering Wittgenstein's notion of the pictures that
ground our language-games[18]. The position, from where we judge, is a
position of outsideness, that is, the position of the spectator. It is this
third perspective, Arendt had in mind, when she talks about the
understanding that means to "see the same world from one another's
standpoint, to see the same in very different and frequently opposing
aspects." As Zerilli states;
"The spectator is the one who, through the use of imagination, can
reflect on the whole in a disinterested manner, that is, a manner free not
simply from private interest but also from interest tout court, which is to
say from any standard of utility whatsoever[19]."
By being in the position of outsideness, the spectator obtains
impartiality. According to Arendt, this impartiality is not acquired inside
the political realm, but is inherent in the position of the outsider[20].
Thus, the judgments of the spectator is different than the actions and
judgments of the actor in political realm. The judgments of the spectator
creates the very space in which the actions and actors can appear. As she
writes;
"The judgment of the spectator creates the space without which no such
objects could appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics
and the spectators, not the actors and the makers. And this critic and
spectator sits in every actor[21]."
Thus, the judging activity of the spectators create the public space.
Until now then, we have seen that, according to Arendt, there is no
rational, single and universal truth possible in politics, "since rational
truth concerns man in his singularity, it is unpolitical by nature[22]." As
plurality and opinion are the key features of the political realm, we need
to listen as much as standpoints as we can and represent them, to achieve a
validity not on objective strict ground, but on a subjective ground by
communicating. By judging (from the standpoint of the spectator), we affirm
our freedom and discover the limits of our common world.
At this point, now I would like to refer briefly to Ludwig Wittgenstein,
another important and significant philosopher of 20th century. According to
the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, which is totally differing form the
Tractatus, we cannot go beyond our forms of life, which is "given" to us,
and in this sense, there is no possibility for universal truths or grounds
(or a universal grammar as Chomsky claims) that can be taken for granted
for everybody and can cover politics "once and for all." As he writes in
Philosophical Investigations;
"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is
false?" - What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in
their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions,
but rather in form of life[23].
What Wittgenstein means by a form of life is the "underlying consensus of
linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior, assumptions, practices, traditions,
and natural propensities which humans, as social beings, share with one
another, and which is therefore presupposed in the language they use;
language is woven into that pattern of human activity and character, and
meaning is conferred on its expressions by the shared outlook and nature of
its users[24]." The form of life is the frame of reference we learn to work
within the language of our community. By learning the language, we learn
the assumptions and practices which are inseparably bound to the language.
Thus, this is the reason why explanation and justification (and validity)
can go beyond our form of life. As Wittgenstein writes, "What has to be
accepted, the given is - so one could say - forms of life[25]."
Thus, in this sense, for Wittgenstein, it is not possible to talk about a
universal truth (or perhaps even about the term truth at all). And if we
cannot talk about a truth, how are we to say what is "right" and what is
"wrong". As he states in On Certainty;
"Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? -If we
call this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to
combat theirs? […] And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there
are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings […]
I said I would 'combat' the other man,-but wouldn't I give him reams?
Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes
persuasion.[26]."
Conclusion
At this point, after presenting the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Ludwig
Wittgenstein, on the impossibility of a timeless, universal truth, a
question may be raised; do these approaches of Arendt and Wittgenstein lead
us to cultural relativism? And my answer is going to be "no, it doesn't".
As Hans Sluga claims, in On Certainty, Wittgenstein insists that every
particular belief must be seen as part of a system of beliefs which
together constitute a world-view. This does not mean that he was advocating
a careless relativism. His view is rather a form of naturalism which
assumes that forms of life, world-views, and language-games are ultimately
constrained by the nature of the world. The world teaches us that certain
games cannot be played[27].
According to Wittgenstein, propositions, which are considered absolutely
certain such as Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" or Moore's "I know for
certain that this is a hand here", cannot be taken to express metaphysical
truths, for they play a normative role in our language-games. Thus, the
conclusion is that all philosophical argumentation must come to an end, but
that the end of such argumentation is not an absolute, self-evident truth,
that it is rather a certain kind of natural human practice[28].
As it comes to Arendt, Zerilli follows Stanley Cavell's reading of the
Third Critique, that is, questioning the idea that rationality is a matter
of reaching agreement in conclusions. According to Kant, when we judge
aesthetically, the validity of our judgment does not depend on their
empirical assent. But, then, why bother exchanging views at all, if we are
not going to reach an agreement by proofs and validity? As Cavell
emphasizes, the debate lives despite the fact that there is no guarantee of
reaching an agreement in the end. The possibility of agreement is not
excluded, but the validity of an aesthetic judgment does not depend on it.
Even if we agree on the arguments of somebody of their judgment, we don't
need to agree with their conclusion.[29] If I may give an example, on a
discussion about capital punishment, I may agree with the opposition side
who supports capital punishment because the killing of the murderer gives
the victim's family relief. But although I agree with this argument, I
still can disagree with the judgment that capital punishment is right,
hence, I don't need to agree on a final conclusion to make a debate
meaningful. And finally, as opinion and debate are indispensable for Arendt
considering the public realm, not reaching to an agreement in the processes
but not in the conclusion does not take us to relativism or an
understanding of "anything goes", or makes debate pointless at all.
References:
Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future, NY: The Viking Press,
1961
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1958
Baehr, Peter, The Portable Hannah Arendt, NY: Penguin Books,
2000
Beiner, Ronald (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant's
Political Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992
Grayling, A.C, Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt
Sluga, Hans, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1996
Villa, Dana (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1969
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell
Publishing, 2009
Zerilli, Linda, We Feel Our Freedom, 2005
-----------------------
[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/#Int
[2] Villa, Dana (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.135
[3] Baehr, Peter, The Portable Hannah Arendt, NY: Penguin Books, 2000,
p.574
[4] Zerilli, Linda, We Feel Our Freedom, 2005, p.159
[5] Beiner, Ronald (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant's Political
Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p.13-14
[6] We Feel Our Freedom, p.159
[7] Ibid, p.159
[8] The Portable Hannah Arendt, p.550
[9] We Feel Our Freedom, p.162
[10] We Feel Our Freedom, p.162
[11] Ibid, p.163
[12] Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future, NY: The Viking Press, 1961,
p.223
[13] Between Past and Future, p.220-221
[14] We Feel Our Freedom, p.167-168
[15] The Portable Hannah Arendt, p.555
[16] Ibid, p.553
[17] Ibid, p.556
[18] We Feel Our Freedom, p.168
[19] Ibid, p.177
[20] The Portable Hannah Arendt, p.571
[21] Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p.63
[22] The Portable Hannah Arendt, p.559
[23] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell
Publishing, 2009, p.94e
[24] Grayling, A.C, Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001, p.97
[25] Philosophical Investigations, p.238e
[26] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969,
p.80e-81e
[27] Sluga, Hans, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1996, p.22
[28] The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, p.23
[29] We Feel Our Freedom, p.169
