Heisenberg Physics and Philosophy The Revolution In Modern Science

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY The Revolution in Modern Science

WORLD PERSPECTIVES Volumes already published I

II

APPROACHES TO GOD

Jacques Maritain

ACCENT ON FORM

Lancelot

III

SCOPE OF TOTAL ARCHITECTURE

IV

RECOVERY OF FAITH

V VI VII VIII

WORLD

Konrad Adenauer

KNOWLEDGE OF

V. Gordon Childe

MAN

Lewis

AND MATERIALISM

IX

THE ART OF LOVING

X

DYNAMICS OF FAITH

XI

MATTER, MIND AND

XII

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

THE TRANSFORMATIONS

MAN

Walter Gropius

INDIVISIBLE

SOCIETY AND

Law Whyte

Mumford

Fred Hoyle Erich

Fromm

Paul Tillich

MAN

Edmund W.

Sinnott

MYSTICISM: CHRISTIAN AND BUDDHIST Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki

XIII

XIV

MAN'S WESTERN QUEST AMERICAN HUMANISM

Denis de Rougemont

Howard Mumford Jones

XV THE MEETING OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE Martin C. D'Arcy, SJ.

XVI RICH LANDS AND POOR XVII XVIII

Gunnar Myrdal

MEANING FOR THE LIBERATION Swami Nikhilananda OF THE SPIRIT

HINDUISM

:

ITS

CAN PEOPLE LEARN TO LEARN?

Brock Chisholm

BOARD OF EDITORS

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

NIELS

BOHR

RICHARD COURANT

Hu

SHIH

ERNEST JACKH ROBERT M. MAC!VER JACQUES MARITAIN J.

ROBERT OPPENHEIMER 1. 1.

RABI

SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

ALEXANDER SACHS

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Planned and Edited

PHYSICS

by

.

Volume Niwteen

RUTH NANDA ANSHEN

AND PHILOSOPHY

The Revolution in Modern Science

BY WERNER HEISENBERG

New

York

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY Copyright

1958 by Werner Heisenberg

Printed in the United States of America

No

All rights in this book are reserved. may be used or reproduced

part of the book

any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For Brothers information address Harper in

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Library of Congress catalog card number: 58-6150

Contents

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

What This

INTRODUCTION

Northrop

I.

II.

III.

IV.

F. S. G.

Series

Means

VI.

27

THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY

30

VIII.

IX.

X. XI.

44

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE ROOTS OF ATOMIC 59

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINCE DESCARTES IN COMPARISON WITH THE NEW SITUATION IN QUANTUM THEORY

THE RELATION

OF

76

QUANTUM THEORY TO OTHER

PARTS OF NATURAL SCIENCE VII.

1

AN OLD AND A NEW TRADITION

SCIENCE V.

ix

THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY

93

110

AND COUNTERPROPOSALS TO THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM 128 THEORY

CRITICISM

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER LANGUAGE AND REALITY IN MODERN PHYSICS THE ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN THINKING

147 167

187

World Perspectives What This

It

is

the thesis of

Series

Means

Perspectives that man is in the consciousness which, in spite of his

World

process of developing a

new

apparent spiritual and moral

can eventually lift the the fear, ignorance, and isolation to this nascent consciousness, to this captivity,,

human race above and beyond which beset concept of

it

today. It

is

man born out of a universe perceived through a fresh

World Perspectives is dedicated. those Only spiritual and intellectual leaders of our epoch who have a paternity in this extension of man's horizons are invited vision of reality, that

to participate in this Series: those who are aware of the truth that beyond the divisiveness among men there exists a primor-

power since we are all bound together by a common humanity more fundamental than any unity of dogma; those who recognize that the centrifugal force which has scattered and atomized mankind must be replaced by an integrating structure and process capable of bestowing meaning and purpose on existdial unitive

ence; those who realize that science itself, the limitations of its own methodology,

man

when not inhibited by when chastened and

an indeterminate range of yet undreamed consequences that may flow from it. This Series endeavors to point to a reality of which scientific theory has revealed only one aspect. It is the commitment to this reality that lends universal intent to a scientist's most original and solitary thought. By acknowledging this frankly we shall

humbled, commits

to

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

X

restore science to the great family of

men hope

to

fulfill

human aspirations by which

themselves in the world

ing and sentient beings. For our problem ciple of differentiation

and

community is

as think-

to discover

yet relationship lucid

a prin-

enough to

to purify scientific, philosophic and all other knowljustify discursive and intuitive, by accepting their interboth edge, dependence. This is the crisis in consciousness made articulate

and

through the

crisis

in science. This

is

the

new awakening.

Each volume presents the thought and belief of its author and points to the way in which religion, philosophy, art, science, economics, politics and history may constitute that form of human activity which takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity and difficulty. Thus World Perspectives endeavors to define that ecumenical power of the mind and heart which enables man through his mysterious greatness to re-create his life.

This Series

is

committed

to

a re-examination of

all

those sides

human endeavor which

the specialist was taught to believe he could safely leave aside. It interprets present and past events impinging on human life in our growing World Age and enof

what man may

yet attain when summoned by an uninner to the quest of what is most exalted in necessity bending him. Its purpose is to offer new vistas in terms of world and visages

human development

while refusing to betray the intimate cor-

between universality and individuality, dynamics and freedom and destiny. Each author deals with the increasform,

relation

ing realization that spirit and nature are not separate and apart; that intuition and reason must regain their importance as the

means of perceiving and fusing inner being with outer reality. World Perspectives endeavors to show that the conception of wholeness, unity, organism is a higher and more concrete con-

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

XI

ception than that of matter and energy. Thus an enlarged meaning of lif e, of biology, not as it is revealed in the test tube of the

laboratory but as

it is

experienced within the organism of

life

attempted in this Series. For the principle of life consists in the tension which connects spirit with the realm of matter.

itself3 is

The element

of

life is

dominant in the very texture of nature,

life, biology, a trans-empirical science. The laws their origin beyond their mere physical manifesta-

thus rendering of life tions

have

and compel us

to consider their spiritual source. In fact,

the widening of the conceptual framework has not only served to restore order within the respective branches of knowledge, but

has also disclosed analogies in man's position regarding the analysis and synthesis of experience in apparently separated do-

mains of knowledge suggesting the possibility of an ever more embracing objective description of the meaning of life. Knowledge, it is shown in these books, no longer consists in a manipulation of man and nature as opposite forces, nor in the reduction of data to mere statistical order, but is a means of liberating

the

mankind from the

way toward

and the

of fear, pointing the goal of the rehabilitation of the human will

rebirth of faith

The works

and

power

and confidence

published also

patterns, systems

destructive

in the

human

person.

endeavor to reveal that the cry for

authorities

is

growing

less insistent as

the

grows stronger in both East and West for the recovery of a dignity, integrity and self-realization which are the inalienable

desire

rights of

man who may now guide change by means of conscious

purpose in the light of rational experience. Other vital questions explored relate to problems of international understanding as well as to problems dealing with

and the resultant tensions and antagonisms. The growing perception and responsibility of our World Age point to the

prejudice

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

xii

person and the collective person each other; that the thrall of totaliintegrate tarianism of both left and right has been shaken in the universal

new

reality that the individual

supplement and

desire to recapture the authority of truth and human totality. Mankind can finally place its trust not in a proletarian authori-

humanism, both of which have betrayed the spiritual property right of history, but in a sacramental brotherhood and in the unity of knowledge. This new

tarianism, not in a secularized

consciousness has created a widening of human horizons beyond every parochialism, and a revolution in human thought

comparable to the basic assumption, among the ancient Greeks, of the sovereignty of reason; corresponding to the great effulgeuoe^of the moral conscience articulated by the Hebrew proph-

analogous to the fundamental assertions of Christianity; or to the beginning of a new scientific era, the era of the science of dynamics, the experimental foundations of which were laid by ets;

Galileo in the Renaissance.

An important

effort of this Series

dictory meanings and

is

to re-examine the contra-

applications which are given today to such

terms as democracy, freedom, justice, love, peace, brotherhood and God. The purpose of such inquiries is to clear the way for the foundation of a genuine world history not in terms of nation or race or culture but in terms of man in relation to God, to himself, his fellow

man and the universe,

that reach beyond imFor the meaning of the World Age consists in respecting man's hopes and dreams which lead to a deeper

mediate

self-interest.

understanding of the basic values of

World

all

peoples.

planned to gain insight into the meannot only is determined by history but who also

Perspectives

is

ing of man, who determines history. History is to be understood as concerned not only with the Ufe of man on this planet but as including also

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Xlil

such cosmic influences as interpenetrate our human world. This generation is discovering that history does not conform to the social

of

optimism of modern

and that the organization the establishment of freedom and

civilization

human communities and

peace are not only intellectual achievements but spiritual and moral achievements as well, demanding a cherishing of the wholeness of

human

personality, the

"unmediated wholeness of

and thought," and constituting a never-ending challenge to man, emerging from the abyss of meaninglessness and suffering, to be renewed and replenished in the totality of his life. ec Justice itself, which has been in a state of pilgrimage and crucifixion" and now is being slowly liberated from the grip of social and political demonologies in the East as well as in the West, begins to question its own premises. The modern revolutionary movements which have challenged the sacred institutions feeling

by protecting social injustice in the name of social examined and re-evaluated. are justice In the light of this, we have no choice but to admit that the of society

unireedom against which freedom

is

measured must be retained

namely, that the aspect of truth out of which the night view appears to emerge, the darkness of our time, is as little

with

it,

man's subjective advance. Thus the two sources of man's consciousness are inseparable, not as dead but as living and complementary, an aspect of that "principle of

abandonable as

is

complementarity" through which Niels Bohr has sought to unite quantum and the wave, both of which constitute the very

the

fabric of

There

life's is

danger of

radiant energy.

mankind today a counterforce a quantitative, anonymous mass in

to the sterility culture, a

and

new, if sometimes imperceptible, spiritual sense of convergence toward world unity on the basis of the sacredness of each human person

WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Xiv

and

respect for the plurality of cultures.

There

is

a growing

awareness that equality may not be evaluated in mere numerical terms but is proportionate and analogical in its reality. For when equality

is

equated with interchangeability, individuality

negated and the human person extinguished. We stand at the brink of an age of a world life

of

presses forward to actualize

man and

nature, of time

in

new forms. The

and

space, of

which

is

human

false separation

freedom and

security,

acknowledged and we are faced with a new vision of man in his organic unity and of history offering a richness and diversity of quality and majesty of scope hitherto unprecedented. In relating the accumulated wisdom of man's spirit to the new reality of the World Age, in articulating its thought and belief, World Perspectives seeks to encourage a renaissance of hope in society and of pride in man's decision as to what his destiny will be. World Perspectives is committed to the recognition that all great changes are preceded by a vigorous intellectual reevaluation and reorganization. Our authors are aware that the sin of hybris may be avoided by showing that the creative process itself is

if by free we mean arbitrary, or unrelated For the creative process in the human mind, the developmental process in organic nature and the basic laws of the inorganic realm may be but varied expressions of a universal is

not a free activity

to cosmic law.

formative process. Thus World Perspectives hopes to show that although the present apocalyptic period is one of exceptional tensions, there

is

also

at'

work' an exceptional

movement toward

a compensating unity which refuses to violate the ultimate moral

work in the human effort must at power

at

universe, that very last

power upon which

this

way we may come

all

to

an inherent independence of and mental growth which though conditioned by cir-

understand that there spiritual

depend. In

exists

WORLD PERSPECTIVES cumstances

is

XV

never determined by circumstances. In

this

way

the great plethora of human knowledge may be correlated with an insight into the nature of human nature by being attuned to the wide

and deep range

of

human

thought and

human

ex-

perience.

In spite of the

infinite obligation of

men and in

spite of their

power, in spite of the intransigence of nationalisms, and in spite of the homelessness of moral passions rendered ineffectual by the scientific outlook, beneath the apparent turmoil and upfinite

heaval of the present, and out of the transformations of this dynamic period with the unfolding of a world consciousness, the

purpose of World Perspectives is to help quicken the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth' and interpret the significant ele3

ments of the World Age now taking shape out of the core of that undimmed continuity of the creative process which restores man to mankind while deepening and enhancing his communion with the universe.

RUTH NANDA ANSHEN

New

York, 1958

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY The Revolution in Modern Science

Introduction by F.

S. C.

Northrop

Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, The "Law School, Yale University

There

is a general awareness that contemporary physics has about an important revision in man's conception of the brought universe and his relation to it. The suggestion has been made

that this revision pierces to the basis of man's fate and freedom, affecting even his conception of his capacity to control his own destiny. In no portion of physics does this suggestion show itself more pointedly than in the principle of indeterminacy of quan-

tum mechanics. The author

book is the discoverer of this fact, usually bears his name. Hence, no one is more competent to pass judgment on what it means than he. principle. In

In

The

Physical Principles of the Quantum Heisenberg gave an exposition of the theoretical

his previous

Theory*

of this

it

book,

interpretation, experimental meaning and mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics for professional physicists. Here

and other physical theories with respect to their philosophical implications and some of their likely social consequences for the layman. More specifically, he attempts here to raise and suggest answers to three questions: (1) What do he pursues

this

the experimentally verified theories of contemporary physics affirm? (2) How do they permit or require man to think of himself in relation to his universe? (3) How is this new way of * University of Chicago

Press,

Chicago, 1930.

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY

2

thinking, which is the creation of the affect other parts of the world?

modern West, going

to

The

third of these questions is dealt with briefly by Heisenberg at the beginning and end of this inquiry. The brevity of his remarks should not lead the reader to pass lightly over their import.

As he

notes,

whether we

like

or not,

it

modern

and in part destroy traditional customs frequently assumed by native leaders of nonWestern societies, and also often by their Western advisers, that

ways are going

and

values. It

to alter

is

the problem of introducing modern scientific instruments and ways into Asia, the Middle East and Africa is merely that of giving the native people their political independence and then providing them with the funds and the practical instruments.

This

assumption overlooks several things. First, the instruments of modern science derive from its theory and require a facile

comprehension of that theory for their correct manufacture or effective use. Second, this theory in turn rests on philosophical, as well as physical, assumptions.

When

comprehended, these

and social menand at points the and caste incompatible with, family, tribally centered menand values of the native Middle Eastern or African tality Asian, people. In short, one cannot bring in the instruments of modern philosophical assumptions generate a personal tality and behavior quite different from,

physics without sooner or later introducing

mentality, and

this mentality, as

it

trained youth, upsets the old familial

its

philosophical captures the scientifically

and

tribal

moral

loyalties.

unnecessary emotional conflict and social demoralization are not to result, it is important that the youth understand what is happening to them. This means that they must see their ex-

If

perience as the coming together of two different philosophical mentalities, that of their traditional culture and that of the new

INTRODUCTION

Hence, the importance for everyone of understanding

physics.

the philosophy of the

But

3

new

physics.

may be asked, Isn't physics quite independent of philosophy? Hasn't modern physics become effective only by dropping philosophy? Clearly, Heisenberg answers both of these it

questions in the negative. Why is this the case? Newton left the impression that there were no

assumptions in

which were not necessitated by the experimental data. This occurred when he suggested that he made no hypotheses and that he had deduced his basic concepts and laws from

his physics

the experimental findings. Were this conception of the relation between the physicist's experimental observations and his theory correct, tion,

Newton's theory would never have required modificait ever have implied consequences which experi-

nor could

ment does not confirm. Being implied by the facts, it would be as indubitable and final as they are. In 1885, however, an experiment performed by Michelson and Morley revealed a fact which should not exist were the theoretical assumptions of Newton the whole truth. This made it

evident that the relation between the physicist's experimental and his theoretical assumptions is quite other than what

facts

Newton had

led many modern physicists to suppose. When, ten some years later, experiments on radiation from black bodies enforced an additional reconstruction in Newton's way of think-

ing about his subject matter, this conclusion became inescapable. Expressed positively, this means that the theory of physics is

mere description of experimental facts nor something deducible from such a description; instead, as Einstein has

neither a

emphasized, the physical scientist only arrives at his theory by method runs not from speculative means. The deduction in his facts to the assumptions of the theory

but from the assumed


4

theory to the facts and the experimental data. Consequently, theories have to be proposed speculatively and pursued deductively with respect to their many consequences so that they can be put to indirect experimental tests. In short, any theory of physics makes more physical and philosophical assumptions than the facts alone give or imply. For this reason, any theory is subject to further modification and reconstruction with the advent of

new

evidence that

results of the

is

incompatible, after the

manner

Michelson-Morley experiment, with

its

of the

basic as-

sumptions.

These assumptions, moreover, are philosophical in character. They may be ontological, i.e., referring to the subject matter of knowledge which is independent of its relation to the perceiver; or they may be epistemological, i.e., referring to the scientific

and knower to the subject matter which he knows. Einstein's special and general theories of relativity modify the philosophy of modern physics in the first of these two respects by radically altering the philosophical theory of space and time and their relation to matter. relation of the scientist as experimenter

Quantum mechanics, especially its Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy, has been notable for the change it has brought in the physicist's epistemological theory of the relation of the experimenter to the object of his scientific knowledge. Perhaps and important thesis of this book is its author's quantum mechanics has brought the concept of back into physical science. This makes quantum potentiality as theory important for ontology as for epistemology. At this point, Heisenberg's philosophy of physics has an element in the most novel

contention that

common with that It is

of Whitehead.

because of

this introduction of potentiality into the matter of subject physics, as distinct from the epistemological

INTRODUCTION

5

predicament of physicists, that Einstein objected to quantum mechanics. He expressed this objection by saying: "God does not play dice." The point of this statement is that the game of dice rests on the laws of chance, and Einstein believed that the latter

concept finds

its

scientific

logical limitations of the finite

meaning solely in the epistemoknowing niind in its relation to

the omnicomplete object of scientific knowledge and, hence, is misapplied when referred ontologically to that object itself. The object being per se all complete and in this sense omniscient, manner of God, the concept of chance or of probability

after the is

inappropriate for any scientific description of it. This book is important because it contains Heisenberg's

answer to

and

of

of

criticism

this

quantum

theory by

his principle of indeterminacy Einstein and by others. In under-

standing this answer two things must be kept in mind: ( 1 ) The aforementioned relation between the data of experimental physics

and the concepts

tween the

of

its

mechanics and

theory. (2)

The

difference be-

probability in (a) Newton's Einstein's theory of relativity and in (b) quan-

role of the concept

tum mechanics. Upon

(

1 )

,

of.

Einstein

and Heisenberg, and

rela-

mechanics and quantum mechanics, are in agreement. only with respect to (2) that they differ. Yet the reason for

tivistic

It is

Heisenberg's stein

and the quantum

from Einwhich Einstein

physicist's difference

on (2) depends in considerable part on

(

1

)

admits. (1)

imply

affirms that the experimental data of physics do not theoretical concepts. From this it follows that the object

its

knowledge is never known directly by observation or experimentation, but is only known by speculatively proposed of scientific

construction or axiomatic postulation, tested only via its deduced consequences. To indirectly theoretic

and experimentally


6

find the object of scientific to

its

knowledge we must go, therefore,

theoretical assumptions.

When we

do

this for (a)

Newton's or Einstein's mechanics

quantum mechanics, we discover that the concept of probability or chance enters into the definition of the state of

and

for (b)

a physical system, and, in this sense, into its subject matter, in quantum mechanics, but does not do so in Newton's mechanics or Einstein's theory of relativity. This undoubtedly is what Heisenberg means when he writes in this book that quantum

theory has brought the concept of potentiality back into physical science. It is also, without question, what Einstein has in mind

when he objects to quantum theory. Put more concretely, this difference between quantum mefollows:

and previous physical theories may be expressed as In Newton's and Einstein's theory, the state of any

isolated

mechanical system at a given

chanics

moment

of time

is

given

when

precisely only numbers specifying the position and momentum of each mass in the system are empirically determined at that moment of time; no numbers referring to a probability are present. In quantum mechanics the interpretation of an observation of a system is a rather complicated procedure. The

a single reading, the accuracy of discussed, or it may comprise a complicated set of data, such as the photograph of the water droplets in a cloud chamber; in any case, the result can be stated only in terms of a

observation

may

consist in

which has to be

probability distribution concerning, for instance, the position or momentum of the particles of the system. The theory then pre-

a future time. The theory is not experimentally verified when that future state arrives if merely the momentum or position numbers in a particular obdicts the probability distribution for

servation

lie

within the predicted range.

The same experiment

INTRODUCTION

J

with the same initial conditions must be repeated many times, and the values of position or momentum, which may be different in each observation, must similarly be found to be distributed according to the predicted probability distribution. In short, the crucial difference between quantum mechanics and Einstein's or

Newton's mechanics centers in the definition of a mechanical

moment of time, and this difference is that quantum mechanics introduces the concept of probability into its definition of state and the mechanics of Newton and Einstein system at any

does not.

This does not mean that probability had no place in Newton's or Einstein's mechanics. Its place was, however, solely in the theory of errors by means of which the accuracy of the Yes or

No

verification or nonconfirmation of the prediction of the theory was determined. Hence, the concept of probability and

chance was

restricted to the epistemological relation of the

what he knows; it did not enter what he knows. Thus, Einstein's dictum that "God does not play dice" was satisfied in his two theories of relativity and in Newton's mechanics. scientist in

the verification of

into the theoretical statement of

Is there

and that

any way

of deciding

of Heisenberg

between

Einstein's contention

and other quantum

answers have been given to this question.

theorists?

Some

Many

physicists

and

have argued

philosophers, emphasizing operational definitions, that, since all physical theories, even classical ones, entail human error and uncertainties, there is nothing to be decided between theorists. This, however, is (a) to of the overlook axiomatically constructed, constitutive presence theoretic definitions as well as theory-of-errors, operational definitions in scientific method and (b) to suppose that the

Einstein

and the quantum

concept of probability and the even more complex uncertainty


8

relation enter into

quantum mechanics only

definitional sense. Heisenberg

in the operational-

shows that the

latter supposition

.isjalse.

Other

scientists

and philosophers, going

treme, have argued

to the opposite ex-

that, merely because there

is

uncertainty in

predicting certain phenomena, this constitutes no argument whatever for the thesis that these phenomena are not completely

determined. This argument combines the statical problem of defining the state of a mechanical system at a given time with the dynamical or causal problem of predicting changes in the state of the system through time. But the concept of probability in

quantum theory enters only into its statics, i.e., its theoretical The reader will find it wise, therefore, to keep

definition of state.

two components, i.e., the statical theoretical definition-of-state component and the dynamic, or causal, theoretical change-of-state-through-time component. With respect to the former, the concept of probability and the attendant uncertainty enter theoretically and in principle; they do not refer merely to the operational and epistemological uncertainties and errors, arising from the finiteness of, and inaccuracies in, human behavior, that are common to any scientific theory and any distinct

these

experimentation whatsoever.

may be

asked, should the concept of probability be introduced into the theoretic definition of the state of a me-

But, why,

it

1

chanical system at any statical moment t in principle? In making such a theoretical construct by axiomatic postulation, do not

Heisenberg and quantum theoreticians generally beg the question at issue between themselves and Einstein? This book makes clear that the answer to these questions is as follows: The reason for the procedure of quantum mechanics is thesis (1) above, which Einstein himself also accepts. it

INTRODUCTION Thesis

(

1 )

is

that

we know

g

the object of scientific knowledge

only by the speculative means of axiomatic theoretic construction or postulation; Newton's suggestion that the physicist can

deduce our theoretical concepts from the experimental data being false. It follows that there is no a priori or empirical meaning for affirming that the object of scientific knowledge, or, more 1 specifically, the state of a mechanical system at a given time t ,

must be defined in a particular way. The set of theoretic

sole criterion

is,

which

assumptions concerning the subject matter of

mechanics when pursued to their deduced experimental consequences is confirmed by the experimental data?

happens that when we theoretically and in principle define the state of a mechanical system for subatomic phenomena in terms solely of numbers referring to position and

Now,

it

would have us do, and deduce the consequences for radiation from black bodies, this theoretical assumption concerning the state of a mechanical system and the subject matter of atomic physics is shown to be false by experimental evidence. The experimental facts simply are not what the

momentum,

as Einstein

theory calls for. When, however, the traditional theory is modified with the introduction of Planck's constant and the addition in principle of the second set of numbers referring to the probawill be bility that the attached position-momentum numbers

found, from which the uncertainty principle follows, the experimental data confirm the new theoretical concepts and principles.

In short, the situation in quantum mechanics with respect to experiments on black-body radiation is identical with that faced by Einstein with respect to the Michelson-Morley experiment. In

by introducing the new theoretical assumption fexphysical theory brought into accord with the facts. Thus, to assert that, notwithstanding quantum perimental both

cases, only

in principle

is


10

mechanics, the positions and

momenta

of subatomic masses are

"really" sharply located in space and time as designated by one pair of numbers only and, hence, completely deterministic causally, as

Einstein

and the aforementioned philosophers of science

would have one

do, is to affirm a theory concerning the subject matter of physical knowledge which experiments on black-body radiation have shown to be false in the sense that a deductive

experimental consequence of this theory is not confirmed. It does not follow, of course, that some new theory compatible with the foregoing experimental facts might not be discovered in

which the concept its

of probability does not enter in principle into definition of state. Professor Norbert Wiener, for example,

believes that

he has clues to the direction such a theory might have to reject a definition of state in

take. It would, however,

terms of the four space-time dimensions of Einstein's theory and would, therefore, be incompatible with Einstein's thesis on other grounds. Certainly, one cannot rule out such a possibility. Nevertheless, until such an alternative theory is presented, anyone, who does not claim to possess some a priori or private source of information concerning

what the object

of scientific

knowledge must be, has no alternative but to accept the definition of state of quantum theory and to affirm with the author of this book that it restores the concept of potentiality to the object of

modern

scientific

knowledge. Experiments on black-body

radiation require one to conclude that God plays dice. What of the status of causality and determinism in quantum mechanics? Probably the interest of the layman and the humanist

in this If this

book depends most on its answer to this question. answer is to be understood, the reader must pay par-

ticular attention to Heisenberg's description of (a) the afore-

mentioned definition of

state

by recourse

to the concept of

INTRODUCTION probability

must

also

and

1 1

(b) the Schrodinger time-equation. The reader difficult task of all, that

make sure, and this is the most

the meaning of the words "causality" and "determinism" in his mind when he asks the above question is identical with the these words have in Heisenberg's mind when he specithe answer. Otherwise, Heisenberg will be answering a different question from the one the reader is asking and a com-

meaning fies

plete misunderstanding upon the reader's part will occur. The situation is further complicated by the fact that modern

physics permits the concept of causality to have

two

different,

scientifically precise meanings, the one stronger than the other, and there is no agreement among physicists about which one of

two meanings the word "causality" is to be used to desigsome physicists and philosophers of science use the word to designate the stronger of the two meanings. There is

these

nate. Hence,

evidence, at times at least, that this

is

Professor Heisenberg*s

usage in this book. Other physicists and philosophers, including the writer of this Introduction, use the word "causality" to designate the weaker of the two meanings and the word "de-

terminism" to designate the stronger meaning.

When the former

followed, the words "causality" and "determinism" usage become synonymous. When the second usage is followed, every deterministic system is a causal system, but not every causal is

system

is

deterministic.

Great confusion has entered into previous discussion of this the questopic because frequently neither the person who asks tion nor the physicist who has answered it has been careful to

whether he is using the word specify in either question or answer "causality" in its weaker or in its stronger modern scientific meaning.

If

one asks "Does causality hold in quantum meis asking about causality

chanics?" not specifying whether one


12

its weaker sense, one then gets apparently from equally competent physicists. One answers contradictory

in

its

stronger or in

word "causality" in its stronger sense, quite answers "No." The other physicist, taking "causality"

physicist, taking the

correctly

its weaker sense, equally correctly answers "Yes." Naturally, the impression has arisen that quantum mechanics is not specific about what the answer is. Nevertheless, this impression is er-

in

The answer of quantum mechanics becomes unequivmoment one makes the question and the answer

roneous. ocal the

unambiguous by specifying which meaning

of "causality"

one

is

talking about. It is important, therefore, to

word

become

clear

about different

5

Let us begin with the possible meanings 33 of the word "cause and then common-sense layman's usage of the

"causality.'

more exact meanings in modern physics, considering the meaning in Aristotle's physics on the way. One may say "The stone hit the window and caused the glass

move to

the

to break/

between

The

3

In

thought of as a relation between the stone and the windowpane.

this use of "causality" it is

objects,

i.e.,

scientist expresses

the same thing in a different way.

He

describes the foregoing set of events in terms of the state of the

and the windowpane at the earlier time t1 when the stone and the windowpane were separated and the state of this same 2 system of two objects at the later time t when the stone and the stone

windowpane

collided. Consequently,

to think of causality as

thinks of

it

as

object or the

whereas the layman tends

a relation between

objects, the scientist

a relation between different

same system

states of the

same

of objects at different times.

why, in order to determine what quantum mechanics about says causality, one must pay attention to two things: ( 1 ) The state-function which defines the state of any physical system This

is

INTRODUCTION at

any

specific

13

t. (2) The Schrodinger time-equation which the physical system at the earlier time t1 to its at any specifiable later time t2 What Heisenberg

time

relates the state of

different state

says about

(

1 )

.

and (2) must, therefore, be read with meticulous

care. It will

help to understand what

about the relation between the

quantum mechanics

states of

a given physical

says

object,

or system of physical objects, at different times if we consider the possible properties that this relation might have. The weakest

would be that of mere temporal succession with no connection whatever and with not even a probability, necessary however small, that the specifiable initial state will be followed possible case

by a specifiable future state. Hume gives us reasons for believing that the relation between the sensed states of imin time

mediately sensed natural

phenomena

is

of this character. Cer-

tainly, as he pointed out, one does not sense any relation of necessary connection. Nor does one directly sense probability. All that sensation gives us with respect to the successive states of any

the mere relation of temporal succession. This point is of great importance. It means that one can arrive at a causal theory in any science or in common-sense

phenomenon

is

knowledge, or even at a probability theory, of the relation be-

tween the successive states of any object or system, only by speculative

means and axiomatically constructed, deductively and philosophical theory which is tested

formulated scientific

not directly against the sensed and experimental data but only indirectly by way of its deductive consequences.

A second possibility with respect to the character of the relaany physical system at different times a necessary one, but that one can know necessary connection is only by knowing the future

tion between the states of is

that the relation

what

this

is


14

The

knowledge of the future state may be obtained by waiting until it arrives or by having seen the future or final state of similar systems in the past. When such is the case, causality is teleological. Changes of the system with time are

state.

latter

either

determined by the in the later

two

states

final state

or goal of the system.

The

physical

1 an acorn in the earlier state t and an oak tree 2 state t is an example. The connection between these

system which

is

seems to be a necessary one. Acorns never change into

trees or into elephants. They change only into oaks. Yet, the given properties of this physical system in the acorn state of 1 the earlier time t , no scientist has as yet been able to deduce the properties of the oak tree which the system will have at the

maple

later

time

t

2 .

Aristotelian physics affirmed that all causal rela-

tions are teleological.

Another

possibility

object, or

any

is

that the relation between the states of

any system of

objects, at different times is

relation of necessary connection such that, given

the

a

knowledge of

of the system, assuming isolation, its future state can be deduced. Stated in more technical mathematical laninitial state

guage, this means that there exists an indirectly verified, axiomatically constructed theory whose postulates (1) specify a state-function, the independent variables of which completely define the state of the system at

any

specific instant of time,

and

(2) provide a time-equation relating the numerical empirical

values of the independent variables of this function at any earlier 1 time t to their numerical empirical values at any specific later

time

2

in such a

that by introducing the operationally denumbers into the time-equation the future t2 numbers can be deduced by merely solving the equation. When t

termined

t

1

way

set of

the case, the temporal relation between states exemplify mechanical causation. this is

is

said to

INTRODU GTION It is to

be noted that

this definition of

1

5

mechanical causality

open the question of what independent variables are required to define the state of the system at any given time. Hence,

leaves

at least

may be

two possibilities arise: (a) the concept of probability used to define the state of the system or (b) it may not

When

be so used.

(b)

is

the case

no independent

variables re-

ferring to probabilities appear in the state-function and the stronger type of mechanical causality is present. When (a) is

the case independent variables referring to probabilities, as well as to other properties such as position and momentum, appear

and only the weaker type of mechanical causation occurs. If the reader keeps these two meanings of mein the state-function

chanical causation in

mind and makes

sure which

meaning

Heisenberg referring to in any particular sentence of this book, he should be able to get its answer to the question concerning is

the status of causality in modern physics. What of determinism? Again, there is

vention this

among

word

is

to

physicists

be used.

and philosophers It is in

no agreed-upon conof science

about

how

accord with the common-sense

usage to identify it with the strongest possible causality. Let us, then, use the word "determinism" to denote only the stronger type of mechanical causation. Then I believe the careful reader of this book will get the following answer to his question: In

Newtonian, Einsteinian and quantum mechanics, mechanical, rather than teleological, causality holds. This is why quantum physics is called quantum mechanics, rather than quantum whereas causality in Newton's and Einstein's physics is of the stronger type and, hence, both mechanical and deterministic, in quantum mechanics it is of the weaker causal teleologies. But,

type and, hence, mechanical but not deterministic. From the latter fact it follows that if anywhere in this book Heisenberg

1


6

words "mechanical causality" in their stronger, deterministic meaning and the question be asked "Does mechanical causation in this stronger meaning hold in quantum uses the

mechanics?" then the answer has to be "No," even more complicated, as the reader will find, than even these introductory distinctions between the different types of causation indicate. It is to be hoped, however,

The

situation

is

that this focusing of attention upon these different meanings will enable the reader to find his way through this exceptionally important book more easily than would otherwise be the case.

These distinctions should suffice, also, to enable one to grasp the tremendous philosophical significance of the introduction of the weaker type of mechanical causation into modern physics,

which has occurred in quantum mechanics.

Its significance

con-

in reconciling the concept of objective, and in this sense ontological, potentiality of Aristotelian physics with the concept of sists

mechanical causation of modern physics. It would be an error, therefore, if the reader, from Heisenberg's emphasis upon the presence in quantum mechanics of something analogous to Aristotle's concept of potentiality, concluded that contemporary physics has taken us back to Aristotle's physics and ontology. It would be an equal error conversely to conclude, because mechanical causation in its weaker meaning still holds in quantum mechanics, that all is the same now in modern physics with respect to its causality and ontology as was the case before quantum mechanics came into being.

What has occurred is that in quantum theory contemporary man has moved on beyond the classical medieval and the modern world to a new physics and philosophy which combines consistently

some of the basic causal and ontological assumptions it be recalled, we use the word "ontologicaP*

of each. Here, let

INTRODUCTION to denote

which

any experimentally

I

J

verified concept of scientific theory

refers to the object of scientific

knowledge rather than

merely to the epistemological relation of the scientist as knower to the object which he knows. Such an experimentally verified philosophical synthesis of ontological potentiality with ontological mechanical causality, in the weaker meaning of the latter

concept, occurred when physicists found it impossible to account theoretically for the Compton effect and the results of experiment

on black-body radiation unless they extended the concept of probability from its Newtonian and Einsteinian merely epistemological, theory-of-errors role in specifying when their theory or is not experimentally confirmed to the ontological role, specified in principle in the theory's postulates, of characterizing is

the object of scientific knowledge itself. Need one wonder that Heisenberg went through the subjective emotional experiences described in this book before he

became reconciled to the necessity, imposed by both experimental and mathematical considerations, of modifying the philosophical and scientific beliefs of both medieval and modern man in so deep-going a manner. Those interested in a firsthand description of the

moments alone.

will

human

want

in one of

spirit

to read this

The courage which

it

its

most creative

book because

of this factor

make this step away from classical modern physics may

took to

the unqualified determinism of be appreciated if one recalls that even such a daring, creative allow God to play dice; spirit as Einstein balked. He could not

there could not be potentiality in the object of scientific knowledge, as the weaker form of mechanical causality in quantum

mechanics allows. Before one concludes, however, that plete

gambler and that potentiality

is

God

in

has become a com-

all objects,

certain limi-

1


8

which quantum mechanics places on the application of its weaker form of mechanical causation must be noted. To appreciate these qualifications the reader must note what this tations

book says about (1) the Compton effect, (2) Planck's constant h, and (3) the uncertainty principle which is defined in terms of Planck's constant.

This constant h

is

a number referring to the quantum of

action of any object or system of objects. This quantum, which extends atomicity from matter and electricity to light and even

very small. When the quantum numbers of the system being observed are small, as is the case with subatomic phenomena, then the uncertainty specified by the Heisenberg to energy

itself, is

uncertainty principle of the positions and momenta of the masses of the system becomes significant. Then, also, the probability numbers associated with the position-momentum numbers in the state-function become significant. When, however, the quantum numbers of the system are large, then the quantitative amount of uncertainty specified by the Heisenberg principle becomes insignificant and the probability numbers in the state-function can be neglected. Such is the case with gross common-sense objects. At this point quantum mechanics with its basically weaker type of causality gives rise, as a special case of itself, to Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics with their stronger type of causality and determinism. Consequently, for human beings considered merely as gross common-sense objects the stronger type of caus-

and, hence, determinism reigns also. Nevertheless, subatomic phenomena are scientifically significant in man. To this extent, at least, the causality governing him ality holds

is

and he embodies both mechanical fate and There are scientific reasons for believing that this

of the weaker type,

potentiality.

occurs even in heredity.

Any

reader

who wants

to pursue this

INTRODUCTION

19

W

hat Is beyond the pages of this book should turn to * by Professor Erwin Schrodinger, the physicist after whom the time-equation in quantum mechanics is named. Undoubtedly, potentiality and the weaker form of causality hold topic

Life?

human beings, particuphenomena in man that are the directly introspected human ideas and

also for countless other characteristics of larly for those cortical neural

epistemic correlates of

purposes. If the latter possibility is the case, the solution of scientific,

hand. This problem in its

a baffling

philosophical and even moral problem may be

at

How is the

mechanical causation, even weaker form, of quantum mechanics to be reconciled with is:

the tdeological causation patently present in the moral, political and legal purposes of man and in the teleological causal de-

termination of his bodily behavior, in part at least, by these purposes? In short, how is the philosophy of physics expounded in

book by Heisenberg to be reconciled with moral, political and legal science and philosophy? It may help the reader to appreciate why this book must be mastered before these larger questions can be correctly underthis

stood or effectively answered to

some

articles

which

if

very brief reference

is

made here

relate its theory of physical causation to

the wider relation between

mechanism and

humanities and the social sciences.

teleology in the

The relevant articles are

(a)

by Professors Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigdow in the journal of The Philosophy of Science for January, 1943 (b) by Doctors McCulloch and Pitts in The Bulletin of Mathematical Bio;

physics,

Volume 5,

1943, and Volume 9, 1947; and (c) Chapter World Order, edited by the

XIX of Ideological Differences and

and published by the Yale University Cambridge; Macmttlan Company, New York; 1946.

writer of this Introduction

* University

Press,


20

Press in 1949. If read after this book, (a) will arises

logical causality

as

show how

by Heisenberg here. Similarly, (b)

causality described

teleo-

a special case of the merchanical will pro-

vide a physical theory of the neurological correlates of introspected ideas, expressed in terms of the teleologically mechanical

an explanation of how ideas can have a causally significant effect on the behavior of men. Likewise, (c) will show how the ideas and purposes of moral, to the political and legal man relate, by way of (b) and (a), mechanical and of causality so theory physical potentiality

causality of (a), thereby giving

thoroughly described by Heisenberg in this book. It remains to call attention to what Professor Heisenberg says about Bohr's principle of complementarity. This principle plays

a great role in the interpretation of quantum theory by "the Copenhagen School" to which Bohr and Heisenberg belong. Some students of quantum mechanics, such as Margenau in his

book The Nature clusion that

of Physical Reality,* are inclined to the con-

quantum mechanics

requires merely

its

definition of

Schrodinger time-equation and those other of its mathematical postulates which suffice to ensure, as noted above, that Einsteinian and Newtonian mechanics corne out of quanstate,

its

tum mechanics

as

one of

its

special cases.

According to the

complementarity arises from the failure to keep the stronger and weaker form of mechanical causality continuously in mind, with the resultant attribution of latter thesis, the principle of

the stronger form to those portions of only the weaker form is involved.

quantum mechanics where

When

this

happens, the

principle of complementarity has to be introduced to avoid * McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1950, pp. 418-422. See Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Macmillan, York, 1947, Chapter XL

also,

New

INTRODUCTION

21

contradiction. If, however, one avoids the foregoing practice, the principle of complementarity becomes, if not unnecessary, at least of a form such that one avoids the danger, noted by

* and appreciated by Bohr, of giving pseudo solutions to physical and philosophical problems by playing fast and loose with the law of contradiction, in the name of the principle

Margenau

of complementarity.

By

its

particle-picture

common-sense

had

to be put on both the language of atomic physics and

use the qualifications that

common-sense wave-picture language were brought together. But once having formulated the result with axiomatically its

constructed mathematical exactitude, any further use of it is merely a superficial convenience when, leaving aside the exact

and

essential

mathematical assumptions of quantum mechanics,

one indulges in the common-sense language and images of waves and particles. It has been necessary to go into the different interpretations of the principle of complementarity in order to enable the reader to pass an informed judgment concerning what Heisen-

book about the common-sense and Cartesian concepts of material and mental substances. This is the case because his conclusion concerning Descartes results from his

berg says in

this

generalization of the principle of complementarity beyond physics, first, to the relation between common-sense biological concepts

and mathematical

physical concepts and, second, to the result of this generalization is that

body-mind problem. The

the Cartesian theory of mental substances comes off very much better in this book, as does the concept of substance generally,

the case in any other book on the philosophy of contemporary physics which this writer knows.

than *

is

Margenau ,

op.

cit. f

p. 422.


22

for

Whitehead, science

the concept of

and

example,

concluded

that

contemporary

for, and have no need of, such as Lord Russell monists Neutral substance.

and philosophy

logical positivists

find

no place

such as Professor Carnap agree.

Generally speaking, Heisenberg argues that there is no compelling reason to throw away any of the common-sense after one concepts of either biology or mathematical physics,

knows the

refined concepts that lead to the complete clarifica-

tion of the problems in atomic physics. Because the latter clarification is complete, it is relevant only to a very limited range

of problems within science and cannot enable us to avoid using many concepts at other places that would not stand critical analysis of the type carried out in

quantum

theory. Since the

and it ideal of complete clarification cannot be achieved important that we should not be deceived about this point one

may

is

indulge in the usage of common-sense concepts if it is sufficient care and caution. In this respect, certainly,

done with

complementarity is a very useful scientific concept. In any event, two things seem clear and make what Heisenberg says on these matters exceedingly important. First, the principle of complementarity and the present validity of the Cartesian and common-sense concepts of body and mind stand and fall together. Second, it may be that both these notions are

now be, or must thrown away. Even so, in the case of the theory of the stepladder will have to remain until by its use

merely convenient stepladders which should eventually be,

mind

we

at least,

more linguistically exact and empirically satisfactory theory that will permit us to throw the Cartesian language away. To be sure, piecemeal theories of mind which do find the

not appeal to the notion of substance now exist, but none of their authors, unless it be Whitehead, has shown how the Ian-

INTRODUCTION

23

gauge of this piecemeal theory can be brought into commensurate and compatible relationship with the scientific

human

language of the other

facts of

therefore, that anyone,

whether he be a professional physicist or who may think he knows better

knowledge.

It is likely,

philosopher or the lay reader,

than Heisenberg on these important matters, runs the grave risk of supposing he has a scientific theory of mind in its relation to body,

when

in fact this

is

not the case.

we have

directed attention, with but two exto what the ceptions, philosophy of contemporary physics has to about the say object of scientific knowledge qua object, inde-

Up

to this point

pendent of its relation to the scientist as knower. In short, we have been concerned with its ontology. This philosophy also has its

epistemological component. This

The

component

falls

into three

between (a) the

directly observed data parts: (1) given to the physicist as inductive knower in his observations or his experiments and (b) the speculatively proposed, indirectly

relation

verified, axiomatically constructed postulates of his theory.

latter

term (b) defines the objects of

scientific

The

knowledge qua

object and, hence, gives the ontology. The relation between (a) and (b) defines one factor in the epistemology. (2) The role of

the concept of probability in the theory of errors, by means of physicist defines the criterion for judging how far his

which the

experimental findings can depart, due to errors of human experimentation, from the deduced consequences of the postulates of the theory

and

still

be regarded as confirming the theory. (3 )

The effect of the experiment being performed being known. What Heisenberg says about the

upon the object first and second

of these three epistemological factors in contemporary physics has already been emphasized in this Introduction. It remains to direct the reader's attention to

what he

says about item (3 )

.


24

In modern physical theory, previous to quantum mechanics, (3) played no role whatever. Hence, the epistemology of modern physics was then completely specified by ( 1 ) and ( 2 )

In quantum mechanics, however, (3) (as well as (1) and (2)) becomes very important. The very act of observing alters the object being observed when its quantum numbers are alone.

small.

From this fact Heisenberg draws a very important conclusion concerning the relation between the object, the observing physicist, and the rest of the universe. This conclusion can be directed to the following key points. recalled that in some of the definitions of mechanical

appreciated It

may be

if

attention

is

causality given earlier in this Introduction, the qualifying

words

were added; elsewhere it was implicit. This qualifying condition can be satisfied in principle in Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics, and also in practice by mak"for

ing

an

isolated system"

more and more

careful observations

and refinements in

one's experimental instruments. The introduction of the concept of probability into the definition of state of the object of scientific

knowledge in quantum mechanics rules out, however, in and not merely in practice due to the imperfections of

principle,

human

observation

and instruments, the

tion that the object of the physicist's

satisfying of the condi-

knowledge

is

an

isolated

system. Heisenberg shows also that the including of the experimental apparatus and even of the eye of the observing scientist in the physical system which is the object of the knower's knowl-

quantum mechanics be correct, the objects have to be defined in principle by recourse to

edge does not help, states of all

since, if

the concept of probability. Consequently, only if the whole universe is included in the object of scientific knowledge can the qualifying condition "for

an

isolated system"

be

satisfied for

INTRODUCTION

25

even the weaker form of mechanical causation. Clearly, the philosophy of contemporary physics is shown by this book to be as novel in its epistemology as it is in its ontology. Indeed, it is

from the

originality of

of potentiality

its

that the novelty of

the consistent unification

ontology

and mechanical

causality in

its

weaker form

arises.

its

epistemology Unquestionably, one other thing

is

clear.

An

analysis of the

modern

physics with to what about the human of they say respect object knowledge and its relation to the human knower exhibits a very rich and specific experimentally verified theories of

complex ontological and epistemological philosophy which is an essential part of the scientific theory and method itself. Hence, physics neutral.

is

neither epistemologically nor ontologically

Deny any one of the epistemological assumptions of the and there

no scientific method for testing whether what the theory says about the physical object is true, in the sense of being empirically confirmed. Deny any one of the ontological assumptions and there is not enough content in the

physicist's theory

is

axiomatically constructed mathematical postulates of the physicist's theory to permit the deduction of the experimental facts

introduced to predict, co-ordinate consistently and explain. Hence, to the extent that experimental physicists assure

which

it is

us that their theory of contemporary physics is indirectly and experimentally verified, they ipso facto assure us that its rich

and complex

ontological

and epistemological philosophy

is

verified also.

When

such empirically verified philosophy of the true in the natural sciences is identified with the criterion of the good and the just in the humanities and the social sciences, one has natural-law ethics and jurisprudence. In other words, one has a scientifically

meaningful cognitive criterion and method for


26

judging both the verbal, personal and social norms of the positive law and the living ethos embodied in the customs, habits

and

traditional cultural institutions of the de facto peoples cultures of the world. It is the coming together of this

and

new

philosophy of physics with the respective philosophies of culture of mankind that is the major event in today's and tomorrow's

At this point, the philosophy of physics in this book and important reference to the social consequences of physics

world. its

come together. The chapters

of this

book have been read as Gifford Lectures

at the University of St. Andrews during the winter term 1955 1956. According to the will of their founder the Gifford Lectures

should "freely discuss all questions about man's conceptions of God or the Infinite, their origin, nature, and truth, whether he

can have any such conceptions, whether God is under any or what limitations and so on." The lectures of Heisenberg do not attempt to reach these most general and most difficult problems. But they try to go far beyond the limited scope of a special science into the wide field of those general human problems that have been raised by the enormous recent development and the far-reaching practical applications of natural science.

I.

An Old and

WHEN

a

New Tradition

one speaks today of modern physics, the

first

thought

of atomic weapons. Everybody realizes the enormous influence of these weapons on the political structure of our present world is

and

is

one?

When the world has adjusted itself in its political structure

willing to admit that the influence of physics on the general situation is greater than it ever has been before. But is the political aspect of modern physics really the most important to the

new

influence of

technical possibilities,

modern

what then

will

remain of the

physics?

To

answer these questions, one has to remember that every it the spirit by which it has been created. Since nation and every every political group has to be interested in the tool carries with

new weapons

in some way irrespective of the location and of the cultural tradition of this group, the spirit of modern physics will penetrate into the minds of many people and will connect itself

ways with the older traditions. What will be the outcome of this impact of a special branch of modern science on different powerful old traditions? In those parts of the world in which modern science has been developed the primary interest has been directed for a long time toward practical activity, industry and engineering combined with a rational analysis of in different

27


28 the outer

and inner conditions for such

activity.

Such people

will

new

ideas since they have had time for a slow and gradual adjustment to the modern scientific methods of thinking. In other parts of the world these find

it

ideas

rather easy to cope with the

would be confronted with the

of

modern

reality,

physics

space and

and philosophical true that the results

religious

foundations of the native culture. Since

it is

do touch such fundamental concepts as

time, the confrontation

may

lead to entirely

new developments which cannot yet be foreseen. One characteristic feature of this meeting between modern science and the older methods of thinking will be its complete internationality. In this exchange of thoughts the one side, the old tradition, will

be different in the different parts of the world, but the other side will be the same everywhere and therefore the results of this

exchange

will

be spread over

all

areas in which the discussions

take place.

For such reasons

may

it

discuss these ideas of

not be an unimportant task to try to physics in a not too technical

modern

language, to study their philosophical consequences, and to pare them with some of the older traditions.

The

best

way

may be by a

to enter into the

com-

problems of modern physics

historical description of the

development of quantum quantum theory is only a small sector of atomic physics and atomic physics again is only a very small theory. It is true that

sector of

modern

science. Still

it is

in

quantum theory

that the

most fundamental changes with respect to the concept of reality have taken place, and in quantum theory in its final form the

new ideas of atomic physics are concentrated and crystallized. The enormous and extremely complicated experimental equipment needed

for research in nuclear physics shows another very impressive aspect of this part of modern science. But with regard

AN OLD AND A NEW TRADITION

29

to the experimental technique nuclear physics represents the ex-

treme extension of a method of research which has determined the growth of modern science ever since Huyghens or Volta or Faraday. In a similar sense the discouraging mathematical complication of some parts of quantum theory may be said to represent the extreme consequence of the methods of Newton or

Gauss or Maxwell. But the change in the concept of reality manifesting itself in quantum theory is not simply a continuation of the past; it seems to be a real break in the structure of modern science. Therefore, the first of the following chapters will be devoted to the study of the historical development of quantum theory.

II.

The

THE

History of

origin of

Quantum Theory

quantum theory

is

connected with a well-known

phenomenon, which did not belong to the central parts of atomic physics. Any piece of matter when it is heated starts to glow, gets red hot and white hot at higher temperatures. The color does not depend much on the surface of the material, and

body it depends solely on the temperature. Thereemitted by such a black body at high temthe radiation fore, for a black

peratures

is

a suitable object for physical research;

it is

a simple

phenomenon that should find a simple explanation in terms of the known laws for radiation and heat. The attempt made at the end of the nineteenth century by Lord Rayleigh and Jeans failed, however, and revealed serious difficulties. It would not be possible to describe these difficulties here in simple terms. It must be

sufficient to state that the application of the

not lead to sensible

known laws did

When

Planck, in 1895, entered this line of research he tried to turn the problem from radiation to results.

the radiating atom. This turning did not remove any of the difficulties inherent in the problem, but it simplified the interpretation of the empirical facts. It was just at this time, during the summer of 1900, that Curlbaum and Rubens in Berlin

had made very accurate new measurements 30

of the spectrum of

THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY heat radiation.

When

Planck heard of these

results

31

he

tried to

represent them by simple mathematical formulas which looked plausible from his research on the general connection between heat and radiation. One day Planck and Rubens met for tea in Planck's home and compared Rubens' latest results with a

new formula

suggested by Planck. The comparison showed a complete agreement. This was the discovery of Planck's law of heat radiation.

was

same time the beginning of intense theoretical What was the correct physical interpretation of the new formula? Since Planck could, from his earlier work, translate his formula easily into a statement about the radiating atom (the so-called oscillator), he must soon have found that It

work

his

at the

for Planck.

formula looked as

quanta of energy

known

the oscillator could only contain discrete a result that was so different from anything if

in classical physics that he certainly must have refused it in the beginning. But in a period of most intensive

to believe

work during the summer of 1900 he finally convinced himself that there was no way of escaping from this conclusion. It was told by Planck's son that his father spoke to him about his new ideas on a long walk through the Grunewald, the wood in the suburbs of Berlin. On this walk he explained that he felt he had of the first rank, comparable perhaps possibly made a discovery of Newton. So Planck must have realized discoveries the to only

had touched the foundations of our and that these foundations would one day

at this time that his formula

description of nature,

move from their traditional new and as yet unknown position of

start to

present location toward a

stability. Planck, who was conservative in his whole outlook, did not like this consequence at all, but he published his quantum hypothesis in December of 1900.


32

The

idea that energy could be emitted or absorbed only in quanta was so new that it could not be fitted into

discrete energy

the traditional framework of physics. An attempt by Planck to reconcile his new hypothesis with the older laws of radiation failed in the essential points. It took five years until the next step could be made in the new direction.

This time

was the young Albert Einstein, a revolutionary genius among the physicists, who was not afraid to go further away from the old concepts. There were two problems in which it

he could make use of the

new

ideas.

One was

the so-called

the emission of electrons from metals under

photoelectric effect, the influence of light.

The

experiments, especially those of

Lenard, had shown that the energy of the emitted electrons did not depend on the intensity of the light, but only on its color or, more precisely, on its frequency. This could not be understood

on the

basis of the traditional theory of radiation. Einstein

could

explain the observations by interpreting Planck's hypothesis as saying that light consists of quanta of energy traveling through space. The energy of one light quantum should, in agreement

with Planck's assumptions, be equal to the frequency of the light multiplied by Planck's constant. The other problem was the specific heat of solid bodies.

The

traditional theory led to values for the specific heat which fitted the observations at higher temperatures but disagreed with them

at

low

ones.

understand

Again Einstein was able to show that one could

this

behavior by applying the quantum hypothesis atoms in the solid body. These

to the elastic vibrations of the

two results marked a very important advance, since they revealed the presence of Planck's quantum of action as his constant is called among the physicists in several phenomena, which had nothing immediately to do with heat radiation. They

THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY

33

same time the deeply revolutionary character of hypothesis, since the first of them led to a description of completely different from the traditional wave picture.

revealed at the

the

new

light

Light could either be interpreted as consisting of electromagnetic waves, according to Maxwell's theory, or as consisting of light

energy packets traveling through space with high it be both? Einstein knew, of course, that the velocity. quanta,

But could

well-known phenomena of diffraction and interference can be explained only on the basis of the wave picture. He was not able to dispute the complete contradiction between this wave picture and the idea of the light quanta; nor did he even attempt to

remove the inconsistency

of this interpretation.

the contradiction as something which stood only much later.

He

simply took

would probably be under-

In the meantime the experiments of Becquerel, Curie and Rutherford had led to some clarification concerning the structure of the atom. In 191 1 Rutherford's observations on the inter-

action of o-rays penetrating through matter resulted in his

famous atomic model. The atom is pictured as consisting of a nucleus, which is positively charged and contains nearly the total mass of the atom, and electrons, which circle around the nucleus like the planets circle around the sun. The chemical bond between atoms of different elements is explained as an interaction between the outer electrons of the neighboring atoms; it has not directly to do with the atomic nucleus. The nucleus determines the chemical behavior of the atom through its charge which in turn this

fixes

the

model

of

number of electrons in the neutral atom. Initially the atom could not explain the most characteristic

its enormous stability. No planetary system of Newton's mechanics would ever go back the laws following to its original configuration after a collision with another such

feature of the atom,


34 system. still

But an atom of the element carbon, for instance,

remain a carbon atom

after

any

will

collision or interaction in

chemical binding.

Bohr explanation for this unusual stability was given by of Planck's in 1913, through the application quantum hyIf the atom can its only by discrete energy change pothesis.

The

mean

atom can exist only in discrete stationary states, the lowest of which is the normal state of the atom. Therefore, after any kind of interaction the atom energy quanta, this must

will finally always fall

By

back into

this application of

that the

its

normal

quantum theory

state.

to the atomic model,

Bohr could not only explain the stability of the atom but also, in some simple cases, give a theoretical interpretation of the line spectra emitted by the atoms after the excitation through electric discharge or heat. His theory rested upon a combination of

mechanics for the motion of the electrons with quantum conditions, which were imposed upon the classical motions for classical

defining the discrete stationary states of the system.

A consistent

mathematical formulation for those conditions was later given by Sommerfeld. Bohr was well aware of the fact that the quan-

tum

conditions spoil in some way the consistency of Newtonian mechanics. In the simple case of the hydrogen atom one could

from Bohr's theory the frequencies of the light emitted the atom, and the agreement with the observations was perby fect. Yet these frequencies were different from the orbital calculate

frequencies and their harmonics of the electrons circling around the nucleus, and this fact showed at once that the theory was still full of contradictions.

But

it

contained an essential part of the

truth. It did explain qualitatively the chemical behavior of the

atoms and

their line spectra; the existence of the discrete station-


35

ary states was verified by the experiments of Franck and Hertz, Stern and Gerlach.

Bohr's theory had opened up a new line of research. The great amount of experimental material collected by spectroscopy

through several decades was now available for information about the strange quantum laws governing the motions of the electrons in the atom.

The many experiments

be used for the same purpose.

was from

It

of chemistry could

this

time on that the

physicists learned to ask the right questions; and asking the right question is frequently more than halfway to the solution of the

problem.

What were

these questions? Practically all of

them had

to

do

with the strange apparent contradictions between the results of different experiments. How could it be that the same radiation that produces interference patterns, and therefore must consist of waves, also produces the photoelectric effect, and therefore

must

consist of

moving

particles?

How

could

it

be that the

fre-

atom does not quency show up in the frequency of the emitted radiation? Does this mean that there is no orbital motion? But if the idea of orbital motion should in incorrect, what happens to the electrons inside the atom? One can see the electrons move through a cloud chamber, and sometimes they are knocked out of an atom; why should they not also move within the atom? It is true that they of the orbital motion of the electron in the

might be at

rest in the

normal

state of the

lowest energy. But many the electronic shell has an angular there are

momentum.

where

There the elec-

could add a number of found that the attempt one and again Again

trons cannot possibly be at rest. similar examples.

atom, the state of

states of higher energy,

One

to describe atomic events in the traditional terms of physics led to contradictions.


36

Gradually, during the early twenties, the physicists

became

accustomed to these difficulties, they acquired a certain

vague knowledge about where trouble would occur, and they learned to avoid contradictions. They knew which description of an atomic event would be the correct one for the special experiment discussion. This was not sufficient to form a consistent

under

general picture of what happens in a quantum process, but it changed the minds of the physicists in such a way that they

somehow

got into the spirit of

quantum

theory. Therefore, even

some time before one had a consistent formulation of quantum theory one knew more or less what would be the result of any experiment.

One frequently discussed what one called ideal experiments. Such experiments were designed to answer a very critical question irrespective of whether or not they could actually be carried out. Of course it was important that it should be possible in principle to carry out the experiment, but the technique might be extremely complicated. These ideal experiments could be

very useful in clarifying certain problems. If there was no agreement among the physicists about the result of such an ideal ex-

was frequently possible to find a similar but simpler that could be carried out, so that the experimental experiment answer contributed essentially to the clarification of quantum periment,

it

theory.

The strangest experience of those years was that the paradoxes quantum theory did not disappear during this process of clarification; on the contrary, they became even more marked and more exciting. There was, for instance, the experiment of of

Compton on the scattering of X-rays. From earlier experiments on the interference of scattered light there could be no doubt that scattering takes place essentially in the following way:

The


37

incident light wave makes an electron in the beam vibrate in the frequency of the wave; the oscillating electron then emits a

wave with the same frequency and thereby produces Compton found in 1923 that the was different from the frequency

spherical

the scattered light. However, frequency of scattered X-rays

change of frequency could be forunderstood mally by assuming that scattering is to be described as collision of a light quantum with an electron. The energy of of the incident X-ray. This

the light

quantum

is

changed during the

collision;

and

since the

frequency times Planck's constant should be the energy of the light quantum, the frequency also should be changed. But

what happens in

this interpretation of the light

wave? The two

experiments light and the other on the change of frequency of the scattered light seemed to contradict each other without any possibility of compromise.

one on the interference of scattered

By

this

time

many

physicists

were convinced that these ap-

parent contradictions belonged to the intrinsic structure of atomic physics. Therefore, in 1924 de Broglie in France tried to extend the dualism between wave description and particle description to the elementary particles of matter, primarily to the electrons. He showed that a certain matter wave could "corre-

spond" to a moving

electron, just as

a

light

wave corresponds to at the time what the

a moving light quantum. It was not clear word "correspond" meant in this connection. But de

Broglie Bohr's in condition the that theory should quantum suggested wave be interpreted as a statement about the matter waves.

A

for geometrical reasons only be circling around a nucleus can the and a stationary wave; perimeter of the orbit must be an

wave length. In this way de Broglie's idea connected the quantum condition, which always had been a for-

integer multiple of the


38

eign element in the mechanics of the electrons, with the dualism

between waves and

particles.

In Bohr's theory the discrepancy between the calculated

and the frequency of the emitted radiation had to be interpreted as a limitation to the concept of the electronic orbit. This concept had been somewhat

orbital frequency of the electrons

doubtful from the beginning. For the higher orbits, however, the move at a large distance from the nucleus just

electrons should

do when one sees them moving through a cloud chamThere one should speak about electronic orbits. It was

as they ber.

therefore very satisfactory that for these higher orbits the frequencies of the emitted radiation approach the orbital frequency

and its higher harmonics. Also Bohr had already suggested

in his

early papers that the intensities of the emitted spectral lines approach the intensities of the corresponding harmonics. This

principle of correspondence had proved very useful for the approximative calculation of the intensities of spectral lines. In this way one had the impression that Bohr's theory gave a qualitative

but not a quantitative description of what happens inside the atom; that some new feature of the behavior of matter was qualitatively expressed by the quantum conditions, which in turn were connected with the dualism between waves and particles.

The finally

precise mathematical formulation of quantum theory emerged from two different developments. The one

from Bohr's principle of correspondence. One had to give the up concept of the electronic orbit but still had to maintain it in the limit of high quantum numbers, i.e., for the large orbits.

started

by means of its frea and of the electronic orbit; intensities, gives quencies picture it what the a call Fourier expansion mathematicians represents In

this latter case the emitted radiation,


39

The idea suggested itself that one should write down the mechanical laws not as equations for the positions and velocities of the electrons but as equations for the frequencies of the orbit.

and amplitudes of their Fourier expansion. Starting from such equations and changing them very little one could hope to come to relations for those quantities which correspond to the frequencies and intensities of the emitted radiation, even for the small orbits and the ground state of the atom. This plan could actually be carried out; in the summer of 1925 it led to a mathematical formalism called matrix mechanics or, more generally,

quantum mechanics. The equations

of

motion in

Newtonian mechanics were replaced by similar equations between matrices; it was a strange experience to find that many of the old results of Newtonian mechanics, like conservation of energy,

etc.,

could be derived also in the

new

scheme. Later the

investigations of Born, Jordan and Dirac showed that the matrices representing position and momentum of the electron do not commute. This latter fact demonstrated clearly the essential

difference between

quantum mechanics and

classical

me-

chanics.

The

other development followed de Broglie's idea of matter set up a wave equation for de around the nucleus. Early in 1926 he waves stationary

waves. Schrodinger tried to Broglie's

succeeded in deriving the energy values of the stationary

hydrogen atom as "Eigenvalues" of and could give a more general prescription of the

his

states

wave equation

for transforming a

equations of motion into a corresponding given wave equation in a space of many dimensions. Later he was able to prove that his formalism of wave mechanics was mathematiset of classical

cally equivalent to the earlier

Thus one

finally

had a

formalism of quantum mechanics.

consistent mathematical formalism,


40

which could be defined in two equivalent ways starting either from relations between matrices or from wave equations. This formalism gave the correct energy values for the hydrogen atom; it took less than one year to show that it was also successful for

atom and the more complicated problems of the what sense did the new formalism describe atom? The paradoxes of the dualism between wave picture

the helium

heavier atoms. But in the

and particle picture were not solved; they in the mathematical scheme.

A of

were hidden somehow

and very interesting step toward a real understanding quantum theory was taken by Bohr, Kramers and Slater in first

1924. These authors tried to solve the apparent contradiction between the wave picture and the particle picture by the concept of the probability wave. The electromagnetic waves were interpreted not as "real" waves but as probability waves, the in-

which determines in every point the probability for the absorption (or induced emission) of a light quantum by an atom at this point. This idea led to the conclusion that the laws

tensity of

and momentum need not be true for the single event, that they are only statistical laws and are true only in the statistical average. This conclusion was not correct, however, and the connections between the wave aspect and the particle aspect of radiation were still more complicated. But the paper of Bohr, Kramers and Slater revealed one esof conservation of energy

sential feature of the correct interpretation of

quantum

theory.

This concept of the probability wave was something entirely new in theoretical physics since Newton. Probability in mathematics or in statistical mechanics

means a statement about our degree

of knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we do not know the fine details of the motion of our hands which de-

termine the

fall

of the dice

and therefore we say that the proba-


4!

throwing a special number is just one in six. The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater, however, meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something. It was a bility for

quantitative version of the old concept of "potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a

strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility

and reality.

Later

was

when

fixed,

the mathematical framework of

Born took up

quantum theory wave and

this idea of the probability

gave a clear definition of the mathematical quantity in the formalism, which was to be interpreted as the probability wave. It was not a three-dimensional wave like elastic or radio waves, but a wave in the many-dimensional configuration space, and therefore a rather abstract mathematical quantity.

Even at this time, in the summer of 1926, it was not clear in every case how the mathematical formalism should be used to describe a given experimental situation. One knew how to describe the stationary states of an atom, but one did not know

how

much

simpler event as for instance an electron moving through a cloud chamber. When Schrodinger in that summer had shown that his formalto describe a

ism of wave mechanics was mathematically equivalent to quantum mechanics he tried for some time to abandon the idea of

quanta and "quantum jumps" altogether and to replace the electrons in the atoms simply by his three-dimensional matter

He was

inspired to this attempt by his result, that the energy levels of the hydrogen atom in his theory seemed to be simply the eigenfrequencies of the stationary matter waves.

waves.

was a mistake to call them energies; frequencies. But in the discussions which took

Therefore, he thought

they were

just

it


42

autumn of 1926 in Copenhagen between Bohr and Schrodinger and the Copenhagen group of physicists it soon became apparent that such an interpretation would not even be

place in the

sufficient to explain Planck's

formula of heat radiation.

During the months following these discussions an intensive study of all questions concerning the interpretation of quantum theory in Copenhagen finally led to a complete and, as many it physicists believe, satisfactory clarification of the situation. But

was not a solution which one could easily accept. I remember discussions with Bohr which went through many hours till very late at night and ended almost in despair; and when at the end of the discussion I went alone for a walk in the neighboring park again and again the question: Can nature be as it seemed to us in these atomic experiabsurd as possibly ments? I repeated to myself

The final solution was approached in two different ways. The one was a turning around of the question. Instead of asking: How can one in the known mathematical scheme express a given experimental situation? the other question was put: Is it true, perhaps, that only such experimental situations can arise in nature as can be expressed in the mathematical formalism? The

assumption that

this

was

use of those concepts that

actually true led to limitations in the

had been the

basis of classical physics

Newton. One could speak of the position and of the an electron as in Newtonian mechanics and one could observe and measure these quantities. But one could not since

velocity of

both quantities simultaneously with an arbitrarily high accuracy. Actually the product of these two inaccuracies turned fix

out to be not

less

than Planck's constant divided by the mass of

the particle. Similar relations could be formulated for other experimental situations. They are usually called relations of un-

THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY certainty or principle of indeterminacy. One the old concepts fit nature only inaccurately.

The

43

had learned that

of approach was Bohr's concept of complementarity. Schrodinger had described the atom as a system not of a nucleus and electrons but of a nucleus and matter waves.

other

way

This picture of the matter waves certainly also contained an

ele-

ment of truth. Bohr considered the two pictures particle picand wave picture as two complementary descriptions of the same reality. Any of these descriptions can be only partially true, there must be limitations to the use of the particle concept as well as of the wave concept, else one could not avoid contradictions. If one takes into account those limitations which can be

ture

expressed by the uncertainty relations, the contradictions disappear.

1927 one has had a consistent quantum theory, which is frequently called the "Copenhagen interpretation." This interpretation received its crucial test in the autumn of 1927 at the Solvay conference in Brussels. Those experiments which had always led to the worst In

this

way

since the spring of

interpretation of

paradoxes were again and again discussed in all details, especially by Einstein. New ideal experiments were invented to

any possible inconsistency of the theory, but the theory was to be consistent and seemed to fit the experiments as far as one could see. The details of this Copenhagen interpretation will be the subject of the next chapter. It should be emphasized at this point that it has taken more than a quarter of a century to get from the first idea of the existence of energy quanta to a real understanding of the quantum theoretical laws. This indicates the great change that had to take place in the fundamental concepts concerning reality before one could understand the new situatrace

shown

tion.

III.

The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory

THE

Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory starts from a paradox. Any experiment in physics, whether it refers to the phenomena of daily life or to atomic events, is to be described in the terms of classical physics.

The

concepts of classical

physics form the language by which we describe the arrangement of our experiments and state the results. We cannot and

should not replace these concepts by any others. Still the application of these concepts is limited by the relations of uncertainty.

We

must keep

in

mind

this limited

range of applicabut we cannot

bility of the classical concepts while using them,

and should not try to improve them. For a better understanding of

this

paradox

it is

pare the procedure for the theoretical interpretation experiment in classical physics and in quantum theory. In ton's mechanics, for instance,

we may

start

comof an

useful to

New-

by measuring the

position velocity of the planet whose motion we are to The result of the observation is translated into going study.

and the

mathematics by deriving numbers for the co-ordinates and the momenta of the planet from the observation. Then the equations 44

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY of motion are used to derive

and momenta

from these values

45

of the co-ordinates

a given time the values of these co-ordinates or other any properties of the system at a later time, and in this way the astronomer can predict the properties of the system at a later time.

at

He

eclipse of the

can, for instance, predict the exact time for

an

moon.

In quantum theory the procedure is slightly different. We could for instance be interested in the motion of an electron through a cloud chamber and could determine by some kind of observation the initial position and velocity of the electron. But determination will not be accurate; it will at least contain the inaccuracies following from the uncertainty relations and this

will probably contain still larger errors due to the difficulty of the experiment. It is the first of these inaccuracies which allows us to translate the result of the observation into the mathe-

A

matical scheme of quantum theory. probability function is written down which represents the experimental situation at the

time of the measurement, including even the possible errors of the measurement.

This probability function represents a mixture of two things, partly a fact and partly our knowledge of a fact. It represents a assigns at the initial time the probability unity to the initial situation: the electron (i.e., complete certainty) moving with the observed velocity at the observed position;

fact in so far as

it

"observed" means observed within the accuracy of the experiIt represents our knowledge in so far as another observer

ment.

could perhaps know the position of the electron more accurately. The error in the experiment does at least to some extent not but a deficiency in our represent a property of the electron

knowledge of the

electron. Also this deficiency of

expressed in the probability function.

knowledge

is


46 In

classical physics

one should in a careful investigation also As a result one would get

consider the error of the observation.

a probability distribution for the initial values of the co-ordinates and velocities and therefore something very similar to the probability function in quantum mechanics. Only the necessary uncertainty

due to the uncertainty

relations

is

lacking in classical

physics.

When

quantum theory has been time from the observation, one can from the laws of quantum theory calculate the probability functhe probability function in

determined at the

initial

any later time and can thereby determine the probability a measurement giving a specified value of the measured

tion at for

We

can, for instance,, predict the probability for findquantity. the electron at a later time at a given point in the cloud ing

chamber.

It

should be emphasized, however, that the probability itself represent a course of events in the

function does not in

It represents a tendency for events and our of events. The probability function can be connected knowledge

course of time.

with reality only

if

one

essential condition

is fulfilled:

if

a

new

made to determine a certain property of the then does the probability function allow us to system. Only measurement

is

calculate the probable result of the new measurement. The result of the measurement again will be stated in terms of classical physics.

Therefore, the theoretical interpretation of an experiment requires three distinct steps: (1) the translation of the initial experimental situation into a probability function; (2) the fol-

lowing up of this function in the course of time; (3) the stateof a new measurement to be made of the system, the result

ment of

which can then be calculated from the probability function.

For the

first

step the fulfillment of the uncertainty relations

is

a

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY

47

necessary condition. The second step cannot be described in terms of the classical concepts; there is no description of what

happens to the system between the initial observation and the next measurement. It is only in the third step that we change over again from the "possible" to the "actual." illustrate these three steps in a simple ideal experiment. has been said that the atom consists of a nucleus and electrons

Let us It

'moving around the nucleus;

it

has also been stated that the con-

One could argue that it should at least in principle be possible to observe the electron in its orbit. One should simply look at the atom through a microscope of a very high resolving power, then one would see cept of

an

electronic orbit

is

doubtful.

moving in its orbit. Such a high resolving power could to be sure not be obtained by a microscope using ordinary light, since the inaccuracy of the measurement of the position the electron

can never be smaller than the wave length of the light. But a microscope using y-rays with a wave length smaller than the size of the atom would do. Such a microscrope has not yet been constructed but that should not prevent us from discussing the ideal experiment. Is the first step,

the translation of the result of the observation

into a probability function, possible? It is possible only if the uncertainty relation is fulfilled after the observation. The position of the electron will

wave length

be known with an accuracy given by the The electron may have been practically

of the y-ray.

at rest before the observation. least

one light quantum

But in the act of observation at must have passed the micro-

of the 7-ray

Therescope and must first have been deflected by the electron. has fore, the electron has been pushed by the light quantum, it

changed

its

momentum and

its

the uncertainty of this change

velocity, is

and one can show that

just big

enough

to

guarantee


48

the validity of the uncertainty relations. Therefore, there difficulty with the first step.

At the same time one can

easily see that there is

is

no way

no of

observing the orbit of the electron around the nucleus. The second step shows a wave pocket moving not around the nucleus

but away from the atom, because the first light quantum will have knocked the electron out from the atom. The momentum of light quantum of the y-ray is much bigger than the original momentum of the electron if the wave length of the y-ray is much smaller than the size of the atom. Therefore, the first light

quantum

is

sufficient to

knock the electron out of the atom and

one can never observe more than one point in the orbit of the electron; therefore, there is no orbit in the ordinary sense. The next observation

the third step

show the electron on its there is no way of describ-

will

path from the atom. Quite generally ing what happens between two consecutive observations. of course tempting to say that the electron

It is

must have been

somewhere between the two observations and that therefore the electron must have described some kind of path or orbit even if it may be impossible to know which path. This would be a reasonable argument in classical physics. But in quantum theory it would be a misuse of the language which, as we will see later,

We can leave it open for the moment, warning is a statement about the way in which we should talk about atomic events or a statement about the events cannot be

whether

justified.

this

themselves, whether

it

refers to epistemology or to ontology.

In any case we have to be very cautious about the wording of any statement concerning the behavior of atomic particles. Actually we need not speak of particles at all. For many ex-

more convenient

to speak of matter waves; for instance, of stationary matter waves around the atomic nucleus.

periments

it is

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY 49 Such a description would directly contradict the other description if one does not pay attention to the limitations given by the uncertainty relations.

avoided.

when of

its

The

Through the

limitations the contradiction

use of "matter waves"

is

is

convenient, for example,

dealing with the radiation emitted by the atom. By means frequencies and intensities the radiation gives information

about the oscillating charge distribution in the atom, and there the wave picture comes much nearer to the truth than the particle picture.

Therefore, Bohr advocated the use of both pictures,

which he called "complementary" to each

other.

tures are of course mutually exclusive, because

cannot at the same time be a particle

(i.e.,

The two

pic-

a certain thing

substance confined to

a very small volume) and a wave (i.e., a field spread out over a large space), but the two complement each other. By playing with both pictures, by going from the one picture to the other

and back

again,

we finally get the right impression of the strange

kind of reality behind our atomic experiments. Bohr uses the concept of "complementarity" at several places in the interpretation of quantum theory. The knowledge of the position of

a particle

is

complementary to the knowledge of

its

velocity or

momentum. If we know the one with high accuracy we cannot know the other with high accuracy; still we must know both for determining the behavior of the system. The space-time description of the atomic events

is

complementary to

their deterministic

an equation of description. The probability function obeys motion as the co-ordinates did in Newtonian mechanics; its change in the course of time is completely determined by the quantum mechanical equation, but it does not allow a description in space

and

time.

The

on the other hand, and time but breaks the de-

observation,

enforces the description in space


50

termined continuity of the probability function by changing our

knowledge of the system. Generally the dualism between two different descriptions of the same reality is no longer a difficulty since we know from the mathematical formulation of the theory that contradictions

The dualism between

cannot

arise.

tures

waves and

particles

is

the two complementary picbrought out in the

also clearly

the mathematical scheme.

flexibility of

The formalism

is

nor-

mally written to resemble Newtonian mechanics, with equations of motion for the co-ordinates and the momenta of the particles.

But by a simple transformation it can be rewritten to resemble a wave equation for an ordinary three-dimensional matter wave. Therefore, this possibility of playing with different complementary pictures has its analogy in the different transformations of the mathematical scheme; it does not lead to any difficulties in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. real difficulty in the understanding of this interpretation

A

when one

asks the famous question: But what in atomic event? It has been said before an happens "really" that the mechanism and the results of an observation can always arises,

however,

be stated in terms of the

from an observation

classical concepts.

But what one deduces

a probability function, a mathematical that combines statements about possibilities or tendexpression encies with statements about our knowledge of facts. So we canis

not completely objectify the result of an observation, we cannot describe what "happens" between this observation and the next.

we had introduced an element of subjectivism into the theory, as if we meant to say: what happens depends on our way of observing it or on the fact that we observe it. Before This looks as

problem of subjectivism it is necessary to explain why one would get into hopeless difficulties if one

discussing this

quite clearly

if

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY tried to describe

51

what happens between two consecutive ob-

servations.

For

purpose it is convenient to discuss the following ideal experiment We assume that a small source of monochromatic this

:

light radiates

The diameter

toward a black screen with two small holes in it. of the holes may be not much bigger than the

wave length of the light, but their distance will be very much bigger. At some distance behind the screen a photographic plate the incident light. If one describes this experiment in terms of the wave picture, one says that the primary wave penetrates through the two holes; there will be secondary spherical registers

waves starting from the holes that interfere with one another, and the interference will produce a pattern of varying intensity

on the photographic

plate.

The

blackening of the photographic plate is a quantum process, a chemical reaction produced by single light quanta. Therefore, it must also be possible to describe the experiment in terms of light quanta. If it would be permissible to say what happens to the single light quantum between its emission from

and its absorption in the photographic plate, one could argue as follows: The single light quantum can come through the first hole or through the second one. If it goes through the first hole and is scattered there, its probability for

the light source

being absorbed at a certain point of the photographic plate cannot depend upon whether the second hole is closed or open. The probability distribution on the plate will be the same as if only the first hole was open. If the experiment is repeated many times

and one takes together

all

cases in

which the

light

quantum has

first hole, the blackening of the plate due to these cases will correspond to this probability distribution. If one considers only those light quanta that go through the second

gone through the


52

hole, the blackening should correspond to a probability distribution derived from the assumption that only the second hole is

open. The total blackening, therefore, should just be the sum of the blackenings in the two cases; in other words, there should be no interference pattern. But we know this is not correct, and the experiment will show the interference pattern. Therefore, the statement that any light quantum must have gone either through the

first

or through the second hole

contradictions. This

is

problematic and leads to

example shows clearly that the concept of

the probability function does not allow a description of what happens between two observations. Any attempt to find such a description would lead to contradictions; this must the term "happens" is restricted to the observation.

mean

that

Now, this is a very strange result, since it seems to indicate that the observation plays a decisive role in the event and that the reality varies, depending upon whether we observe it or not.

To make

this point clearer

observation

more

we have

to analyze the process of

closely.

To

begin with, it is important to remember that in natural science we are not interested in the universe as a whole, including ourselves, but we direct our attention to some part of the universe and make that the object of our studies. In atomic physics this part is usually a very small object, an atomic particle or a group of such particles, sometimes much larger the size

important that a large part of the universe, including ourselves, does not belong to the object. does not matter; but

it is

the theoretical interpretation of an experiment starts with the two steps that have been discussed. In the first step we

Now,

have to describe the arrangement of the experiment, eventually combined with a first observation, in terms of classical physics

and

translate this description into a probability function.

This


53

probability function follows the laws of quantum theory, and its change in the course of time, which is continuous, can be calculated

from the

initial conditions; this is

the second step.

The

probability function combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies

("potentia" in Aristotelian philosophy), and these statements are completely objective, they do not depend on any observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system,

which

of course are subjective in so far as they

may be

different

In ideal cases the subjective element in the probability function may be practically negligible as compared with the objective one. The physicists then speak of a for different observers.

"pure case."

When we now come

to the next observation, the result of

which should be predicted from the theory, it is very important to realize that our object has to be in contact with the other part of the world, namely, the experimental arrangement, the meas-

uring rod,

etc.,

moment

before or at least at the

of observation.

This means that the equation of motion for the probability function does now contain the influence of the interaction with the

measuring device. This influence introduces a uncertainty, since the measuring device

is

new

element of

necessarily described

in the terms of classical physics; such a description contains all the uncertainties concerning the microscopic structure of

the device which

device

is

we know from thermodynamics, and

connected with the

rest of the

world,

it

since the

contains in fact

the uncertainties of the microscopic structure of the whole world. These uncertainties may be called objective in so far as they are

simply a consequence of the description in the terms of classical physics and do not depend on any observer. They may be called


54

subjective in so far as they refer to our incomplete the world.

knowledge of

After this interaction has taken place, the probability function contains the objective element of tendency and the subjective

element of incomplete knowledge, even if it has been a "pure is for this reason that the result of the observa-

case" before. It

tion cannot generally be predicted with certainty; what can be predicted is the probability of a certain result of the observation,

and

statement about the probability can be checked by rethe peating experiment many times. The probability function does unlike the common procedure in Newtonian mechanics this

not describe a certain event but, at least during the process of observation, a whole ensemble of possible events. The observation itself changes the probability function discontinuously;

it

selects of all possible events

the actual one that

has taken place. Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone the discontinuous change and speak of a "quantum jump." When the old adage "Natura

we

non

facit saltus" is

theory,

we can

suddenly and

used as a basis for criticism of quantum

reply that certainly our knowledge can that this fact justifies the use of the term

change "quan-

tum jump." Therefore, the transition from the "possible" to the "actual" takes place during the act of observation. If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have to realize that the

word "happens" can apply only to the observation, not to the state of affairs between two observations. It applies to the physical, not the psychical act of observation, and we may say that the transition from the "possible" to the "actual" takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the measuring

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY and thereby with the

device,

it is

play; by the

rest of the world,

55

has come into

not connected with the act of registration of the result

mind

of the observer.

The

discontinuous change in the

probability function, however, takes place with the act of registration, because it is the discontinuous change of our knowledge in the instant of registration that has

its

image in the discontinu-

ous change of the probability function.

To what

extent, then, have we finally come to an objective the world, especially of the atomic world? In of description classical physics science started from the belief or should one

say from the illusion?

that

we

could describe the world or at

world without any reference to ourselves. This is actually possible to a large extent. We know that the city of London exists whether we see it or not. It may be said that clas-

least parts of the

which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves. Its success has led to the general ideal of an objective description of sical physics is just that idealization in

the world. Objectivity has become the first criterion for the value of any scientific result. Does the Copenhagen interpreta-

quantum theory still comply with this ideal? One may perhaps say that quantum theory corresponds to this ideal as far as possible. Certainly quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features, it does not introduce the mind of the physition of

a part of the atomic event. But it starts from the division of the world into the "object" and the rest of the world, and from the fact that at least for the rest of the world we use the

cist

as

classical

concepts in our description. This division

is

arbitrary

and historically a direct consequence of our scientific method; the use of the classical concepts is finally a consequence of the general

human way

of thinking.

But

this is already

a reference


56

and

to ourselves

in so far our description

is

not completely

objective.

has been stated in the beginning that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory starts with a paradox. It starts from the fact that we describe our experiments in the terms of It

classical physics and at the same time from the knowledge that these concepts do not fit nature accurately. The tension between these two starting points is the root of the statistical character of

quantum

theory. Therefore,

has sometimes been suggested

it

that one should depart from the classical concepts altogether and that a radical change in the concepts used for describing the experiments might possibly lead back to a nonstatical, completely objective description of nature.

This suggestion, however,

upon a misunderstanding. The

rests

concepts of classical physics are just a refinement of the concepts of daily life and are an essential part of the language which

forms the basis of

all

natural science.

Our

actual situation in

we do

use the classical concepts for the description of the experiments, and it was the problem of quantum theory to find theoretical interpretation of the experiments science

on

is

such that

this basis.

we were

There

is

no use in

other beings than

we

discussing

At

are.

what could be done if point we have to

this

realize, as von Weizsacker has put it, that "Nature is man, but man is earlier than natural science." The

the sentence objectivity.

justifies classical physics,

The second

paradox of quantum

us

with

its

earlier first

than

part of

ideal of complete

why we cannot

escape the the theory, namely, necessity of using the part

tells

classical concepts.

We have

to

add some comments on the actual procedure in

the quantum-theoretical interpretation of atomic events. It has been said that we always start with a division of the world into


57

an object, which we are going to study, and the rest of the world, and that this division is to some extent arbitrary. It should indeed not make any difference in the

if we, e.g., add some part of the measuring device or the whole device to the object and apply the laws of quantum theory to this more complicated object. It can be shown that such an alteration of the theoretical treatment would not alter the predictions concerning a given experiment. This follows mathematically from the fact that the laws of quantum theory are for the phenomena in which Planck's constant can be considered as a very small quantity, approximately identical with the classical laws. But it would be

a mistake to believe that

this

final result

application of the

quantum-

theoretical laws to the measuring device could help to avoid the fundamental paradox of quantum theory.

The measuring

device deserves this

contact with the rest of the world,

if

name there

only

is

an

if it is

in close

interaction be-

tween the device and the observer. Therefore, the uncertainty with respect to the microscopic behavior of the world will enter into the quantum-theoretical system here just as

weE

as in the

interpretation. If the measuring device would be isolated from the rest of the world, it would be neither a measuring device nor could it be described in the terms of classical physics

first

at

all.

With regard to this situation Bohr has emphasized that it is more realistic to state that the division into the object and the

Our actual situation in research work in atomic physics usually this: we wish to understand a certain phenomenon, we wish to recognize how this phenomenon follows from the general laws of nature. Therefore,

rest of the

world

is

not arbitrary. is

that part of matter or radiation which takes part in the phenomenon is the natural "object" in the theoretical treatment and


58

should be separated in this respect from the tools used to study the phenomenon. This again emphasizes a subjective element in the description of atomic events, since the measuring device has been constructed by the observer, and we have to remember that

what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning. Our scientific work in physics consists in asking questions about nature in the language that we possess trying to get an answer from experiment by the means that

and

are at our disposal. In this way quantum theory reminds us, as it, of the old wisdom that when searching for

Bohr has put

one must never forget that in the drama of are ourselves both players and spectators. It is understandable that in our scientific relation to nature our own

harmony

in

existence

we

activity

life

becomes very important when we have to deal with we can penetrate only by using the

parts of nature into which most elaborate tools.

IV.

Quantum Theory and

the Roots of

Atomic Science

THE

concept of the atom goes back much further than the beginning of modern science in the seventeenth century; it has its origin in ancient Greek philosophy and was in that early period the central concept of materialism taught by Leucippus and the other hand, the modern interpretation of Democritus.

On

atomic events has very little resemblance to genuine materialistic philosophy; in fact, one may say that atomic physics has turned science

away from the materialistic trend it had during the nine-

teenth century. It is therefore interesting to compare the development of Greek philosophy toward the concept of the atom with the present position of this concept in modern physics.

The

idea of the smallest, indivisible ultimate building blocks of matter first came up in connection with the elaboration of the concepts of Matter, Being and Becoming which characterized the first epoch of Greek philosophy. This period started in the sixth century B.C. with Thales, the founder of the Milesian

school, to

whom

Aristotle ascribes the statement:

"Water

is

the

all things." This statement, strange as it looks to us, expresses, as Nietzsche has pointed out, three fundamental

material cause of

59


60

ideas of philosophy. First, the question as to the material cause of all things; second, the demand that this question be answered in conformity with reason, without resort to

myths or mysticism; be the it must that third, ultimately possible to reduce postulate was the first exThales' to one statement everything principle. pression of the idea of a fundamental substance, of which all other things were transient forms. The word "substance" in this

connection was certainly in that age not interpreted in the purely material sense which we frequently ascribe to it today. Life was connected with or inherent in this "substance" and Aristotle ascribes to Thales also the statement: All things are full

was put

of gods. Still the question

things and

as to the material cause of

imagine that Thales took his from view primarily meteorological considerations. Of all things we know water can take the most various shapes; it can in the all

it is

not

difficult to

winter take the form of ice and snow, it can change into vapor, and it can form the clouds. It seems to turn into earth where the rivers is

form

their delta,

the condition for

can spring from the earth. Water Therefore, if there was such a funda-

and

life.

it

was natural to think of water first. The idea of the fundamental substance was then carried further by Anaximander, who was a pupil of Thales and lived in the same town. Anaximander denied the fundamental substance to be water or any of the known substances. He taught that the primary substance was infinite, eternal and ageless and that it mental substance,

it

encompassed the world. This primary substance is transformed into the various substances with which we are familiar. Theophrastus quotes from Anaximander: "Into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, as is ordained, for they

make

reparation

and

satisfaction to

their injustice according to the

one another for

ordering of time."

In

this

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE ROOTS OF ATOMIC SCIENCE

61

philosophy the antithesis of Being and Becoming plays the

fundamental

The primary

substance, infinite and ageless, the undifferentiated Being, degenerates into the various forms which lead to endless struggles. The process of Becoming is conrole.

sidered as a sort of debasement of the infinite Being a disintegration into the struggle ultimately expiated by a return into

which is without shape or character. The struggle which is meant here is the opposition between hot and cold, fire and water, wet and dry, etc. The temporary victory of the one over the other is the injustice for which they finally make reparation that

in the ordering of time. According to Anaximander, there is "eternal motion," the creation and passing away of worlds from infinity to infinity. It

lem

be interesting to notice at this point that the probwhether the primary substance can be one of the known

may

substances or must be something essentially different occurs in a somewhat different form in the most modern part of atomic physics.

The

physicists

today try to find a fundamental law of

elementary particles and their properties can be derived mathematically. This fundamental equation of motion may refer either to waves of a known type,

motion for matter

from which

all

to proton and meson waves, or to waves of an essentially different character which have nothing to do with any of the

known waves mean that all

way

or elementary particles. In the first case it would other elementary particles can be reduced in some

to a few sorts of "fundamental" elementary particles;

actually theoretical physics has during the past two decades mostly followed this line of research. In the second case all dif-

be reduced to some universal energy or matter, but none of the

ferent elementary particles could

substance which

we may

different particles could

call

be preferred to the others as being more


62

The

view of course corresponds to the doctrine of Anaximander, and I am convinced that in modern physics this view is the correct one. But let us return to Greek

fundamental.

latter

philosophy. The third of the Milesian philosophers, Anaximenes, an associate of Anaximander, taught that air was the primary substance. "Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so

do

5

breath and air encompass the whole world.' Anaximenes introduced into the Milesian philosophy the idea that the process of condensation or rarefaction causes the change of the primary substance into the other substances.

The condensation

of water

vapor into clouds was an obvious example, and of course the difference between water vapor and air was not known at that time.

In the philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus the concept of

Becoming occupies the foremost

place.

He

regarded that which

moves, the fire, as the basic element. The difficulty, to reconcile the idea of one fundamental principle with the infinite variety of

phenomena,

the opposites

is

is

solved for

really

him by

recognizing that the strife of

a kind of harmony. For Heraclitus the

is at once one and many, it is just "the opposite tension" of the opposites that constitutes the unity of the One. says:

world

He

"We

that war is common to all and strife is justice, things come into being and pass away through

must know

and that

all

strife."

Looking back to the development of Greek philosophy up to point one realizes that it has been borne from the beginning

this

to this stage

by the tension between the One and the Many. For

our senses the world consists of an infinite variety of things and events, colors and sounds. But in order to understand it we have to introduce

some kind

of order,

and order means

to recognize

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE ROOTS OF ATOMIC SCIENCE what

is

equal,

it

means some

sort of unity.

63

From this springs the

one fundamental principle, and at the same to derive from it the infinite variety of things.

belief that there is

time the

difficulty

That there should be a material cause

for all things was a natural starting point since the world consists of matter. But when one carried the idea of fundamental unity to the extreme

one came to that

infinite and eternal undifferentiated Being which, whether material or not, cannot in itself explain the infinite variety of things. This leads to the antithesis of Being

and Becoming and

finally to the solution of Heraclitus, that the

itself is the fundamental principle; the "imperishable change, that renovates the world/' as the poets have called it. But the change in itself is not a material cause and therefore is

change

represented in the philosophy of Heraclitus by the basic element,

which

is

both matter and a moving

fire

as the

force.

We may remark

at this point that modern physics is in some to the doctrines of Heraclitus. If we replace near extremely

way word

by the word "energy" we can almost repeat his statements word for word from our modern point of view. Energy is in fact the substance from which all elementary particles, all atoms and therefore aU things are made, and energy is that which moves. Energy is a substance, since its total amount does not change, and the elementary particles can actually be made from this substance as is seen in many experiments on the the

"fire"

creation of elementary particles. Energy can be changed into motion, into heat, into light and into tension. Energy may be called the this

fundamental cause for

all

change in the world. But

comparison of Greek philosophy with the ideas of modern

science will be discussed later.

Greek philosophy returned for some time to the concept of the

One in the teachings of Parmenides, who lived in Elea in the


64

south of Italy. His most important contribution to Greek thinking was, perhaps, that he introduced a purely logical argument that is iminto metaphysics. "One cannot know what is not be thought that can nor utter for is it the same it; thing possible

and that can

be." Therefore, only the

One

is,

and there

is

no

becoming or passing away. Parmenides denied the existence of empty space for logical reasons. Since all change requires empty he dismissed change as an illusion. But philosophy could not rest for long on this paradox. Empedocles, from the south coast of Sicily, changed for the first time from monism to a kind of pluralism. To avoid the difficulty

space, as he assumed,

that one primary substance cannot explain the variety of things and events, he assumed four basic elements, earth, water, air

and

fire.

The

and separated by the Therefore, these latter two, which are

elements are mixed together

Love and Strife. treated as corporeal ways many

action of in

like

the other four elements,

are responsible for the imperishable change. Empedocles describes the formation of the world in the following picture : First, is the infinite Sphere of the One, as in the philosophy of Parmenides. But in the primary substance all the four "roots" are mixed together by Love. Then, when Love is passing out and

there

elements are partially separated and parAfter that the elements are completely septially combined. arated and Love is outside the World. Finally, Love is bringing Strife coining in, the

the elements together again and Strife is passing out, so that we return to the original Sphere. This doctrine of Empedocles represents a very definite turning

toward a more

materialistic

elements are not so terial substances.

the mixture

and

Here

The

four

principles as real

ma-

view in Greek philosophy.

much fundamental for the

time the idea

expressed that of few a which are fundasubstances, separation first

is


65

mentally different, explains the infinite variety of things and events. Pluralism never appeals to those who are wont to think

fundamental

principles. But it is a reasonable kind of comprowhich avoids the difficulty of monism and allows the establishment of some order.

in

mise,

The

next step toward the concept of the atom was Anaxagoras, who was a contemporary of Empedocles.

Athens about

made by

He

lived

probably in the first half of the fifth century B.C. Anaxagoras stresses the idea of the mixture, the assumption that all change is caused by mixture and separain

tion.

thirty years,

He assumes an infinite variety of infinitely small

"seeds," of

things are composed. The seeds do not refer to the four elements of Empedocles, there are innumerably many different

which

all

But the seeds are mixed together and separated again and in this way all change is brought about. The doctrine of Anaxagoras allows for the first time a geometrical interpretation of the term "mixture": Since he speaks of the infinitely small seeds, their mixture can be pictured as the mixture between two kinds of sand of different colors. The seeds may change in number and seeds.

in relative position. Anaxagoras assumes that all seeds are in everything, only the proportion may change from one thing to another. He says: "All things will be in everything; nor is it possible for

them

everything."

The

Love and

to be apart, but all things have a portion of universe of Anaxagoras is set in motion not by

Strife, like

that of Empedocles, but

by "Nous," which

we may translate as "Mind." From this philosophy it was only one step to the concept of the atom, and this step occurred with Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera. The antithesis of Being and Not-being in the philosophy of Parmenides

is

here secularized into the antithesis of the "Full"

and the "Void." Being

is

not only One,

it

can be repeated an


66 infinite

number

of times. This

unit of matter.

has a

The atom

finite size.

Motion

is

is

is

the atom, the indivisible smallest

eternal

made

and

indestructible,

but

it

possible through the empty first time in history there

space between the atoms. Thus for the

was voiced the idea we would say ticles

of the existence of smallest ultimate parof elementary particles, as the fundamental

building blocks of matter.

According to this new concept of the atom, matter did not con33 only of the "Full/ but also of the "Void, of the empty space 9

sist

in

which the atoms move. The

logical objection of

Parmeni-

exist, was simply From our modern point of with experience. comply would say that the empty space between the atoms in

des against the Void, that not-being cannot

ignored to

view

we

the philosophy of Democritus was not nothing;

it

was the

carrier

and kinematics, making possible the various armovements of atoms. But the possibility of and rangements has always been a controversial problem in phiempty space In the theory of general relativity the answer is given losophy.

for geometry

produced by matter or matter by geometry. This answer corresponds more closely to the view held by many

that geometry

is

philosophers that space is defined by the extension of matter. But Democritus clearly departs from this view, to make change and motion possible. The atoms of Democritus were all of the same substance, which had the property of being, but had different sizes and different shapes.

They were pictured

therefore as divisible in a

mathematical but not in a physical sense. The atoms could move and could occupy different positions in space. But they had no

They had

neither color nor smell nor which we perceive by our senses were supposed to be produced by the movements and positions

other physical properties.

taste.

The

properties of matter


67

of the atoms in space. Just as both tragedy and comedy can be written by using the same letters of the alphabet, the vast variety of events in this world can be realized by the same atoms

through their different arrangements and movements. Geometry and kinematics, which were made possible by the void, proved to

be

still

more important

in

some way than pure

being.

De-

quoted to have said: "A thing merely appears to merely appears to be sweet or bitter. Only atoms and empty space have a real existence." The atoms in the philosophy of Leucippus do not move

mocritus

have

is

color,

it

merely by chance. Leucippus seems to have believed in complete determinism, since he is known to have said: "Naught happens for nothing, but everything from a ground and of necessity." The

any reason for the original motion of the atoms, which just shows that they thought of a causal description of the atomic motion; causality can only explain later events by earlier events, but it can never explain the beginning. The basic ideas of atomic theory were taken over and modified, in part, by later Greek philosophers. For the sake of comparison with modem atomic physics it is important to mention atomists did not give

the explanation of matter given by Plato in his dialogue Timaeus. Plato was not an atomist; on the contrary, Diogenes Laertius reported that Plato disliked Democritus so much that

he wished all his books to be burned. But Plato combined ideas that were near to atomism with the doctrines of the Pythagorean school and the teachings of Empedocles. offshoot of Orphism, which goes back to the worship of Dionysus. Here has been established

The Pythagorean

school

was an

the connection between religion and mathematics which ever since has exerted the strongest influence on human thought. The

Pythagoreans seem to have been the

first

to realize the creative


68

force inherent in mathematical formulations. Their discovery

sound in harmony if their lengths are in a simple ratio demonstrated how much mathematics can mean for the understanding of natural phenomena. For the Pythagthat

two

strings

was not so much a question of understanding. For them the simple mathematical ratio between the length of the There was also much strings created the harmony in sound. school which for of the the doctrines in Pythagorean mysticism us is difficult to understand. But by making mathematics a part oreans

it

of their religion they touched

human

an

essential point in the develop-

quote a statement by Bertrand Russell about Pythagoras: "I do not know of any other man who has been as influential as he was in the sphere of thought."

ment

of

thought. I

may

of the discovery of the regular solids made by the Pythagoreans and of the possibility of combining them with the elements of Empedocles. He compared the smallest parts of

Plato

knew

the element earth with the cube, of air with the octahedron, of

with the tetrahedron, and of water with the icosahedron. There is no element that corresponds to the dodecahedron; here fire

Plato only says "there was yet a fifth combination

which God

used in the delineation of the universe."

which represent the four elements, can all, it is made clear by Plato that they are not indivisible. Plato constructs the regular solids from two basic triangles, the equilateral and the isosceles triangles, which are put together to form the surface of the solids. Therefore, the elements can (at least partly) be transformed into each other. The regular solids can be taken apart into their triangles and new regular solids can be formed of them. For If the regular solids,

be compared with the atoms at

instance,

one tetrahedron and two octahedra can be taken apart which can be recombined to

into twenty equilateral triangles,


69

give one icosahedron. That means: one atom of fire and two atoms of air can be combined to give one atom of water. But the

fundamental

triangles

cannot be considered as matter, since they

have no extension in space. It is only when the triangles are put together to form a regular solid that a unit of matter is created.

The

smallest parts of matter are not the fundamental Beings, as in the philosophy of Democritus, but are mathematical forms.

Here

it is

quite evident that the form it is the form.

is

more important than the

substance of which

After this short survey of Greek philosophy up to the formation of the concept of the atom we may come back to modern physics

and ask how our modern views on the atom and on

quantum theory compare with this ancient development. Historically the word "atom" in modern physics and chemistry was referred to the

wrong

object, during the revival of science in the

seventeenth century, since the smallest particles belonging to what is called a chemical element are still rather complicated systems of smaller units. These smaller units are nowadays called elementary particles, and it is obvious that if anything in modern physics should be

compared with the atoms of Democritus

it

should be the elementary particles like proton, neutron, electron, meson.

Democritus was well aware of the fact that should,

by

of matter

their

if

the atoms

motion and arrangement, explain the properties taste they cannot themselves have

color, smell,

he has deprived the atom of these and atom is thus a rather abstract piece of his qualities matter. But Democritus has left to the atom the quality of "being," of extension in space, of shape and motion. He has left these qualities because it would have been difficult to speak about the atom at all if such qualities had been taken away from

these properties. Therefore,


70

it. On the other hand, this implies that his concept of the atom cannot explain geometry, extension in space or existence, because it cannot reduce them to something more fundamental.

The modern view of the elementary particle with regard to this point seems more consistent and more radical. Let us discuss the question What is an elementary particle? We say, for instance, simply "a neutron" but we can give no well-defined picture and what we mean by the word. We can use several pictures and describe it once as a particle, once as a wave or as a wave packet. But we know that none of these descriptions is accurate. Certainly the neutron has no color, no smell, no taste. In this respect :

it

atom

resembles the

of

Greek philosophy. But even the other

qualities are taken from the elementary particle, at least to some extent; the concepts of geometry and kinematics, like shape or

motion in space, cannot be applied to it consistently. If one wants to give an accurate description of the elementary particle

and here the emphasis

is

on the word "accurate"

the only

thing which can be written down as description is a probability function. But then one sees that not even the quality of being (if

that

may be called a

"quality" ) belongs to

what is

described.

possibility for being or a tendency for being. Therefore, the elementary particle of modern physics is still far more abIt is

a

than the atom of the Greeks, and it is by this very property more consistent as a clue for explaining the behavior of matter. stract

In the philosophy of Democritus 5* substance if the word "substance

The elementary

all

atoms

consist of the

same

to be applied here at all* physics carry a mass in the

is

modern which they have other

particles in

same limited sense in properties. Since mass and energy are, according to the theory of relativity, essentially the same concepts, we may say that all elementary particles consist of energy.

This could be interpreted as defining energy as


Jl

the primary substance of the world. It has indeed the essential property belonging to the term "substance," that it is conserved.

Therefore,

modern clitus

if

it

has been mentioned before that the views of

physics are in this respect very close to those of Heraone interprets his element fire as meaning energy.

which moves; it may be called the primary and change, energy can be transformed into matter or heat or light. The strife between opposites in the philosophy of Heraclitus can be found in the strife between two different Energy

is

cause of

in fact that

all

forms of energy. In the philosophy of Democritus the atoms are eternal and indestructible units of matter, they can never be transformed

With regard to this question modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans. The elementary particles are into each other.

certainly not eternal

and

indestructible units of matter, they

can actually be transformed into each other. As a matter of fact, if two such particles, moving through space with a very high kinetic energy, collide, then

many new

elementary particles may be created from the available energy and the old particles may have disappeared hi the collision. Such events have been frequently observed

and

offer the best proof that all particles are

made of the same substance: modern

energy. But the resemblance of the views to those of Plato and the Pythagoreans can be

somewhat further. The elementary particles in Plato's Timaeus are finally not substance but mathematical forms. "All things are numbers" is a sentence attributed to Pythagoras. The only mathematical forms available at that time were such geometric forms as the regular solids or the triangles which form their surface. In modern quantum theory there can be no doubt that the elementary particles will finally also be mathematical

carried


72

The Greek and found them in the regular solids. Modern science, however, has from its beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries started from the

forms, but of a

much more

complicated nature.

philosophers thought of static forms

dynamic problem. The constant element in physics since Newton is not a configuration or a geometrical form, but a dynamic law.

The

equation of motion holds at

all

times,

it is

in this sense

whereas the geometrical forms, like the orbits, are changing. Therefore, the mathematical forms that represent the eternal,

elementary particles will be solutions of some eternal law of motion for matter. Actually this is a problem which has not yet

been solved. The fundamental law of motion for matter is known and therefore it is not yet possible to derive

not yet

mathematically the properties of the elementary particles from such a law. But theoretical physics in its present state seems to

be not very far from this goal and we can at least say what kind of law we have to expect. The final equation of motion for matter will probably be some quantized nonlinear wave equation for a

wave

of operators that simply represents matter, not any specified kind of waves or particles. This wave equation will probably be equivalent to rather complicated sets of integral field

equations, which have "Eigenvalues" and "Eigensolutions," as the physicists call it. These Eigensolutions will finally represent the elementary particles; they are the mathematical forms which

We might mention here that these "Eigensolutions" will follow from the fundamental equation for matter by much the same matheshall replace the regular solids of the Pythagoreans.

matical process by which the harmonic vibrations of the Pythagorean string follow from the differential equation of the string. But, as has been said, these problems are not yet solved. If we follow the Pythagorean line of thought we may

hope


73

that the fundamental law of motion will turn out as a mathe-

matically simple law, even

may

evaluation with respect to the

It is difficult to give any hope for simplicity except the fact that has hitherto always been possible to write the fundamental

Eigenstates

good argument it

if its

be very complicated.

for this

equations in physics in simple mathematical forms. This fact fits in with the Pythagorean religion, and many physicists share

but no convincing argument has must be so.

their belief in this respect,

been given to show that

it

yet

We may add an argument at this point concerning a question which

frequently asked by laymen with respect to the concept of the elementary particle in modern physics: Why do the is

physicists claim that their elementary particles cannot be divided into smaller bits? The answer to this question clearly shows

how much more

abstract

modern

science

is

as

compared

to

Greek philosophy. The argument runs like this: How could one divide an elementary particle? Certainly only by using extreme forces

and very sharp

tools.

The

only tools available are other

Therefore, collisions between two elementary particles of extremely high energy would be the only processes by which the particles could eventually be divided.

elementary

particles.

Actually they can be divided in such processes, sometimes into very many fragments; but the fragments are again elementary

not any smaller pieces of them, the masses of these fragments resulting from the very large kinetic energy of the two colliding particles. In other words, the transmutation of particles,

energy into matter makes

it

possible that the fragments of ele-

mentary panicles are again the same elementary particles. After this comparison of the modern views in atomic physics with Greek philosophy we have to add a warning, that this comparison should not be misunderstood. It may seem at first


74 sight that the

Greek philosophers have by some kind of

in-

come to the same or very similar conclusions as we have in modern times only after several centuries of hard labor with experiments and mathematics. This interpretation genious intuition

of our comparison would, however, be a complete misunderstanding. There is an enormous difference between modern

and Greek philosophy, and that is just the empiristic attitude of modern science. Since the time of Galileo and Newton, modern science has been based upon a detailed study of nature and upon the postulate that only such statements should

science

be made, as have been verified or at least can be verified by experiment. The idea that one could single out some events from nature by an experiment, in order to study the details and to what is the constant law in the continuous change, did

find out

not occur to the Greek philosophers. Therefore, modern science has from its beginning stood upon a much more modest, but at the same time much firmer, basis than ancient philosophy. Therefore, the statements of

meant much more

modern physics are in some way

seriously than the statements of Greek phi-

losophy. When Plato says, for instance, that the smallest particles of fire are tetrahedrons, it is not quite easy to see what he really

means.

Is

the form of the tetrahedron only symbolically attached do the smallest particles of fire mechani-

to the element fire, or

cally act as rigid tetrahedrons or as elastic tetrahedrons,

and by

what

force could they be separated into the equilateral triangles, etc.? Modern science would finally always ask: can one

How

decide experimentally that the atoms of and not perhaps cubes? Therefore, when it

matically

are tetrahedrons

modern

science states

a certain solution of a fundamental equation of means that we can from this solution deduce mathe-

that the proton

matter

fire

all

is

possible properties of the

proton and can check the


75

correctness of the solution possibility of

by experiments in every detail. This checking the correctness of a statement experi-

mentally with very high precision and in any number of details gives an enormous weight to the statement that could not be attached to the statements of early Greek philosophy. All the same, some statements of ancient philosophy are rather near to those of modern science. This simply shows how far one

can get by combining the ordinary experience of nature that we have without doing experiments with the untiring effort to get some logical order into this experience to understand it from general principles.

V.

The Development of

Philosophical Ideas

Since Descartes in Comparison with the New Situation in Quantum Theory

THE two thousand years that followed the culmination of Greek science and culture in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the human mind was to a large extent occupied with problems of a different kind from those of the early period. In the first centuries of Greek culture the strongest impulse had come from the immediate reality of the world in which we live and which we perceive by our senses. This reality was full of life and there was no good reason to stress the distinction between matter and mind or between body and soul. But in the philosophy of Plato one already sees that another reality begins to become stronger. In the famous simile of the cave Plato compares men to prisoners in a cave who are bound and can look in only one direction. They have a fire behind them and see on a wall the shadows of themselves and of objects behind them. Since they see nothing but the shadows, they regard those shadows as real and are not aware of the objects. Finally one of the prisoners escapes and comes from the cave into the light of the sun. For the first time he sees real things and realizes that he had been deceived IN

76

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINCE DESCARTES hitherto

by the shadows. For the

and thinks only with sorrow

first

of his long

JJ

time he knows the truth life

in the darkness.

The

real philosopher is the prisoner who has escaped from the cave into the light of truth, he is the one who possesses real knowl-

edge. This immediate connection with truth or, we may in the Christian sense say, with God is the new reality that has begun to

become stronger than the

our

senses.

The immediate

world as perceived by connection with God happens within reality of the

human soul, not in the world, and this was the problem that occupied human thought more than anything else in the two thousand years following Plato. In this period the eyes of the

the

philosophers were directed toward the human soul and its relation to God, to the problems of ethics, and to the interpretation of the revelation but not to the outer world. It

was only in the

time of the Italian Renaissance that again a gradual change of the human mind could be seen, which resulted finally in a revival of the interest in nature.

The

great development of natural science since the sixteenth seventeenth centuries was preceded and accompanied by a and

development of philosophical ideas which were closely connected with the fundamental concepts of science. It may therefore be instructive to comment on these ideas from the position that has

been reached by modern science in our time. The first great philosopher of this new period of science was Rene Descartes who lived in the first half of the seventeenth

finally

century.

Those

of his ideas that are

most important for the

development of scientific thinking are contained in his Discourse the basis of doubt and logical reasoning he tries on Method.

On

to find

a completely new and as he thinks

He

solid

ground for a

does not accept revelation as such a

philosophical system. basis nor does he want to accept uncritically

what

is

perceived


78

by the senses. So he starts with his method of doubt. his doubt upon that which our senses tell us about the

He

casts

results of

our reasoning and finally he arrives at his famous sentence: "cogito ergo sum." I cannot doubt my existence since it follows

am thinking. After establishing the existence of the I in this way he proceeds to prove the existence of God es-

from the

fact that I

on the lines of scholastic philosophy. Finally the existence of the world follows from the fact that God had given me a strong inclination to believe in the existence of the world, and

sentially

simply impossible that God should have deceived me. This basis of the philosophy of Descartes is radically different

it is

from that of the ancient Greek philosophers. Here the starting point is not a fundamental principle or substance, but the attempt of a fundamental knowledge. And Descartes realizes that what we know about our mind is more certain than what we

know about the outer world. But already his starting point with the "triangle" God-World-I simplifies in a dangerous way the basis for further reasoning. The division between matter and and body, which had started in Plato's God is separated both from the I complete. philosophy, and from the world. God in fact is raised so high above the

mind

or between soul is

world and

now

men

that

He

finally

appears in the philosophy of

Descartes only as a common point of reference that establishes the relation between the I and the world.

While ancient Greek philosophy had infinite variety of things

tried to find order in the

and events by looking for some funda-

mental unifying principle, Descartes tries to establish the order through some fundamental division. But the three parts which result

from the

division lose

some

of their essence

when any one

considered as separated from the other two parts. If one part uses the fundamental concepts of Descartes at all, it is essential is

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINCE DESCARTES that

God

is

in the world

and

in the I

and

it is

79

also essential that

the I cannot be really separated from the world. Of course Descartes knew the ^indisputable necessity of the connection, but

philosophy and natural science in the following period developed on the basis of the polarity between the "res cogitans" and the "res extensa," and natural science concentrated its interest on the "res extensa." The influence of the Cartesian division on

human

thought in the following centuries can hardly be overestimated, but it is just this division which we have to criticize later from the development of physics in our time. Of course it would be wrong to say that Descartes, through

new method in philosophy, has given a new direction to human thought. What he actually did was to formulate for the first time a trend in human thinking that could already be seen his

during the Renaissance in Italy and in the Reformation. There revival of interest in mathematics which expressed an

was the

increasing influence of Platonic elements in philosophy, and the insistence on personal religion. The growing interest in mathe-

matics favored a philosophical system that started from logical reasoning and tried by this method to arrive at some truth that

was

as certain as

a mathematical conclusion. The insistence on

personal religion separated the I and its relation to God from the world. The interest in the combination of empirical knowledge

with mathematics as seen in the work of Galileo was perhaps some partly due to the possibility of arriving in this way at

knowledge that could be kept apart completely from the theological disputes raised by the Reformation. This empirical knowledge could be formulated without speaking about God or about ourselves and favored the separation of the three fundamental concepts God-World-I or the separation between "res there was in some cogitans" and "res extensa." In this period


80

agreement among the pioneers of empirical science that in their discussions the name of God or a fundacases

an

explicit

mental cause should not be mentioned.

On the

other hand, the difficulties of the separation could be from the beginning. In the distinction, for instance, seen clearly between the "res cogitans" and the "res extensa" Descartes was forced to put the animals entirely on the side of the "res extensa." Therefore, the animals

and the plants were not

essen-

from machines, their behavior was completely determined by material causes. But it has always seemed difficult to deny completely the existence of some kind of soul in the ani-

tially different

mals,

and it seems

to us that the older concept of soul for instance

in the philosophy of

Thomas Aquinas was more

natural and

forced than the Cartesian concept of the "res cogitans," even if we are convinced that the laws of physics and chemistry

less

valid in living organisms. One of the later conseof this view of Descartes was that, if animals were quences as machines, it was difficult not to think the considered simply

are

strictly

same about men. Since, on the other hand, the "res cogitans" and the "res extensa" were taken as completely different in their essence, it did not seem possible that they could act upon each other. Therefore, in order to preserve complete parallelism between the experiences of the mind and of the body, the mind also was in its activities completely determined by laws which corre-

sponded to the laws of physics and chemistry. Here the question of the possibility of "free will" arose. Obviously this whole description is somewhat artificial and shows the grave defects of the Cartesian partition. On the other hand in natural science the partition several centuries extremely successful. The mechanics of

and

all

was

for

Newton

the other parts of classical physics constructed after

its

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINCE DESCARTES

81

model started from the assumption that one can describe the world without speaking about God or ourselves. This possibility soon seemed almost a necessary condition for natural science in general. But at this point the situation

through quantum theory and

changed to some extent therefore we may now come to a

comparison of Descartes's philosophical system with our present situation in modem physics. It has been pointed out before that

Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory we can indeed proceed without mentioning ourselves as individuals, but we cannot disregard the fact that natural science is formed by

in the

men. Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have thought, but it makes the sharp separation between the world and the I impossible. If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian partition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the human mind during the three centuries following Descartes

and it will take a long time for

it

to be

replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.

The

position to which the Cartesian partition has led with to the "res extensa" was what one may call metaphysical respect realism. The world, i.e., the extended things, "exist." This is to

be distinguished from practical realism, and the different forms of realism may be described as follows: We "objectivate" a statement

if

we

claim that

its

content does not depend on the

82


conditions under

which

it

can be

verified. Practical realism as-

sumes that there are statements that can be objectivated and that in fact the largest part of our experience in daily life consists realism claims that there are no of such statements.

Dogmatic

statements concerning the material world that cannot be obPractical realism has always been and will always be jectivated.

an is,

essential part of natural science.

as

But

Dogmatic

realism, however,

we see it now, not a necessary condition for natural science.

it

has in the past played a very important role in the de-

of classical physics is velopment of science; actually the position that of dogmatic realism. It is only through quantum theory that we have learned that exact science is possible without the basis

of dogmatic realism.

When

Einstein has criticized

quantum

theory he has done so from the basis of dogmatic realism. This is a very natural attitude. Every scientist who does research work looking for something that is objectively true. His statements are not meant to depend upon the conditions under feels that

he

is

which they can be verified. Especially in physics the fact that we can explain nature by simple mathematical laws tells us that here we have met some genuine feature of reality, not something we have in any meaning of the word invented ourselves.

that

This

is

the situation which Einstein

had

in

mind when he took

dogmatic realism as the basis for natural science. But quantum theory is in itself an example for the possibility of explaining nature by means of simple mathematical laws without this basis. These laws may perhaps not seem quite simple when one compares

them with Newtonian mechanics. But, judging from the of the phenomena which are to be ex-

enormous complexity

plained (for instance, the line spectra of complicated atoms), the mathematical scheme of quantum theory is comparatively

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINCE DESCARTES simple. Natural science dogmatic realism.

is

83

actually possible without the basis of

Metaphysical realism goes one step further than dogmatic by saying that "the things really exist." This is in fact

realism

what Descartes tried to prove by the argument that "God cannot have deceived us." The statement that the things really exist is different from the statement of dogmatic realism in so far as here the

word

35

"exists

occurs,

which

is

also

meant

in the other

sum" ... "I think, therefore I am." But what is meant at this point that is not yet

statement "cogito ergo it is difficult

to see

contained in the thesis of dogmatic realism; and this leads us to a general criticism of the statement "cogito ergo sum," which Descartes considered as the solid ground on which he could

build his system. It

is

in fact true that this statement has the

certainty of a mathematical conclusion,

if the words "cogito" and "sum" are defined in the usual way or, to put it more cautiously and at the same time more critically, if the words are so defined that the statement follows. But this does not tell us

anything about

and "being" sense always

how

far

we can

use the concepts of "thinking"

in finding our way. It

is

finally in

an empirical question how

a very general can be

far our concepts

applied.

The

metaphysical realism was felt soon after Descartes and became the starting point for the empiristic difficulty of

philosophy, for sensualism The three philosophers

and

positivism.

who can be

taken as representatives

for early empiristic philosophy are Locke, Berkeley

Locke

holds, contrary to Descartes, that

and Hume.

knowledge is ultimately founded in experience. This experience may be sensation or perception of the operation of our own mind. Knowledge, so Locke states, is the perception of the agreement or disagreement all


84 of

two

ideas.

The

next step was taken by Berkeley. If actualy all derived from perception, there is no meaning

our knowledge is in the statement that the things really exist; because if the perception is given it cannot possibly make any difference whether the things exist or do not identical with existence.

exist.

Therefore, to be perceived

is

This line of argument then was exHume, who denied induc-

tended to an extreme skepticism by

and causation and thereby arrived at a conclusion which taken seriously would destroy the basis of all empirical science. The criticism of metaphysical realism which has been ex-

tion if

pressed in empiristic philosophy is certainly justified in so far as a warning against the naive use of the term "existence." The

it is

positive statements of this philosophy lines.

Our

can be

criticized

on similar

perceptions are not primarily bundles of colors or

sounds; what we perceive is already perceived as something, the accent here being on the word "thing," and therefore it is doubtful

whether we gain anything by taking the perceptions instead

of the things as the ultimate elements of reality.

The underlying difficulty has been clearly recognized by modern positivism. This line of thought expresses criticism against the naive use of certain terms like "thing," "perception," "existence" by the general postulate that the question whether a given sentence has any meaning at all should always be

thoroughly and

critically

examined. This postulate and from mathematical logic.

lying attitude are derived

its

under-

The

pro-

an attachment of symbols to the phenomena. The symbols can, as in mathematics, be combined according to certain rules, and in this way statements cedure of natural science

is

pictured as

about the phenomena can be represented by combinations of symbols. However, a combination of symbols that does not comply with the rules is not wrong but conveys no meaning.


85

The obvious difficulty in this argument is the lack of any general criterion as to when a sentence should be considered as definite decision is possible only when the senmeaningless.

A

tence belongs to a closed system of concepts and axioms, which in the development of natural science will be rather the exception rule. In some cases the conjecture that a certain senmeaningless has historically led to important progress, opened the way to the establishment of new connections

than the tence for

it

is

which would have been impossible if the sentence had a meaning. An example in quantum theory that has already been discussed is the sentence: "In which orbit does the electron move around the nucleus?" But generally the positivistic scheme taken from mathematical logic is too narrow in a description of nature which necessarily uses words and concepts that are only vaguely defined.

The

philosophic thesis that all knowledge is ultimately founded in experience has in the end led to a postulate concerning the logical clarification of any statement about nature. Such

a postulate may have seemed justified in the period of classical physics, but since quantum, theory we have learned that it cannot

The words

"position" and "velocity" of an electron, for instance, seemed perfectly well defined as to both their meaning and their possible connections, and in fact they were

be

fulfilled.

mathematical framework of Newtonian mechanics. But actually they were not well defined, as is seen from the relations of uncertainty. One may say that regarding their position in Newtonian mechanics they were well defined, but in their relation to nature they were not. This shows that we can never know beforehand which limitations will clearly defined concepts within the

be put on the applicability of certain concepts by the extension of our knowledge into the remote parts of nature, into which we


86

can only penetrate with the most elaborate tools. Therefore, in the process of penetration we are bound sometimes to use our concepts in a

way which

meaning. Insistence

is

not justified and which carries no

on the postulate

of complete logical clari-

would make science impossible. We are reminded here by modern physics of the old wisdom that the one who insists on never uttering an error must remain silent. A combination of those two lines of thought that started from Descartes, on the one side, and from Locke and Berkeley, on the other, was attempted in the philosophy of Kant, who was the founder of German idealism. That part of his work which is im-

fication

portant in comparison with the results of modern physics is contained in The Critique of Pure Reason. He takes up the question whether knowledge is only founded in experience or can come from other sources, and he arrives at the conclusion that our knowledge

is

in part

"a priori" and not inferred induc-

tively from experience. Therefore, he distinguishes between "empirical knowledge and knowledge that is "a priori." At the same time he distinguishes between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions. Analytic propositions follow simply from logic, and their denial would lead to self-contradiction. Propositions that 5'

are not "analytic" are called "synthetic." What is, according to Kant, the criterion for knowledge being "a priori"? Kant agrees that all knowledge starts with experience

but he adds that it is not always derived from experience. It is true that experience teaches us that a certain thing has such or such properties, but it does not teach us that it could not be if a proposition is thought together with its must be "a priori." Experience never gives to its judgments complete generality. For instance, the sentence "The sun rises every morning" means that we know no exception to

different. Therefore,

necessity

it

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINGE DESCARTES this rule in

the past

and that we expect

it

87

to hold in future. But

we can imagine exceptions to the rule. If a judgment is stated with complete generality, therefore, if it is impossible to imagine any exception, it must be "a priori." An analytic judgment is always "a priori" ; even if a child learns arithmetic from playing with marbles, he need not later go back to experience to know that

"two and two are

hand,

is

four.'

3

Empirical knowledge, on the other

synthetic.

But are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Kant tries to prove this by giving examples in which the above criteria seem to be fulfilled. Space and time are, he says, a priori forms of pure intuition. In the case of space he gives the following metaphysical arguments: 1.

Space

not an empirical concept, abstracted from other

is

experiences, for space

something external,

is

presupposed in referring sensations to

and external experience

is

only possible

through the presentation of space. 2. Space is a necessary presentation a priori, which underlies all external perceptions; for we cannot imagine that there should be no space, although we can imagine that there should be nothing in

space. 3.

Space

not a discursive or general concept of the relations is only one space, of which what we

is

of things in general, for there call "spaces"

are parts, not instances.

presented as an infinite given magnitude, which the parts of space; this relation is different from that of a concept to its instances, and therefore space is not a 4.

Space

is

holds within

itself all

concept but a form of intuition.

These arguments

shall

not be discussed here. They are men-

tioned merely as examples for the general type of proof that Kant has in mind for the synthetic judgments a priori.


00

With regard to and time, the law

Kant took as a priori, besides space of causality and the concept of substance. In a later stage of his work he tried to include the law of conservation of matter, the equality of "actio and reactio" and even the law of gravitation. No physicist would be willing to follow Kant here, if the term "a priori" is used in the absolute sense that was given to it by Kant. In mathematics Kant took Euclidean geometry as "a

physics

priori."

we compare these doctrines of Kant with the results of modern physics we must mention another part of his work, to which we wiH have to refer later. The disagreeable question Before

really exist," which had given rise to emoccurred also in Kant's system. But Kant piristic philosophy, has not followed the line of Berkeley and Hume, though that

whether "the things

would have been *

"thing-in-itself

logically consistent.

as different

kept some connection with

He

kept the notion of the

from the percept, and in

this

way

realism.

Coming now to the comparison of Kant's doctrines with modern physics, it looks in the first moment as though his central concept of the "synthetic judgments a priori" had been completely annihilated by the discoveries of our century. The theory of relativity has changed our views on space and time, it fact revealed entirely new features of space and time, of

has in

which

nothing is seen in Kant's a priori forms of pure intuition. The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory and the law of conservation of matter is no longer true for the ele-

Obviously Kant could not have foreseen the but since he was convinced that his concepts would be "the basis of any future metaphysics that can be called

mentary

new

particles.

discoveries,

science"

wrong.

it is

interesting to see

where

his

arguments have been

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS SINGE DESCARTES

89

As example we take the law of causality. Kant says that whenwe observe an event we assume that there is a foregoing event from which the other event must follow according to some rule. This is, as Kant states, the basis of all scientific work. In ever

this discussion it is

not important whether or not we can always from which the other one followed.

find the foregoing event

we can

it in many cases. But even if we cannot, nothing can prevent us from asking what this foregoing event might have been and to look for it. Therefore, the law of causality is reduced to the method of scientific research; it is the

Actually

find

condition which makes science possible. Since we actually apply 3 this method, the law of causality is "a priori' and is not derived

from experience. Is this true in

atomic physics? Let us consider a radium atom, a-particle. The time for the emission of the

which can emit an

We

cannot be predicted. can only say that in the take about two thousand years. will in the emission average place we do not actually look emission when observe the we Therefore, a-particle

from which the emission must according to a rule follow. Logically it would be quite possible to look for such a foregoing event, and we need not be discouraged by the fact that hitherto none has been found. But why has the scientific method actually changed in this very fundamental question for a foregoing event

since

Kant?

Two

can be given to that question. The one have been convinced by experience that the laws of quantum theory are correct and, if they are, we know that a

is:

possible answers

We

foregoing event as cause for the emission at a given time cannot know the foregoing event, be found. The other answer is:

We

but not quite accurately. We know the forces in the atomic nucleus that are responsible for the emission of the a-particle.


9O

knowledge contains the uncertainty which is brought about by the interaction between the nucleus and the rest of the

But

this

world. If

we wanted

to

know why

the a-particle was emitted at

that particular time we would have to know the microscopic structure of the whole world including ourselves, and that is impossible. Therefore,

of the

law of

A similar of space

Kant's arguments for the a priori character

causality

no longer apply.

discussion could be given on the a priori character as forms of intuition. The result would be the

and time

The a

priori concepts which Kant considered an undistruth are no longer contained in the scientific system of putable

same.

modern

physics.

they form an essential part of this system in a somewhat different sense. In the discussion of the Copenhagen interpretaStill

tion of

quantum theory

it

has been emphasized that we use the our experimental equipment and

classical concepts in describing

generally in describing that part of the world which does not belong to the object of the experiment. The use of these concepts, including space, time and causality, is in fact the

more

condition for observing atomic events

and

is,

in this sense of the

word, "a priori." What Kant had not foreseen was that these a priori concepts can be the conditions for science and at the same time can have only a limited range of applicability. When we to assume a causal chain of events

make an experiment we have that leads

from the atomic event through the apparatus finally if this causal chain was not assumed,

to the eye of the observer;

nothing could be known about the atomic event. Still we must keep in mind that classical physics and causality have only a limited range of applicability. It was the fundamental paradox of

quantum theory

that could not be foreseen by Kant.

Modern

physics has changed Kant's statement about the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori from a metaphysical one into a


The

synthetic judgments a priori thereby practical one.. the character of a relative truth. If

one reinterprets the Kantian "a

33

priori

QI

have

in this way, there

no reason

to consider the perceptions rather than the things as given. Just as in classical physics, we can speak about those events that are not observed in the same manner as about those is

that are observed. Therefore, practical realism is a natural part of the reinterpretation. Considering the Kantian "thing-in-itsdf

Kant had pointed out

that

we cannot conclude anything from

the perception about the "thing-in-itself ." This statement has, as Weizsacker has noticed, its formal analogy in the fact that in spite of the use of the classical concepts in all the experiments a

nonclassical behavior of the atomic objects is possible. The 5 "thing-in-itself is for the atomic physicist, if he uses this con-

cept at

all,

finally

a mathematical structure; but

this structure

Kant

indirectly deduced from experience. In this reinterpretation the Kantian "a priori" is indirectly connected with experience in so far as it has been formed through the development of the human mind in a very distant

is

contrary to

Following this argument the biologist Lorentz has once compared the "a priori" concepts with forms of behavior that in

past.

animals are called "inherited or innate schemes." It

in fact

is

quite plausible that for certain primitive animals space and time are different from what Kant calls our "pure intuition" of space

and time. The to the

latter

may

belong to the species "man," but not

world as independent of men. But we are perhaps entering

by following this biological the "a priori." It was mentioned here merely as an example of how the term "relative truth" in connection with the

into too hypothetical discussions

comment on

Kantian "a priori" can possibly be interpreted. Modern physics has been used here as an example say,

as a model to check the

results of

or,

we may

some important

philo-


92

sophic systems of the past, which of course were meant to hold a much wider field. What we have learned especially from

in

the discussion of the philosophies of Descartes perhaps be stated in the following way:

and Kant may

concepts or words which have been formed in the past through the interplay between the world and ourselves are not

Any

really sharply defined with respect to their say,

we do

our

way

meaning; that

is

to

exactly how far they will help us in finding often know that they can be applied in the world.

not

know

We

to a wide range of inner or outer experience, but we practically never know precisely the limits of their applicability. This is true

even of the simplest and most general concepts like "existence" and "space and time." Therefore, it will never be possible by

pure reason to arrive at some absolute truth. The concepts may, however, be sharply defined with regard to their connections. This is actually the fact when the concepts

become a part of a system of axioms and definitions which can be expressed consistently by a mathematical scheme. Such a group of connected concepts may be applicable to a wide field of experience and will help us to find our way in this field. But the limits of the applicability will in general

not be known, at least

not completely.

Even

if

we

realize that the

meaning

of a concept

is

never de-

fined with absolute precision, some concepts form an integral part of scientific methods, since they represent for the time being

the final result of the development of

human thought in the past,

even in a very remote past; they may even be inherited and are any case the indispensable tools for doing scientific work in

in

they can be practically a priori. But further limitations of their applicability may be found in the

our time. In

future.

this sense

VI.

The

Relation of

Quantum Theory

to

Other Parts of Natural Science

IT HAS been stated before that the concepts of natural science can sometimes be sharply defined with regard to their connections. This possibility was realized for the first time in Newton's Principia and it is just for that reason that Newton's work has exerted its enormous influence on the whole development of natural science in the following centuries.

Newton

begins his

Principia with a group of definitions and axioms which are interconnected in such a way that they form what one may call a * 'closed system." Each concept can be represented by a mathe-

matical symbol, and the connections between the different concepts are then represented by mathematical equations expressed

by means of the symbols. The mathematical image of the system ensures that contradictions cannot occur in the system. In this the possible motions of bodies under the influence of the acting forces are represented by the possible solutions of the

way

equations. The system of definitions and axioms which can be written in a set of mathematical equations is considered as de-

an

eternal structure of nature, depending neither particular space nor on particular time.

scribing

93

on a


94

The is

connection between the different concepts in the system change any one of the

so close that one could generally not

concepts without destroying the whole system. For this reason Newton's system was for a long time considered as final and the task set before the scientists of the fol-

lowing period seemed simply to be an expansion of Newton's mechanics into wider fields of experience. Actually physics did develop along these lines for about two centuries. From the theory of the motion of mass points one could go over to the mechanics of solid bodies, to rotatory motions, and

one could treat the continuous motions of a fluid or the vibrating motions of an elastic body. All these parts of mechanics or

dynamics were gradually developed in close connection with the evolution of mathematics, especially of the differential calculus, and the results were checked by experiments. Acoustics and

hydrodynamics became a part of mechanics. Another science, in which the application of Newton's mechanics was obvious, was astronomy. The improvements of the mathematical methods gradually led to more and more accurate determinations of the motions of the planets and of their mutual interactions. When the

phenomena

of electricity

and magnetism were

discovered,

the electric or magnetic forces were compared to the gravitational forces and their actions upon the motion of the bodies

could again be studied along the lines of Newtonian mechanics. Finally, in the nineteenth century, even the theory of heat could

be reduced to mechanics by the assumption that heat really conof a complicated statistical motion of the smallest parts of

sists

the concepts of the mathematical theory of probability with the concepts of Newtonian mechanics Clausius, Gibbs and Boltzmann were able to show that the

matter.

By combining

fundamental laws in the theory of heat could be interpreted as

RELATION OF QUANTUM THEORY TO NATURAL SCIENCE statistical

laws following from Newton's mechanics mechanical systems.

when

95

applied

to very complicated

Up to this point the program set up by Newtonian mechanics had been carried out quite consistently and had led to the understanding of a wide field of experience. The first difficulty arose in the discussions on the electromagnetic field in the work of Faraday and Maxwell. In Newtonian mechanics the gravitational force had been considered as given, not as an object for further theoretical studies. In the work of Faraday and Maxwell, however, the field of force itself became the object of the investigation; the physicists wanted to know how this field of force varied as function of space and time. Therefore, they tried

up equations of motion for the fields, not primarily for the upon which the fields act. This change led back to a of view which had been held by many scientists before point to set

bodies

Newton.

body

An action

could, so

to another only

when

it

seemed, be transferred from one

the two bodies touched each other;

a collision or through friction. Newton had introduced a very new and strange hypothesis by assuming a force that acted over a long distance. Now in the theory of the fields of force one could come back to the older idea, that action is for instance, in

from one point to a neighboring point, only by debehavior of the fields in terms of differential equathe scribing tions. This proved actually to be possible, and therefore the transferred

description of the electromagnetic fields as given by Maxwell's equations seemed a satisfactory solution of the problem of force.

changed the program given by Newtonian mechanics. The axioms and definitions of Newton had referred

Here one had

really

to bodies and their motion; but with Maxwell the fields of force seemed to have acquired the same degree of reality as the bodies in Newton's theory. This view of course was not easily ac-


96 cepted;

and

to avoid such

a change in the concept of

reality it

seemed plausible to compare the electromagnetic fields with the fields of elastic deformation or stress, the light waves of Maxwell's theory

with the sound waves in

elastic bodies.

Therefore,

many physicists believed that Maxwell's equations actually referred to the deformations of an elastic medium, which they called the ether;

and

name was

given merely to explain that it could penetrate into other matter and could not be seen or felt. This explanation was

the

medium was

this

so light

and thin that

not too satisfactory, however, since it could not explain the complete absence of any longitudinal light waves. Finally the theory of relativity, which will be discussed in the next chapter, showed in a conclusive way that the concept of the ether as a substance, to which Maxwell's equations refer, had to

be abandoned. The arguments cannot be discussed at this point; but the result was that the fields had to be considered as an independent

A

reality.

and still more startling result of the theory of special relativity was the discovery of new properties of space and time, actually of a relation between space and time that had not been known before and did not exist in Newtonian mefurther

chanics.

the impression of this completely new situation many physicists came to the following somewhat rash conclusion:

Under

Newtonian mechanics had finally been disproved. The primary reality is the field and not the body, and the structure of space and time is correctly described by the formulas of Lorentz and Einstein, and not by the axioms of Newton. The mechanics of Newton was a good approximation in many cases, but now it must be improved to give a more rigorous description of nature. From the point of view which we have finally reached in

RELATION OF QUANTUM THEORY TO NATURAL SCIENCE

97

quantum theory such a statement would appear description of the actual situation. First,

it

as a very poor ignores the fact that

most experiments by which fields are measured are based upon Newtonian mechanics and, second, that Newtonian mechanics cannot be improved; it can only be replaced by something essentially different!

The development

of

quantum theory has taught us

that one

should rather describe the situation in the following terms: Wherever the concepts of Newtonian mechanics can be used to

by Newton are and cannot be improved. But the electromagnetic phenomena cannot adequately be described by the concepts of Newtonian mechanics. Therefore, the experiments on the electromagnetic fields and on light waves, together with their theoretical analysis by Maxwell, Lorentz and Einstein, have led to a new closed system of definitions and axioms and of condescribe events in nature, the laws formulated

strictly correct

can be represented by mathematical symbols, which coherent in the same sense as the system of Newton's me-

cepts that is

from it. Therefore, even the hopes which had accompanied the work of the scientists since Newton had to be changed. Apparently

chanics, but

is

essentially different

progress in science could not always be achieved by using the

known laws of nature for explaining new phenomena. In some cases new phenomena that had been observed could only be understood by new concepts which were adapted to the new phenomena

in the

same way as Newton's concepts were

to the

mechanical events. These new concepts again could be connected in a closed system and represented by mathematical symbols. But if physics or, more generally, natural science proceeded in this way, the question arose: What is the relation between the different sets of concepts? If, for instance, the same


98

concepts or words occur in two different sets and are defined differently with regard to their connection and mathematical representation, in

what

sense

do the concepts represent

reality?

This problem arose at once when the theory of special relativity had been discovered. The concepts of space and time belonged both to Newtonian mechanics and to the theory of relativity.

But space and time

in

Newtonian mechanics were inde-

pendent; in the theory of relativity they were connected by the Lorentz transformation. In this special case one could show that the statements of the theory of relativity approached those of Newtonian mechanics within the limit in which all velocities in the system are very small as compared with the velocity of light. From this one could conclude that the concepts of Newtonian

mechanics could not be applied to events in which there occurred velocities comparable to the velocity of light. Thereby one

had

finally

found an

essential limitation of

Newtonian me-

chanics which could not be seen from the coherent set of con-

from simple observations on mechanical systems. Therefore, the relation between two different coherent sets of

cepts nor

concepts always requires very careful investigation. Before we enter into a general discussion about the structure of any such closed

and coherent

set of concepts

and about their possible

rela-

tions we will give a brief description of those sets of concepts that have so far been defined in physics. One can distinguish four

systems that have already attained their final form.

The

first set,

Newtonian mechanics, has already been

dis-

cussed. It is suited for the description of all mechanical systems, of the motion of fluids and the elastic vibration of bodies; it

comprises acoustics,

The second

statics,

aerodynamics.

closed system of concepts was formed in the of the nineteenth course century in connection with the theory


99

Though the theory of heat could finally be connected with mechanics through the development of statistical mechanics, it would not be realistic to consider it as a part of of heat.

mechanics. Actually the phenomenological theory of heat uses a number of concepts that have no counterpart in other branches of physics, like: heat, specific heat, entropy, free energy, etc. If from this phenomenological description one goes over to a statistical interpretation, by considering heat as energy, distributed statistically among the very many degrees of freedom due to the atomic structure of matter, then heat is no more connected with mechanics than with electrodynamics or other parts

of physics. The central concept of this interpretation is the concept of probability, closely connected with the concept of entropy in the phenomenological theory. Besides this concept the statistical

theory of heat requires the concept of energy. But any

coherent set of axioms and concepts in physics will necessarily contain the concepts of energy, momentum and angular mo-

mentum and

the law that these quantities must under certain conditions be conserved. This follows if the coherent set is in-

tended to describe certain features of nature that are correct at

and everywhere; in other words, features that do not on depend space and time or, as the mathematicians put it, that are invariant under arbitrary translations in space and time, or Lorentz transformation. rotations in space and the Galileo Therefore, the theory of heat can be combined with any of the all

times

other closed systems of concepts. The third dosed system of concepts in the

phenomena

of electricity

and axioms has its origin and magnetism and has reached

form in the first decade of the twentieth century through the work of Lorentz, Einstein and MinkowskL It comprises electrodynamics, special relativity, optics, magnetism, and one its

final


100

may include the de Broglie theory of matter waves of all different sorts of elementary particles, but not the wave theory of Schrodinger. Finally, the fourth coherent system is essentially the quantum theory as it has been described in the first two chapters. Its central concept is the probability function, or the "statistical matrix," as the mathematicians call it. It comprises quantum

and wave mechanics, the theory of atomic spectra, chemistry, and the theory of other properties of matter like electric conductivity, ferromagnetism, etc.

The

relations

between these four

sets of

concepts can be indicontained in the third

cated in the following way: The first set is as the limiting case where the velocity of light can be considered as infinitely big, and is contained in the fourth as the limiting where Planck's constant of action can be considered as

case

The first and partly the third set belong to the fourth as a priori for the description of the experiments. The second set can be connected with any of the other three sets infinitely small.

without

difficulty

with the fourth.

and

The

especially important in its connection independent existence of the third and is

fourth sets suggests the existence of a fifth set, of which one, three, and four are limiting cases. This fifth set will probably be

found someday in connection with the theory of the elementary particles.

We have omitted from this enumeration the set of concepts connected with the theory of general relativity, since this set has perhaps not yet reached its final form. But it should be from the other four sets. After this short survey we may come back to the more general question, what one should consider as the characteristic features Q such a closed system of axioms and definitions. Perhaps the

emphasized that

it is

distinctly different


IOI

most important feature is the possibility of finding a consistent mathematical representation for it. This representation must guarantee that the system does not contain contradictions. Then the system must be suited to describe a wide field of experience.

The

great variety of

phenomena

in the field should correspond

number

of solutions of the equations in the mathematical representation. The limitations of the field can generally to the great

not be derived from the concepts. The concepts are not sharply defined in their relation to nature, in spite of the sharp definition of their possible connections.

The

found from experience, from the

limitations will therefore be

fact that the concepts

do not

allow a complete description of the observed phenomena. After this brief analysis of the structure of present-day physics the relation between physics and other branches of natural science may be discussed. The nearest neighbor to physics is

chemistry. Actually through quantum theory these two sciences have come to a complete union. But a hundred years ago they were widely separated, their methods of research were quite different,

and the concepts

of chemistry

had

at that time

no

counterpart in physics. Concepts like valency, activity, solubility qualitative character, and chemistry sciences. When the theory of heat to the exact scarcely belonged had been developed by the middle of the last century scientists

and

volatility

had a more

to the chemical processes, and ever since then the scientific work in this field has been determined by the hope

started to apply

it

of reducing the laws of chemistry to the mechanics of the atoms. It should be emphasized, however, that this was not possible

within the framework of Newtonian mechanics. In order to give a quantitative description of the laws of chemistry one had to

much wider system of concepts for atomic physics. This was finally done in quantum theory, which has its roots

formulate a


102

Then it was easy reduced be to Newnot could to see that the laws of chemistry tonian mechanics of atomic particles, since the chemical elements just as

much

in chemistry as in atomic physics.

displayed in their behavior a degree of stability completely lacking in mechanical systems. But it was not until Bohr's theory of the atom in 1913 that this point had been clearly understood. In say, the concepts of chemistry are hi the mechanical concepts. If we know part complementary to that an atom is in its lowest stationary state that determines its

the final result, one

chemical properties

may

we cannot

at the

same time speak about the

motion of the electrons in the atom. the one side, and present relation between biology, on be on the and other, may very similar to that chemistry, physics

The

between chemistry and physics a hundred years ago. The methods of biology are different from those of physics and chemistry, and the typical biological concepts are of a more qualitative character than those of the exact sciences.

Concepts

an organ, perception have no in or chemistry. On the other hand, most of counterpart physics the progress made in biology during the past hundred years has like life, organ, cell, function of

been achieved through the application of chemistry and physics to the living organism, and the whole tendency of biology in our time

to explain biological

is

known

physical

whether

this

and chemical

hope is

justified

phenomena on the laws.

basis of the

Again the question arises,

or not.

Just as in the case of chemistry, one learns from simple biological experience that the living organisms display a degree of

which general complicated structures consisting of many different types of molecules could certainly not have on the basis of the physical and chemical laws alone. Therefore, something

stability


1

03

has to be added to the laws of physics and chemistry before the biological phenomena can be completely understood.

With regard

to this question two distinctly different views have frequently been discussed in the biological literature. The one view refers to Darwin's theory of evolution in its connection

with modern genetics. According to this theory, the only concept which has to be added to those of physics and chemistry in order to understand

life is

the concept of history.

The enormous time

interval of roughly four thousand million years that has elapsed since the formation of the earth has given nature the possibility

of trying an almost unlimited variety of structures of groups of molecules. Among these structures there have finally been some

that could reduplicate themselves by using smaller groups from the surrounding matter, and such structures therefore could be created in great numbers. Accidental changes in the structures

provided a structures

still

had

larger variety of the existing structures. Different to compete for the material drawn from the sur-

rounding matter and in

this

way, through the "survival of the

fittest/' the evolution of living organisms finally took place. There can be no doubt that this theory contains a very large amount of truth, and many biologists claim that the addition of

the concepts of history and evolution to the coherent set of concepts of physics and chemistry will be amply sufficient to account for all biological phenomena. One of the arguments frequently used in favor of this theory emphasizes that wherever the laws of

and chemistry have been checked in living organisms have always been found to be correct; there seems definitely they to be no place at which some "vital force" different from the physics

forces in physics could enter.

On the of

its

other hand,

it is

just this

argument that has lost much

weight through quantum theory. Since the concepts of

PHYSICS AN0 PHILOSOPHY

104 physics that of

and chemistry form a

closed

and coherent

set,

namely,

quantum theory, necessary that wherever these concan be to describe used cepts phenomena the laws connected with the concepts must be valid too. Therefore, wherever one it is

treats living

organisms as physicochemical systems, they must

The only question from which we can learn something about the adequacy of this first view is whether the physicochemical concepts allow a complete description of the necessarily act as such.

organisms. Biologists, who answer this question in the negative, generally hold the second view, that has now to be explained. This second view can perhaps be stated in the following is very difficult to see how concepts like perception, function of an organ, affection could be a part of the coherent set of the concepts of quantum theory combined with the con-

terms: It

cept of history.

On the other hand,

these concepts are necessary even if for the moment we

for a complete description of life, exclude mankind as presenting new problems beyond biology.

be necessary for an understanding of go beyond quantum theory and to construct a new coherent set of concepts, to which physics and chemistry may beTherefore, life

it

will probably

to

long as "limiting cases ;" History

and concepts long to

it.

may be an

essential part of

it,

like perception, adaptation, affection also will be-

If this

view

is

correct, the

combination of Darwin's

theory with physics and chemistry would not be sufficient to explain organic life; but still it would be true that living organisms can to a large extent be considered as physicochemical sysas machines, as Descartes and Laplace have put it and

tems

would, if treated as such, also react as such. One could at the same time assume, as Bohr has suggested, that our knowledge of

a

cell

being alive may be complementary to the complete knowlits molecular structure. Since a complete knowledge of

edge of


105

structure could possibly be achieved only by operations that

tliis

destroy the life of the cell, it is logically possible that life precludes the complete determination of its underlying physico-

chemical structure. Even

probably recommend

if

one holds

this

second view one would

for biological research

no other method

than has been pursued in the past decades: attempting to explain as much as possible on the basis of the known physicochemical laws, and describing the behavior of organisms carefully and without theoretical prejudices. The first of these two views is more common among modern biologists

ent

is

The

than the second; but the experience available at presbetween the two views.

certainly not sufficient to decide

given by many biologists to the first view may be due again to the Cartesian partition, which has penetrated so deeply into the human mind during the past centuries. preference that

is

Since the "res cogitans" was confined to men, to the "I," the animals could have no soul, they belonged exclusively to the "res extensa/

5

Therefore, the animals can be understood, so

it is

argued, on the same terms as matter in general, and the laws of physics and chemistry together with the concept of history must

be

sufficient to explain their behavior. It is

only

when

the "res

a new

situation arises which will reBut the Cartesian partition is a concepts. and it is therefore dangerous oversimplification quite possible

cogitans"

is

brought in that

quire entirely

new

that the second view

Quite apart from

is

the correct one.

this question,

which cannot be

settled yet,

we

are obviously still very far from such a coherent and closed of set concepts for the description of biological phenomena. The

degree of complication in biology is so discouraging that one can at present not imagine any set of concepts in which the con-


I06

nections could be so sharply defined that a mathematical representation could become possible.

we go beyond

biology and include psychology in the discusthen there can sion, scarcely be any doubt but that the concepts of physics, chemistry, and evolution together will not be suffiIf

On this point the existence of quantheory has changed our attitude from what was believed in the nineteenth century. During that period some scientists were cient to describe the facts.

tum

inclined to think that the psychological phenomena could ultimately be explained on the basis of physics and chemistry of the

From the quantum-theoretical point of view there is no reason for such an assumption. would, in spite of the fact that the physical events in the brain belong to the psychic phenomena, not expect that these could be sufficient to explain brain.

We

them.

We

would never doubt that the brain

chemical mechanism of psychic

if

treated as such; but for

a physicoan understanding

acts as

phenomena we would start from the fact that the enters as object and subject into the scientific

human mind

process of psychology. Looking back to the different sets of concepts that have been formed in the past or may possibly be formed in the future in the

the world by means of science, be ordered we see that they appear to by the increasing part played by the subjective element in the set. Classical physics can be considered as that idealization in which we speak about the

attempt to find our

world as

way through

entirely separated

from

ourselves.

The

first

three sets

correspond to this idealization. Only the first set complies entirely with the "a priori" in the philosophy of Kant. In the

quantum theory, man as the subject of science in through the questions which are put to nature in brought the a priori terms of human science. Quantum theory does not fourth

is

set,

that of


1

07

allow a completely objective description of nature. In biology It may be important for a complete understanding that the quesspecies man which itself belongs to the genus of living organisms, in other words, that we already know tions are asked

what

life Is

by the

even before

we have

defined

it

scientifically.

But one

should perhaps not enter into speculations about the possible structure of sets of concepts that have not yet been formed.

When

one compares

this

order with older classifications that

belong to earlier stages of natural science one sees that one has

now

divided the world not into different groups of objects but

Into different groups of connections. In science one distinquished, for instance,

an

earlier period of

as

different

groups

minerals, plants, animals, men. These objects were taken according to their group as of different natures, made of different ma-

and determined in

terials,

their behavior

by

different forces.

Now we know that it is always the same matter, the same various chemical compounds that

may belong to any object,

to minerals

as well as animals or plants; also the forces that act between the different parts of matter are ultimately the same in every kind of

What can be

distinguished is the kind of connection primarily important in a certain phenomenon. For when we speak about the action of chemical forces we instance, mean a kind of connection which Is more complicated or in any object.

which

is

case different

from that expressed In Newtonian mechanics. The tissue of events, in which

world thus appears as a complicated

connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or combine and thereby determine the texture of the whole.

When we

represent a group of connections

by a closed and

coherent set of concepts, axioms, definitions and laws which in turn is represented by a mathematical scheme we have in fact isolated

and

idealized this

group of connections with the purpose


108 of clarification.

But even

this

not

it is

way,

if

complete clarity has been achieved in

known how

accurately the set of concepts

describes reality.

These

idealizations

may be

guage that has been formed

called a part of the human lanfrom the interplay between the

world and ourselves, a human response to the challenge of nature. In this respect they may be compared to the different styles of art, say of architecture

or music.

A style of art can also

formal rules which are applied to the material of this special art. These rules can perhaps not be represented in a strict sense by a set of mathematical concepts and

be defined by a

set of

equations, but their fundamental elements are very closely related to the essential elements of mathematics. Equality and in-

and symmetry,

certain group structures play the fundamental role both in art and in mathematics. Usually

equality, repetition

work of several generations is needed to develop that formal system which later is called the style of the art, from its simple beginning to the wealth of elaborate forms which characterize its completion. The interest of the artist is concentrated on this process of crystallization, where the material of the art takes, the

through his action, the various forms that are initiated by the first formal concepts of this style. After the completion the must fade again, because the word "interest" means: to interest

be with something, to take part in a process of life, but this process has then come to an end. Here again the question of how far the formal rules of the style represent that reality of life is meant by the art cannot be decided from the formal

which rules.

Art

reality

is

always an idealization; the ideal is different from from the reality of the shadows, as Plato would but idealization is necessary for understanding.

at least

have put it This comparison between the different

sets of

concepts in


log

natural science with different styles of art may seem very far from the truth to those who consider the different styles of art as rather arbitrary products of the human mind. They would argue that in natural science these different sets of concepts represent objective reality,, have been taught to us by nature, are

by no means arbitrary, and are a necessary conseof our gradually increasing experimental knowledge of quence nature. About these points most scientists would agree; but are

therefore

the different styles of art an arbitrary product of the human mind? Here again we must not be misled by the Cartesian partition.

The

style arises

out of the inteiplay between the world

and ourselves, or more specifically between the spirit of the time and the artist. The spirit of a time is probably a fact as objective as any fact in natural science, and this spirit brings out certain features of the world which are even Independent of time, are in this sense eternal. The artist tries by his work to make these features understandable, and in this attempt he is led to the forms of the style In which he works. Therefore, the two processes, that of science and that of art, are not very different. Both science and art form in the course of the centuries a human language by which we can speak about the more remote parts of reality, and the coherent sets of concepts as well as the different styles of art are different words or groups of words in this language.

VII.

The Theory of Relativity

WITHIN the field of modern physics the theory of relativity has always played a very important

role. It

was in this theory that the

a change in the fundamental principles of physics was recognized for the first time. Therefore, a discussion of those problems that had been raised and partly solved by the theory of relativity belongs essentially to our treatment of the philosophical implications of modern physics. In some sense it may be said that necessity ,for

contrary to quantum theory the development of the theory of relativity from the final recognition of the difficulties to their solution has taken only a very short time. The repetition of

Michelson's experiment by Morley and Miller in 1904 was the first definite evidence for the impossibility of detecting the trans-

motion of the earth by optical methods, and Einstein's paper appeared less than two years later. On the other the hand, experiment of Morley and Miller and Einstein's paper were only the final steps in a development which had started very much earlier and which may be summarized under the lational

decisive

heading "electrodynamics of moving bodies." Obviously the electrodynamics of moving bodies had been an important field of physics and engineering ever since electroserious difficulty had been motors had been constructed.

A

no


III

brought into this subject, however, by Maxwell's discovery of the electromagnetic nature of light waves. These waves differ in one essential property from other waves, for instance, from

sound waves: they can be propagated in what seems to be empty space. When a bell rings in a vessel that has been evacu-

sound does not penetrate to the outside. But light does penetrate easily through the evacuated volume. Therefore, one assumed that light waves could be considered as elastic waves of

ated, the

a very light substance called ether which could be neither seen nor felt but which filled the evacuated space as well as the space

which other matter, like air or glass, existed. The idea that electromagnetic waves could be a reality in themselves, indein

pendent of any bodies, did at that time not occur to the physiSince this hypothetical substance ether seemed to penetrate through other matter, the question arose: What happens if the cists.

matter

is

set into

motion and

if

motion? Does the ether participate in this how is a light wave propagated is the case

this

in the

moving ether? Experiments which are relevant

for the following reason:

The

to this question are difficult velocities of moving bodies are

usually very small compared to the velocity of light. Therefore, the motion of these bodies can only produce very small effects which are proportional to the ratio of the velocity of the body to the velocity of light, or to a higher power of this ratio. Several

experiments by Wilson, Rowland, Roentgen and EichenwaJd and Fizeau permitted the measurement of such effects with an

accuracy corresponding to the first power of this ratio. The theory of the electrons developed by Lorentz in 1895 was able to describe these effects quite satisfactorily. But then the experiof Michdson, Morley and Miller created a new situation.

ment

This experiment

shall

be discussed in some

detail.

In order to


112

get bigger effects and thereby more accurate results, it seemed best to do experiments with bodies of very high velocity. The

earth

moves around the sun with a

velocity of roughly 20 with respect to the sun and does not move with the earth, then this fast motion of the ether with respect to the earth should make itself felt in a change of the

miles/sec. If the ether

is

at rest

be different depending on propagated in a direction parallel or perpendicular to the direction of the motion of the ether. Even if the ether should partly move with the earth, there should be

velocity of light. This velocity should

whether the

light

is

due to what one may call wind of the ether, and this would then probably depend on the altitude above sea level at which the experiment is carried out. A calculation of the expected effect showed that it should be very small, since it

some

effect

effect

proportional to the square of the ratio of the velocity of the earth to that of the light, and that one therefore had to carry out very careful experiments on the interference of two beams of is

motion of the earth. The first experiment of this kind, carried out by Michelson in 1881, had not been sufficiently accurate. But even later

light traveling parallel or perpendicular to the

repetitions of the experiment did not reveal the slightest signs of the expected effect. Especially the experiments of Morley and

Miller in 1904 could be considered as definite proof that effect of the expected order of magnitude did not exist.

an

strange as it was, met another point that had been discussed by the physicists some time before. In Newton's me5 chanics a certain "principle of relativity' is fulfilled that can be

This

result,

described in the following terms: If in a certain system of reference the mechanical motion of bodies fulfills the laws of New-

any other frame of motion with respect in uniform nonrotating

tonian mechanics, then this reference which

is

is

also true for


113

to the first system. Or, in other words, a uniform translational motion of a system does not produce any mechanical effects at all and can therefore not be observed by such effects.

Such a principle

of relativity

so

it

seemed

to the physicists

-

could not be true in optics or electrodynamics. If the first system at rest with respect to the ether, the other systems are not, and

is

motion with respect to the ether should be recognized by effects of the type considered by Michelson. The negative result of the experiment of Morley and Miller in 1904 revived the idea that such a principle of relativity could be true in therefore their

electrodynamics as well as Newtonian mechanics. On the other hand, there was an old experiment by Fizeau in 1851 that seemed definitely to contradict the principle of relativity.

Fizeau had measured the velocity of light in a moving

liquid. If the principle of relativity

of light in the

was

correct, the total velocity

moving liquid should be the sum

of the velocity of

the liquid and the velocity of light in the liquid at rest. But this was not the case; the experiment of Fizeau showed that the total velocity

was somewhat

smaller.

Still the negative results of all more recent experiments to recognize the motion "with respect to the ether" inspired the theoretical physicists and mathematicians at that time to look for

mathematical interpretations that reconciled the wave equation for the propagation of light with the principle of relativity. Lorentz suggested, in 1904, a mathematical transformation that requirements. He had to introduce the hypothesis

fulfilled these

moving bodies are contracted in the direction of motion by a factor depending on the velocity of the body, and in different schemes of reference there are different "apparent" times which that

many ways take the place of the "real" time. In this way he could represent something resembling the principle of relativity: in


114

was the same in every system of had been discussed by Poincare, Fitz-

the "apparent" velocity of light reference. Similar ideas

gerald and other physicists.

The

was taken in the paper by Einstein which he established the "apparent" time of the Lorentz transformation as the "real" time and abolished what had been called "real" time by Lorentz. This was a change in decisive step, however,

in 1905 in

the very foundations of physics; an unexpected and very radical change that required all the courage of a young and revolution-

To

take this step one needed, in the mathematical of nature, nothing more than the consistent aprepresentation plication of the Lorentz transformation. But by its new in-

ary genius.

terpretation the structure of space and time had changed and many problems of physics appeared in a new light. The sub-

stance ether, for instance, could be abolished too. Since all systems of reference that are in uniform translation motion with respect to each other are equivalent for the description of nature, there is no meaning in the statement that there is a substance,

the ether, which is at rest in only one of these systems. Such a substance is in fact not needed and it is much simpler to say that light waves are propagated through empty space and that electromagnetic fields are a reality of their own and can exist in

empty space. But the decisive change was in the structure of space and time. It is very difficult to describe this change in the words of com-

mon language, without the use of mathematics, since the common words "space" and "time" refer to a structure of space and time that is actually an idealization and oversimplification of the real structure. But still we have to try to describe the new structure

and we can perhaps do

When we

use the term "past"

it

in the following

we comprise

all

way: those events


115

which we could know at least in principle, about which we could have heard at least in principle. In a similar manner we comprise

by the term "future"

all

those events which

we

could in-

fluence at least in principle, which we could try to change or to prevent at least in principle. It is not easy for a nonphysicist to see why this definition of the terms "past" and "future" should

be the most convenient one. But one can

easily see that it corre-

sponds very accurately to our common use of the terms. If we use the terms in this way, it turns out as a result of many experi-

ments that the content of "future" or "past" does not depend on the state of motion or other properties of the observer. may say that the definition is invariant against the motion of the

We

observer. This

is

true both in

Newtonian mechanics and in Ein-

theory of relativity. But the difference is this: In classical theory we assume that future and past are separated by an infinitely short time interval

stein's

which we may call the present moment. In the theory of relativity we have learned that the situation is different: future and past are separated by a finite time interval the length of which depends on the distance from the observer. Any action can only be propagated by a velocity smaller than or equal to the velocity of light. Therefore, an observer can at a given instant neither know of nor influence any event at a distant point which takes

two characteristic times. The one time is the which a light signal has to be given from the point of

place between instant at

the event in order to reach the observer at the instant of observation.

The

other time

is

the instant at which

a light

signal,

given

by the observer at the instant of the observation, reaches the between these point of the event. The whole finite time interval

two

instants

may be said

to belong to the "present time" for the

observer at the instant of observation.

Any

event taking place


Il6

between the two characteristic times

may be

called "simul-

taneous" with the act of observation.

The use of the phrase "may be called"

points up an ambiguity due to the fact that this term has been formed from the experience of daily life, in which the velocity of light can always be considered as infinitely high. Actually this term in physics can be defined also in a slightly different manner and Einstein has in his papers used this second in the

word "simultaneous/' which

definition.

When two

simultaneously,

we

events

happen

is

at the

same point

say that they coincide; this term

in space is

quite

unambiguous. Let us now imagine three points in space that lie on a straight line so that the point in the middle has the same distance from each of the

two outer points.

If

two events happen

at the two outer points at such times that light signals starting from the events coincide when they reach the point in the

middle,

we can

definition

is

define the

is

portant consequences for one observer they observer,

if

two events

narrower than the

he

is

first

as simultaneous. This

one.

One

of its

most im-

that

when two

may

not be simultaneous for another

events are simultaneous

in motion relative to the

first

observer.

The con-

nection between the two definitions can be established

by the

statement that whenever two events are simultaneous in the

first

sense of the term, one can always find a frame of reference in which they are simultaneous in the second sense too. The first definition of the term "simultaneous" seems to correspond more nearly to its use in daily life, since the question whether two events are simultaneous does in daily life not depend on the frame of reference. But in both relativistic definitions the term has acquired a precision which is lacking in the

language of daily

life.

In quantum theory the physicists had to

learn rather early that the terms of classical physics describe


117

nature only inaccurately, that their application is limited by the quantum laws and that one therefore should be cautious in

In the theory of

relativity the physicists have tried to change the meaning of the words of classical physics, to make the terms more precise in such a way that they fit the new situa-

their use.

tion in nature.

The

structure of space and time that has been brought to light by the theory of relativity has many consequences in different parts of physics. The electrodynamics of moving bodies

can be derived at once from the principle of relativity. This principle itself can be formulated as a quite general law of nature pertaining not only to electrodynamics or mechanics but to any group of laws: The laws take the same form in all systems of reference, which are different from each other only by a uniform translational motion; they are invariant against the

Lorentz transformation.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the principle of relativity is the inertia of energy, or the equivalence of mass and energy. Since the velocity of light is the limiting velocity which can never be reached by any material body, it is easy to see that it is

more fast

difficult to accelerate

than a body at

rest.

a body that is already moving inertia has increased with

The

very the kinetic energy. But quite generally any kind of energy will, according to the theory of relativity, contribute to the inertia,

the mass, and the mass belonging to a given amount of energy is just this energy divided by the square of the velocity

Le., to

of light. Therefore, every energy carries mass with it; but even a rather big energy carries only a very small mass, and this is the

reason why the connection between mass and energy had not been observed before. The two laws of the conservation of mass

and the conservation

of charge lose their separate validity

and


Il8

are combined into one single law which may be called the law of conservation of energy or mass. Fifty years ago, when the theory of relativity was formulated, this hypothesis of the equivalence of mass and energy seemed to be a complete revolution in physics, it.

and there was

still

very

little

experimental evidence for

many experiments how elementary can be created from kinetic energy, and how such are annihilated to form radiation; therefore, the trans-

In our times we see in

particles particles

mutation from energy into mass and vice versa suggests nothing unusual. The enormous release of energy in an atomic explosion is

another and

still

more spectacular proof of the correctness of But we may add here a critical historical

Einstein's equation.

remark.

has sometimes been stated that the enormous energies of atomic explosions are due to a direct transmutation of mass into It

energy, and that it is only on the basis of the theory of relativity that one has been able to predict these energies. This is, however,

a misunderstanding. The huge amount of energy available in the atomic nucleus was known ever since the experiments of Becquerd, Curie and Rutherford on radioactive decay. Any decaying body like radium produces an amount of heat about a million times greater than the heat released in a chemical process in a similar amount of material. The source of energy in the fission process of

uranium

is just

the same as that in the o-decay

of radium, namely, mainly the electrostatic repulsion of the two parts into which the nucleus is separated. Therefore, the energy of an atomic explosion comes directly from this source and is

not derived from a transmutation of mass into energy. The of elementary particles with finite rest mass does not de-

number

crease during the explosion. But it is true that the binding energies of the particles in an atomic nucleus do show up in their


Iig

masses and therefore the release of energy is In this indirect manner also connected with changes in the masses of the nuclei.

The

equivalence of mass and energy has

portance in physics

besides

Its

great im-

also raised

problems concerning very old has been the thesis of several philo-

philosophical questions. It sophical systems of the past that substance or matter cannot be destroyed. In

modern

physics, however,

many

experiments have

shown that elementary particles, e.g., positrons and electrons, can be annihilated and transmuted Into radiation. Does this mean that these older philosophical systems have been disproved by that the arguments brought forward by

modern experience and

the earlier systems have been misleading? This would certainly be a rash and unjustified conclusion, since the terms "substance" and "matter" in ancient or medieval

philosophy cannot simply be identified with the term "mass" in modern physics. If one wished to express our modern experience in the language of older philosophies, one could consider mass and energy as two different forms of the same "substance" and

thereby keep the idea of substance as indestructible. On the other hand, one can scarcely say that one gains much by expressing modern knowledge in an old language. The philosophic systems of the past were formed from the bulk of knowledge available at their time and from the lines of thought

which such knowledge had

led. Certainly one should not of hundreds of years ago to have the many expect philosophers foreseen the development of modern physics or the theory of relativity. Therefore, the concepts to which the philosophers

to

were led in the process of intellectual clarification a long time ago cannot possibly be adapted to phenomena that can only be observed by the elaborate technical tools of our time. But before going into a discussion of philosophical ImpHca-


120

tions of tie theory of relativity

further development has to be

its

described.

The

hypothetical substance "ether," which had played such an important role in the early discussions on Maxwell's theories in the nineteenth century,

had

as has

been said before

been

abolished by the theory of relativity. This is sometimes stated by saying that the idea of absolute space has been abandoned. But

such a statement has to be accepted with great caution. It is true that one cannot point to a special frame of reference in which the substance ether

is

at rest

and which could therefore deserve the

name "absolute space." But it would be wrong to say that space has now lost all of its physical properties. The equations of motion for material bodies or

fields still

take a different form in

a "normal" system of reference from another one which rotates or is in a nonuniform motion with respect to the "normal" one.

The existence of centrifugal forces in a rotating system proves so far as the theory of relativity of 1905 and 1906 is concerned the existence of physical properties of space which permit the between a rotating and a nonrotating system. This may not seem satisfactory from a philosophical point of

distinction

view, from which one would prefer to attach physical properties only to physical entities like material bodies or fields and not to

empty space. But

so far as the theory of electromagnetic processes or mechanical motions is concerned, this existence of

physical properties of empty space that cannot be disputed.

is

simply a description of facts

A

careful analysis of this situation about ten years later, in 1916, led Einstein to a very important extension of the theory of

which is usually called the theory of "general relaBefore tivity." going into a description of the main ideas of this new theory it may be useful to say a few words about the degree relativity,


121

which we can rely on the correctness of these two parts of the theory of relativity. The theory of 1905 and 1906 is based on a very great number of well-established facts: on the experiments of Michelson and Morley and many similar ones, on the equivalence of mass and energy in innumerable of certainty with

radioactive processes, on the dependence of the lifetime of radioactive bodies on their velocity, etc. Therefore, this theory be-

longs to the firm foundations of modern physics disputed in our present situation.

For the theory of general is

much

scarce.

less

relativity

and cannot be

the experimental evidence

convincing, since the experimental material

is

very

There are only a few astronomical observations which

allow a checking of the correctness of the assumptions. Therefore, this whole theory is more hypothetical than the first one.

The

cornerstone of the theory of general relativity

is

the con-

nection between inertia and gravity. Very careful measurements have shown that the mass of a body as a source of gravity is exactly proportional to the mass as a measure for the inertia of the body. Even the most accurate measurements have never shown any deviation from this law. If the law is generally true,

the gravitational forces can be put on the same level with the centrifugal forces or with other forces that arise as a reaction of the inertia. Since the centrifugal forces

had

to be considered as

due to physical properties of empty space, as had been discussed before, Einstein turned to the hypothesis that the gravitational

due to properties of empty space. This was a very important step which necessitated at once a second step of equal importance. We know that the forces of gravity are produced by

forces also are

masses. If therefore gravitation is connected with properties of or influenced by space, these properties of space must be caused

the masses.

The

centrifugal forces in

a rotating system must be


122

produced by the rotation

(relative to the system)

of possibly

very distant masses. In order to carry out the program outlined in these few sentences Einstein had to connect the underlying physical ideas with the mathematical scheme of general geometry that had been dethe properties of space seemed to veloped by Riemann. Since its geometry continuously with the gravitational fields,

change

be compared with the geometry on curved surfaces where the straight line of Euclidean geometry has to be replaced by the the line of shortest distance, and where the

had

to

geodetical line,

curvature changes continuously. As a final result Einstein was able to give a mathematical formulation for the connection beof masses and the determining parameters facts This of the geometry. theory did represent the common identical about gravitation. It was in a very high approximation

tween the distribution

with the conventional theory of gravitation and predicted furthermore a few interesting effects which were just at the limit of measurability. There was, for instance, the action of gravity

on

light.

When

monochromatic

light

emitted from a heavy moving away through the is

the light quanta lose energy when the star; a red shift of the emitted spectral gravitational field of as yet no experimental evidence for this is There line follows.

star,

red

the discussion of the experiments by Freundlich has shown. But it would also be premature to conclude that

shift, as

clearly

the experiments contradict the prediction of Einstein's theory. beam of light that passes near the sun should be deflected by

A

its

gravitational field.

The

found experimagnitude; but

deflection has been

Freundlich in the right order of

mentally by whether the deflection agrees quantitatively with the value predicted by Einstein's theory has not yet been decided. The best

evidence for the validity of the theory of general relativity seems

THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY be the procession in the orbital motion of the planet Mercury, which apparently is in very good agreement with the value predicted by the theory. to

Though the experimental basis of general relativity is still rather narrow, the theory contains ideas of the greatest importance. During the whole period from the mathematicians of ancient Greece to the nineteenth century, Euclidean geometry had been considered as evident; the axioms of Euclid were re-

garded as the foundation of any mathematical geometry, a foundation that could not be disputed. Then, in the nineteenth century, the mathematicians Bolyai and Lobachevsky, Gauss and Eiemann found that other geometries could be invented

which could be developed with the same mathematical precision as that of Euclid; therefore, the questions as to which geometry was correct turned out to be an empirical one. But it was only through the work of Einstein that the question could really be taken up by the physicists. The geometry discussed in the theory of general relativity was not concerned with three-dimensional space only but with the four-dimensional manifold consisting of space and time. The theory established a connection between the

geometry in

this

manifold and the distribution of masses in the

world. Therefore, this theory raised in an entirely new form the old questions of the behavior of space and time in the largest

dimensions;

it

could suggest passible answers that could be

checked by observations. Consequently, very old philosophic problems were taken up had occupied the mind of man since the earliest phases of philosophy and science. Is space finite or infinite? What was that

there before the beginning of time? What will happen at the end of time? Or is there no beginning and no end? These questions

had found

different answers in different philosophies

and

re-


124 ligions.

In the philosophy of

space of the universe was ible).

Space was due

Aristotle, for instance, the total

finite

(though

it

was

infinitely divis-

to the extension of bodies,

it

was con-

nected with the bodies; there was no space where there were no bodies. The universe consisted of the earth and the sun and the stars:

there

a finite number of bodies. Beyond the sphere of the stars was no space; therefore, the space of the universe was

finite.

In the philosophy of Kant

this question

belonged to what he

questions that cannot be answered, since two different arguments lead to opposite results. Space cannot called "antinomies"

be

finite,

since

we cannot imagine

that there should be

to space; to whichever point in space

an end

we come we can

always imagine that we can go beyond. At the same time space cannot be infinite, because space is something that we can imagine (else

word "space" would not have been formed) and we cannot imagine an infinite space. For this second thesis the argument of Kant has not been verbally reproduced. The sentence "space is infinite" means for us something negative; we cannot come to an end of space. For Kant it means that the infinity of space the

is

really given, that

it

a sense that we can scarcely that a rational answer to the quesfinite or infinite cannot be given because "exists" in

reproduce. Kant's result

is

tion whether space is the whole universe cannot be the object of our experience. similar situation is found with respect to the problem of the

A

In the Confessions of St. Augustine, for instance, this question takes the form: What was God doing before He created the world? Augustine is not satisfied with the joke: infinity of time.

"God was busy preparing

Hell for those

who

ask foolish ques-

says, would be too cheap an answer, and he tries to give a rational analysis of the problem. Only for us is time passing by; it is expected by us as future; it passes by as the

tions." This,

he


125

present moment and is remembered by us as past. But God is not

a thousand yeare are for Him as one day, and one day as a thousand years. Time has been created together with the

in time;

world,

it

belongs to the world, therefore time did not exist beGod the whole course of the uni-

fore the universe existed. For

verse is given at once. There was no time before He created the world. It is obvious that in such statements the word "created" at

once

raises all the essential difficulties.

This word as

It is

usually understood means that something has come into being that has not been before, and in this sense it presupposes the concept of time. Therefore, it is impossible to define in rational

terms what could be meant by the phrase "time has been created." This fact reminds us again of the often discussed lesson that has been learned from

concept, clear as

it

modern

may seem to

physics: that every word or be, has only a limited range of

applicability.

In the theory of general relativity these questions about the infinity of space and time can be asked and partly answered on

an empirical basis. If the connection between the four-dimengeometry in space and time and the distribution of masses in the universe has been correctly given by the theory, then the astronomical observations on the distribution of galaxies in space

sional

give us information about the geometry of the universe as a At least one can build "models" of the universe, cos-

whole.

mological pictures, the consequences of which can be compared with the empirical facts. From the present astronomical knowledge one cannot definitely distinguish

between several possible models.

It

may be

that the space filled by the universe is finite. This would not mean that there is an end of the universe at some place. It would

only

by proceeding farther and farther in one directhe universe one would finally come back to the point

mean

tion in

that

126


from which one had

The

would be similar as on the surface of the earth geometry where we, when starting from a point in an eastward direction, finally come back to this point from the west. With respect to time there seems to be something like a beginning. Many observations point to an origin of the universe about four billion years ago; at least they seem to show that at that time all matter of the universe was concentrated in a much smaller space than it is now and has expanded ever since from this small space with different velocities. The same time of four billion years is found in many different observations (e.g., from the age of meteorites, of minerals on the earth, etc.), and therefore it would be difficult to find an interpretation essentially different from this idea of an origin. If it is the correct one it would mean that beyond this time the concept of time would undergo started.

situation

in the two-dimensional

essential changes.

In the present

state of astronomical observa-

tions the questions about the space-time geometry on a large scale cannot yet be answered with any degree of certainty. But it is

extremely interesting to see that these questions

may

possibly

be answered eventually on a solid empirical basis. For the time being even the theory of general relativity rests on a very narrow experimental foundation and must be considered as much less certain than the so-called theory of special relativity expressed by the Lorentz transformation. Even if one limits the further discussions of

this latter

theory

there is no doubt that the theory of relativity has deeply changed our views on the structure of space and time. The most exciting

aspect of these changes is perhaps not their special nature but the fact that they have been possible. The structure of space and

time which had been defined by

Newton

as the basis of his

mathematical description of nature was simple and consistent

and corresponded very

closely to the use of the concepts

space

THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY and time

in daily

life.

127

This correspondence was in fact so close

that Newton's definitions could be considered as the precise mathematical formulation of these common concepts. Before the

theory of relativity it seemed completely obvious that events could be ordered in time independent of their location in space.

We know now that this impression is created in daily life by the fact that the velocity of light is so very much higher than any other velocity occurring in practical experience; but this restriction was of course not realized at that time. And even if we

know

the restriction

now we can

scarcely imagine that the time

order of events should depend on their location.

The

philosophy of Kant later on drew attention to the fact that the concepts of space and time belong to our relation to nature, not to nature

itself;

that

we

could not describe nature

without using these concepts. Consequently, these concepts are "a priori* in some sense, they are the condition for and not primarily the result of experience, and it was generally believed that they could not be touched by new experience. Therefore, the necessity of the change appeared as a great surprise. It was

the

first

time that the

scientists

learned

how

be in applying the concepts of daily life

cautious they had to to the refined experience

modern experimental science. Even the precise and consistent formulation of these concepts in the mathematical language of Newton's mechanics or their careful analysis in the philosophy of

of

Kant had

no protection against the

offered

critical analysis

warnpossible through extremely accurate measurements. This modern of the useful in later development ing proved extremely physics,

and

it

would

certainly

have been

still

more

difficult

to

understand quantum theory had not the success of the theory of relativity

warned the

use of conphysicists against the uncritical

cepts taken from daily life or from

classical physics.

VIII. Criticism

and Counterproposals

to the

Copenhagen Interpretation of

Quantum Theory

THE Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory has led the away from the simple materialistic views that prevailed in the natural science of the nineteenth century. Since these views had not only been intrinsically connected with physicists far

natural science of that period but had also found a systematic analysis in some philosophic systems and had penetrated deeply into the

mind even

the

Copenhagen

common men on the street, it can be many attempts have been made to criticize

of the

well understood that

interpretation

line with the concepts of

and

to replace

it

by one more in

classical physics or materialistic phi-

losophy.

These attempts can be divided into three different groups. first group does not want to change the Copenhagen in-

The

terpretation so far as predictions of experimental results are concerned; but it tries to change the language of this interpretation in order to get

words, physics.

it tries

a closer resemblance to to

classical physics.

In other

change the philosophy without changing the

Some papers

of this

first

128

group

restrict their

agreement


1

29

with the experimental predictions of the Copenhagen interpretation to all those experiments that have hitherto been carried out or that belong to normal electronic physics. The second group realizes that the Copenhagen interpretation is the only adequate one, if the experimental results agree every-

where with the predictions of this interpretation. Therefore, the papers of this group try to change quantum theory to some extent in certain critical points. The third group, finally, expresses rather

its

general dissatis-

faction with the results of the especially with

its

Copenhagen interpretation and philosophical conclusions, without making

definite counterproposals. Papers

Schrodinger belong to this third been the first of the three groups.

von Laue and which has group historically

by

Einstein,

However, all the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation do agree on one point. It would, in their view, be desirable to return to the reality concept of classical physics or, to use a more general philosophic term, to the ontology of materialism. They

would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them. This, however, is impossible or at least not entirely possible

because of the nature of the atomic phenomena, as has been discussed in some of the earlier chapters. It cannot be our task to formulate wishes as to

how

the atomic

phenomena should be;

our task can only be to understand them. When one analyzes the papers of the first group, it is important to realize from the beginning that their interpretations cannot be refuted by experiment, since they only repeat the Copenhagen interpretation in a different language. From a strictly positivistic

standpoint one

may even say that we are here


130

concerned not with counterproposals to the Copenhagen interpretation but with its exact repetition in a different language. Therefore, one can only dispute the suitability of this language. One group of counterproposals works with the idea of "hidden 33

parameters. Since the quantum-theoretical laws determine in general the results of an experiment .only statistically, one would

from the

classical standpoint

be inclined to think that there

exist

some hidden parameters which escape observation in any ordinary experiment but which determine the outcome of the experiment in the normal causal way. Therefore, some papers try to construct such parameters within the

framework of quan-

tum mechanics. Along

this line, for instance,

Bohm

has

made a

counter-

Copenhagen interpretation, which has recently been taken up to some extent also by de Broglie. Bohm's interpretation has been worked out in detail. It may therefore serve here as a basis for the discussions. Bohm considers the par-

proposal to the

ticles

as "objectively real" structures, like the point masses in in configuration space are in

Newtonian mechanics. The waves

his interpretation "objectively real" too, like electric fields.

Con-

figuration space is a space of many dimensions referring to the different co-ordinates of all the particles belonging to the system.

Here we meet a

first difficulty:

what does

it

mean

to call

waves

in configuration space "real"? This space is a very abstract space. The word "real" goes back to the Latin word "res,"

which means "thing"; but things are in the ordinary threedimensional space, not in an abstract configuration space. One

may

call the

waves in configuration space "objective" when one

wants to say that these waves do not depend on any observer; but one can scarcely call them "real" unless one is willing to

change the meaning of the word.

Bohm

goes on defining the


131

perpendicular to the surfaces of constant wave-phase as the possible orbits of the particles. Which of these lines is the "real"

lines

Mm, on the history of the system and the measuring apparatus and cannot be decided without knowing more about the system and the measuring equipment than actually can be known. This history contains in fact the orbit depends, according to

hidden parameters, the "actual orbit" before the experiment started.

One consequence of this interpretation is, as Pauli has emphasized, that the electrons in the

ground states of many atoms should be at rest, not performing any orbital motion around the atomic nucleus. This looks like a contradiction of the experiments, since measurements of the velocity of the electrons in the ground state (for instance, by means of the Compton effect)

reveal always a velocity distribution in the ground state, which in conformity with the rules of quantum mechanics given is the by square of the wave function in momentum or velocity

But here Bohm can argue that the measurement can no longer be evaluated by the ordinary laws. He agrees that the normal evaluation of the measurement would indeed lead to a space.

velocity distribution; but

measuring equipment

is

when

the

quantum

taken into account

theory for the especially

some

introduced ad hoc by Bohm

then strange quantum potentials the statement is admissible that the electrons "really" always are at rest. In measurements of the position of the particle, Bohm takes the ordinary interpretation of the experiments as correct; in measurements of the velocity he rejects it. At this price Bohm

considers himself able to assert:

"We do

not need to abandon

the precise, rational and objective description of individual systems in the realm of quantum theory." This objective description,

however, reveals

itself

as a kind of "ideological super-


132

which has little to do with immediate physical hidden parameters of Bohm's interpretation are a such kind that they can never occur in the description of

structure,"

reality; for the

of

real processes,

if

quantum theory remains unchanged.

this difficulty, Bohm does in fact express the hope that in future experiments in the range of the elementary particles the hidden parameters may yet play a physical part, and that quantum theory may thus be proved false. When

In order to escape

such strange hopes were expressed, Bohr used to say that they were similar in structure to the sentence: "We may hope that it

will later turn out that

sometimes 2

X

2

=

5, for this

would

be of great advantage for our finances." Actually the fulfillment of Bohm's hopes would cut the ground from beneath not only

quantum theory but also Bohm's interpretation. Of course it must at the same time be emphasized that the analogy just mentioned, although complete, does not represent a logically compelling

argument against a possible future alteration of quantum manner suggested by Bohm. For it would not be

theory in the

fundamentally unimaginable that, for example, a future extension of mathematical logic might give a certain meaning to the = 5, and it might statement that in exceptional cases

2X2

even be possible that

this

extended mathematics would be of use

in calculations in the field of economics.

We

are nevertheless

actually convinced, even without cogent logical grounds, that such changes in mathematics would be of no help to us financially.

Therefore,

it

is

very

difficult to

understand

how

the

mathematical proposals which the work of Bohm indicates as a possible realization of his hopes could be used for the description of physical If

we

phenomena.

disregard this possible alteration of

then Bohm's language, as

we have

quantum

theory,

already pointed out, says


133

nothing about physics that

hagen interpretation

says.

is different from what the CopenThere then remains only the question

of the suitability of this language. Besides the objection already made that in speaking of particle orbits we are concerned with a 3

superfluous "ideological superstructure/ it must be particularly mentioned here that Bohm's language destroys the symmetry be-

tween position and velocity which is implicit in quantum theory; for the measurements of position Bohm accepts the usual interpretation, for the rejects

most

it.

measurements of velocity or

momentum he

Since the symmetry properties always constitute the

essential features of

a theory.

would be gained by omitting them

It is difficult

to see

what

in the corresponding lan-

guage. Therefore, one cannot consider Bohm's counterproposal to the Copenhagen interpretation as an improvement.

A

can be raised in a somewhat different form against the statistical interpretations put forward by Bopp and (on a slightly different line) by Fenyes. Bopp considers the creation or the annihilation of a particle as the fundamental similar objection

process of quantum theory, the particle is "real" in the classical sense of the word, in the sense of materialistic ontology, and the laws of quantum theory are considered as a special case of

and annihilation. which contains This interpretation, many interesting comments on the mathematical laws of quantum theory, can be carried out in such a manner that it leads, as regards the physical consequences, to exactly the same conclusions as the Copenhagen correlation statistics for such events of creation

interpretation. So far it is, in the positivistic sense, isomorphic with it, as is Bohm's. But in its language it destroys the symmetry between particles and waves that otherwise is a characteristic feature of the mathematical scheme of quantum theory. As early

as

1928

it

was shown by Jordan, Klein and Wigner

that the


134

mathematical scheme can be interpreted not only as a quantizamotion but also as a quantization of three-

tion of particle

dimensional matter waves; therefore, there is no reason to consider these matter waves as less real than the particles. The

symmetry between waves and

particles could

be ensured in

the corresponding correlation

statisBopp's interpretation only were developed for matter waves in space and time as well, and if the question was left open whether particles or waves are if

tics

to

be considered

as the

ce

actual" reality.

The assumption

that particles are real in the sense of the materialistic ontology will always lead to the temptation to consider deviations from the uncertainty principle as "basically" posscible. Fenyes, for instance, says that "the existence of the

uncertainty principle [which he connects with certain statistical relations] by no means renders impossible the simultaneous

measurement, with arbitrary accuracy, of position and velocity." Fenyes does not, however, state how such measurements should be carried out in practice, and therefore to remain abstract mathematics.

his considerations

seem

whose counterproposals to the Copenhagen interpretation are akin to those of Bohm and Fenyes, relates the "hidden parameters to a new kind of particle introduced ad hoc, the "zeron," which is not otherwise observable. However, such a concept runs into the danger that the interaction between the real particles and the zerons dissipates the energy among the many degrees of freedom of the zeron field, so that the whole of thermodynamics becomes a chaos. Weizel has not explained how Weizel,

5*

he hopes to avoid

this danger. standpoint of the entire group of publications mentioned so far can perhaps best be defined by recalling a similar discus-

The

sion of the theory of special relativity.

Anyone who was

dis~


135

with Einstein's negation of the ether, of absolute space of absolute time could then argue as follows: The nonexistence of absolute space and absolute time is by no means

satisfied

and

proved by the theory of special

relativity. It

has been shown

only that true space and true time do not occur directly in any ordinary experiment; but if this aspect of the laws of nature

has been correctly taken into account, and thus the correct "apparent" times have been introduced for moving co-ordinate

would be no arguments against the assumption of an absolute space. It would even be plausible to assume that the

systems, there

center of gravity of our galaxy is (at least approximately) at rest in absolute space. The critic of the special theory of relativity

might add that we

will allow the

may hope

unambiguous

that future measurements

definition of absolute space (that

of the "hidden parameter" of the theory of relativity) the theory of relativity will thus be refuted. It is

is,

and that

seen at once that this argument cannot be refuted by

experiment, since it as yet makes no assertions which differ from those of the theory of special relativity. But such an interpretation would destroy in the language used the decisive symmetry property of the theory, namely, the Lorentz invariance, and it

must therefore be considered inappropriate.

The analogy to quantum theory is obvious. The laws of quantum theory are such that the "hidden parameters," invented ad hoc, can never be observed. The decisive symmetry properties are thus destroyed if we introduce the hidden parameters as a the interpretation of the theory. of Blochinzev and Alexandrov is quite different in

fictitious entity into

The work

statement of the problem from those discussed before. These authors expressly and from the beginning restrict their objections

its

against the

Copenhagen

interpretation to the philosophical side


136 of the problem.

The physics of this interpretation is accepted un-

reservedly.

external form of the polemic, however, is so much the sharper: "Among the different idealistic trends in contemporary

The

Copenhagen school is the most reactionary. The present article is devoted to the unmasking of the idealistic and agnostic speculations of this school on the basic problems physics the so-called

of

quantum

physics," writes Blochinzev in his introduction. The polemic shows that here we have to do not with

acerbity of the

science alone but with a confession of faith, with adherence to

a certain creed. The aim is expressed at the end with a quotation from the work of Lenin "However marvellous, from the point of view of the common human intellect, the transformation of the unweighable ether into weighable material, however strange the electrons lack of any but electromagnetic mass, however unusual the restriction of the mechanical laws of motion to but :

one realm of natural phenomena and their subordination to the deeper laws of electromagnetic phenomena, and so on all this is but another confirmation of dialectic materialism." This latter statement seems to

make

Blochinzev's discussion about the rela-

quantum theory to the philosophy of dialectic materialism less interesting in so far as it seems to degrade it to a staged

tion of

is known before the trial has begun. important to get complete clarity about the arguments brought forward by Blochinzev and Alexandrov. Here, where the task is to rescue materialistic ontology, the

trial in

which the verdict

Still it is

made

against the introduction of the observer into the interpretation of quantum theory. Alexandrov writes: "We must therefore understand by 'result of measurement' in attack

is

chiefly

quantum theory only the objective effect of the interaction of the electron with a suitable object. Mention of the observer must

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY be avoided, and

we must treat

137

and objective an of the characteristic physical quantity objective but not the result of an observation." According phenomenon, to Alexandrov, the wave function in configuration space characeffects.

A

objective conditions

is

terizes the objective state of the electron.

In his presentation Alexandrov overlooks the fact that the formalism of quantum theory does not allow the same degree of objectivation as that of classical physics. For instance, if the interaction of a system with the measuring apparatus is treated as a whole according to quantum mechanics and if both are

regarded as cut off from the rest of the world, then the formalism of quantum theory does not as a rule lead to a definite result; will not lead, e.g., to the blackening of the photographic plate at a given point. If one tries to rescue Alexandrov's "objective effect" by saying that "in reality" the plate is blackened at a

it

given point after the interaction, the rejoinder is that the quantum mechanical treatment of the closed system consisting of electron,

measuring apparatus and plate

is no longer being an event describable in which is not without further

applied. It is the "factual" character of

terms of the concepts of daily life in the mathematical formalism of quantum which and theory, appears in the Copenhagen interpretation by

comment contained

the introduction of the observer.

Of

course the introduction of

the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature.

The observer has,

rather, only the function of registering

decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration,

"actual,"

from the

is

the transition from the "possible" to the absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted i.e.,

interpretation of

quantum

theory.

At

this point

quan-


138

connected with thermodynamics in so far as every act of observation is by its very nature an irreversible process; it is only through such irreversible processes turn theory

is

intrinsically

quantum theory can be consistently connected with actual events in space and time. Again the irreversiwhen projected into the mathematical representation bility is that the formalism of

of the

a consequence of the observer's incomplete and in so far not completely "ob-

phenomena

knowledge

of the system

jective."

Blochinzev formulates matter slightly differently from Alexandrov: "In quantum mechanics we describe not a state of the particle in itself but the fact that the particle belongs to this or that statistical assembly. This belonging is completely objective and does not depend on statements made by the observer." Such

formulations, however, take us very far

away from

materialistic ontology.

how

probably too far

To make

this

point clear

it

belonging to a statistical assembly is used in the interpretation of classical thermodynamics. If an observer has determined the temperature of a system and wants is

useful to recall

to

draw from his

in the system he

this

results conclusions is

about the molecular motions

able to say that the system

out of a canonical ensemble and thus he sibly

having

different energies.

"In

may

reality"

is

just

one sample

consider so

it

as pos-

we would con-

the system has only one definite energy at a given time, and none of the others is realized. The observer has been deceived if he considered a different energy at that

clude in classical physics

moment

as possible.

The canonical ensemble contains statements

not only about the system itself but also about the observer's incomplete knowledge of the system. If Blochinzev in quantum

a system's belonging to an assembly "comhe uses the word "objective" in a different pletely objective," theory

tries to call

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY sense

from that in

classical physics.

belonging means, as has

For in

139

classical physics this

been

said, statements not only about the but also about the observer's degree of knowledge of the system

system.

tum

One

exception must be

theory. If in

quantum

made

to this assertion in quanis characterized

theory the assembly

by only one wave function in configuration space (and not, as usual, by a statistical matrix), we meet a special situation (the so-called "pure case") in which the description can be called objective in some sense and in which the element of incomplete knowledge does not occur immediately. But since every measurement would (on account of its irreversible features) reintroduce the element of incomplete knowledge, the situation would not

be fundamentally

we

different.

from these formulations how difficult it is try to push new ideas into an old system of concepts belonging to an earlier philosophy or, to use an old metaphor, when we attempt to put new wine into old bottles. Such at-

Above when we

all,

see

for they mislead us into continually occupying ourselves with the inevitable cracks in the cannot old bottles instead of rejoicing over the new wine.

tempts are always

distressing,

We

possibly expect those thinkers who a century ago introduced dialectic materialism to have foreseen the development of

theory. Their concepts of matter and reality could not refined experimental possibly be adapted to the results of the our of days. technique

quantum

Perhaps one should add at this point some general remarks about the attitude of the scientist to a special creed; it may be a difference bereligious or a political creed. The fundamental

tween the religious and the political creed that the latter refers to the immediate material reality of the world around us, while the former has as

its

object another reality beyond the material


140

world

is

not important for this special question; it is the probitself that is to be discussed. From what has been

lem of creed

would be inclined to demand that the never rely on special doctrines, never confine

said one

thinking to

a

special philosophy.

He

scientist

his

should

method

of

should always be prepared

have the foundations of his knowledge changed by new experience. But this demand would again be an oversimplification of our situation in life for two reasons. The first is that the to

structure of our thinking is determined in our youth by ideas at that time or by getting into contact with

which we meet

strong personalities from

form an integrating part

make

it difficult

ideas later on.

munity

whom we

learn. This structure will

of all our later

work and

it

may

well

for us to adapt ourselves to entirely different

The second

reason

is

that

we

belong to a com-

kept together by common scale of ethical values, or by a common

or a society. This

community

is

by a common language in which one speaks about the general problems of life. The common ideas may be supported by the authority of a ideas,

church, a party or the state and, even if this is not the case, it may be difficult to go away from the common ideas without getting into conflict with the

contradict

tMnking may would be unwise

community. Yet the

some

of the

results of scientific

common

ideas. Certainly

demand that the scientist should generally not be a loyal member of his community, that he should be deprived of the happiness that may come from belonging to a community, and it would be equally unwise to desire that the it

common

to

ideas of society which

from the

scientific

point of view

are always simplifications should change instantaneously with the progress of scientific knowledge, that they should be as variable as scientific theories this

point

we come back even

must

necessarily be. Therefore, at

in our time to the old

problem of

COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY the "twofold truth" that has

filled

141

the history of Christian re-

ligion throughout the later Middle Ages. There is the very disputable doctrine that "positive religion whatever form it may

an indispensable need

for the mass of the people, while of science seeks the real truth back of religion and seeks it only there." "Science is esoteric," so it is said, "it is only for in If our few." time the political doctrines and social activities

take

the

is

man

take the part of positive religion in some countries, the problem is still essentially the same. The scientist's first claim will always be intellectual honesty, while the community will frequently ask of the scientist that least

in view of the variability of science

he at

wait a few decades before expressing in public his dissent-

ing opinions. There is probably no simple solution to this problem, if tolerance alone is not sufficient; but some consolation

may come from the fact that it is certainly an old problem belonging to human life. Coming back now to the counterproposals to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory we have to discuss the second group of proposals, which try to change quantum theory in order to arrive at a different philosophical interpretation. The most careful attempt in this direction has been made by Janossy, has realized that the rigorous validity of quantum mechanics compels us to depart from the reality concept of classical

who

physics.

a way

He

that,

therefore seeks to alter

although

many

quantum mechanics

of the results remain true,

in such

its

struc-

ture approaches that of classical physics. His point of attack is what is called "the reduction of wave packets," i.e., the fact that

function generally, the probability takes cognizance of changes discontinuously when the observer a result of measurement. Janossy notices that this reduction can-

the

wave function

or,

more

not be deduced from the differential equations of the mathe-


142

matical formalism and he believes that he can conclude from

an inconsistency in the usual interpretation. It that the "reduction of wave packets" always appears in the Copenhagen interpretation when the transition is completed from the possible to the actual. The probability

this that there is is

well

known

function,

which covered a wide range of possibilities, is suddenly much narrower range by the fact that the experi-

reduced to a

ment has

led to a definite result, that actually a certain event

has happened. In the formalism this reduction requires that the so-called interference of probabilities, which is the most char-

phenomenon of quantum theory, is destroyed by the partly undefmable and irreversible interactions of the system with the measuring apparatus and the rest of the world. Janossy acteristic

now tries

to alter

quantum mechanics by the introduction

of so-

damping terms into the equations, in such a way that the interference terms disappear of themselves after a finite time. called

Even

if this

corresponds to reality

and there

is

no reason to

from the experiments that have been performed suppose there would still remain a number of alarming consequences of such an interpretation, as Janossy himself points out (e.g., waves which are propagated faster than the velocity of light, interchange of the time sequence of cause and effect, etc.). Therethis

we

should hardly be ready to sacrifice the simplicity of quantum theory for this kind of view until we are compelled by

fore,

experiments to do so. Among the remaining opponents of what is sometimes called the "orthodox" interpretation of quantum theory, Schrodinger

has taken an exceptional position inasmuch as he would ascribe the "objective reality" not to the particles but to the waves and is not prepared to interpret the waves as "probability waves only." In his paper entitled

"Are There Quantum Jumps?" he


143

attempts to deny the existence of quantum jumps altogether (one may question the suitability of the term "quantum jump" at this

and could replace

by the less provocative term "disSchrodinger's work first of all contains some misunderstanding of the usual interpretation. He overlooks the fact that only the waves in configuration space (or the place

continuity" )

.

it

Now,

"transformation matrices" ) are probability waves in the usual interpretation, while the three-dimensional matter waves or radia-

waves are not. The

tion little

latter

have

"reality" as the particles; they

just as

much and

just as

have no direct connection

with probability waves but have a continuous density of energy and momentum, like an electromagnetic field in Maxwell's theory. Schrodinger therefore rightly emphasizes that at this point the processes can be conceived of as being more continuous

than they usually are. But this interpretation cannot remove the element of discontinuity that is found everywhere in atomic

any scintillation screen or Geiger counter demonstrates element at once. In the usual interpretation of quantum theory it is contained in the transition from the possible to the

physics; this

actual. Schrodinger himself makes no counterproposal as to how he intends to introduce the element of discontinuity, everywhere

observable, in a different

manner from the usual

interpretation.

Finally, the criticism which Einstein, Laue and others have expressed in several papers concentrates on the question whether

the Copenhagen interpretation permits a unique, objective debe scription of the physical facts. Their essential arguments may stated in the following terms: The mathematical scheme of quantum theory seems to be a perfectly adequate description of

the

statistics

of atomic

phenomena. But even

if its

statements

about the probability of atomic events are completely correct, this interpretation does not describe what actually happens inde-


144

But something must pendently of or between the observations. this something need not be dehappen, this we cannot doubt; scribed in terms of electrons or waves or light quanta, but unless the task of physics is not completed. It cannot be admitted that it refers to the act of observation only. it is

described

The

physicist

somehow

must postulate

in his science that

present, essentially unchanged,

if

is

studying a

he were not

there. Therefore,

no

understanding of

the Copenhagen interpretation offers the atomic phenomena. It is easily

he

made and which would be

world which he himself has not

real

what this criticism demands is again the the answer from the ontology. But what can be

seen that

old materialistic

point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation? can say that physics is a part of science and as such aims

We

at

a description and understanding scientific

of nature.

Any

kind of

or not, depends on our language, on

understanding, the communication of ideas. Every description of phenomena, of experiments and their results, rests upon language as the only

means

the concepts of daily physics

The words

of communication.

may

life,

of this language represent

which in the

be refined to the concepts of

scientific

language of

These an unambiguous communication about the setting up of experiments and about classical physics.

concepts are the only tools for

about events,

their results. If therefore the

description of

what

really

atomic physicist

happens

is

asked to give a

in his experiments, the

words

"description" and "really" and "happens" can only refer to the concepts of daily life or of classical physics. As soon as the

gave up this basis he would lose the means of unambiguous communication and could not continue in his physicist

science. Therefore,

any statement about what has "actually


145

33

is a statement in terms of the classical concepts and because of thermodynamics and of the uncertainty relations by its very nature incomplete with respect to the details of the

happened

atomic events involved. The demand to "describe what happens in the quantum-theoretical process between two successive 3'

observations is a contradiction in adjecto, since the word "describe" refers to the use of the classical concepts, while these concepts cannot be applied in the space between the observa-

can only be applied at the points of observation. should be noticed at this point that the Copenhagen in-

tions; they It

terpretation of

quantum theory

is

in

no way

positivistic.

For,

based on the sensual perceptions of the observer as elements the of reality, the Copenhagen inter-

whereas positivism

is

pretation regards things and processes which are describable in terms of classical concepts, i.e., the actual, as the foundation of

any physical interpretation.

At the same time we

see that the statistical nature of the laws

of microscopic- physics cannot be avoided, since any knowledge because of the quantum-theoretical laws of the "actual" is

by

its

very nature an incomplete knowledge. ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the

The

33

kind of existence, the direct "actuality of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation is impossible, however.

A few remarks may be added concerning the formal structure of all the counterproposals hitherto made against the Copenthese proposals hagen interpretation of quantum theory. All

have found themselves compelled to

sacrifice the essential

sym-

quantum theory (for instance, the symmetry between waves and particles or between position and velocity) . metry properties of

146 Therefore,


we may well suppose that the Copenhagen interpreta-

tion cannot be avoided

if

these

symmetry properties

Lorentz invariance in the theory of

relativity

like the

are held to be a

genuine feature of nature; and every experiment yet performed supports this view.

IX.

Quantum Theory and

the Structure of

Matter

THE concept of matter has undergone a great number of changes in the history of human thinking. Different interpretations have been given hi different philosophical systems. All these different meanings of the word are still present in a greater or lesser degree in what we conceive in our time as the word

"matter,"

The

Greek philosophy from Thales to the Atomists, in the seeking unifying principle in the universal mutability of all had formed the concept of cosmic matter, a world subthings, early

stance which experiences all these transformations, from which all individual things arise and into which they become again

transformed. This matter was partly identified with some specific matter like water or air or fire; only partly, because it had

no other attribute but are made.

to

be the material from which

all

things

Later, in the philosophy of Aristotle, matter was thought of in the relation between form and matter. All that we perceive in the world of phenomena around us is formed matter. Matter is

not a reality but only a possibility, a "potentia" ; it exists only by means of form. In the natural process the "essence," in

itself

148


as Aristotle calls

it,

form

into actuality.

passes over

The matter

from mere

possibility

of Aristotle

is

through

certainly not a

matter like water or air, nor is it simply empty space; it a kind of indefinite corporeal substratum, embodying the possibility of passing over into actuality by means of the form. The typical examples of this relation between matter and form in the

specific is

philosophy of Aristotle are the biological processes in which matter is formed to become the living organism, and the building and forming activity of man. The statue is potentially in the

marble before

it is cut out by the sculptor. Then, much later, starting from the philosophy of Descartes, matter was primarily thought of as opposed to mind. There were the two complementary aspects of the world, "matter" and

Descartes put it, the "res extensa" and the "res cogitans." Since the new methodical principles of natural science, especially of mechanics, excluded all tracing of corporeal

"mind,"

or, as

phenomena back

to spiritual forces, matter could

be considered

reality of its own independent of the mind and of any super9 natural powers. The "matter" of this period is "formed matter/

as

a

the process of formation being interpreted as a causal chain of mechanical interactions; it has lost its connection with the vege-

and therefore the dualism no longer relevant. It is this concept of matter which constitutes by far the strongest component in our present use of the word "matter."

tative soul of Aristotelian philosophy,

between matter and form

is

Finally, in the natural science of the nineteenth century an-

other dualism has played some role, the dualism between matter and force. Matter is that on which forces can act; or matter can

produce gravity,

forces.

and

Matter, for instance, produces the force of on matter. Matter and force are two

this force acts

distinctly different aspects of the corporeal

world. In so far as

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER the forces

may be

149

formative forces this distinction comes closer

and form. On the other most recent development of modern physics this between matter and force is completely lost, since

to the Aristotelian distinction of matter

hand, in the distinction

every field of force contains energy and in so far constitutes matter. To every field of force there belongs a specific kind of elementary particles with essentially the same properties as all other atomic units of matter.

When natural science investigates the problem of matter it can do so only through a study of the forms of matter. The infinite variety and mutability of the forms of matter must be the immediate object of the investigation and the efforts must be directed toward finding some natural laws, some unifying prin-

can serve as a guide through this immense field. natural science and especially physics has concenTherefore, trated its interest for a long period on an analysis of the structure of matter and of the forces responsible for this structure. ciples that

Since the time of Galileo the fundamental method of natural science

had been the experiment. This method made it possible from general experience to specific experience, to single

to pass out characteristic events in nature

from which

its

"laws" could

be studied more directly than from general experience. If one wanted to study the structure of matter one had to do experi-

ments with matter. One had to expose matter tions in order to study

its

to extreme condi-

transmutations there, in the hope of

finding the fundamental features of matter which persist under all

apparent changes. In the early days of modern natural science this was the object of chemistry, and this endeavor led rather early to the concept of the chemical element. A substance that could not be further dissolved or disintegrated

by any of the means

at the disposal of


I5O the chemist

boiling, burning, dissolving,

mixing with other

was called an element. The introduction of this a first and most important step toward an underconcept was standing of the structure of matter. The enormous variety of

substances, etc.

substances was at least reduced to a comparatively small number of more fundamental substances, the "elements/ and thereby some order could be established among the various phenomena 9

of chemistry. The word "atom" was consequently used to designate the smallest unit of matter belonging to a chemical element, and the smallest particle of a chemical compound could be pic-

tured as a small group of different atoms. The smallest particle of the element iron, e.g., was an iron atom, and the smallest particle of water, the water molecule, consisted of one oxygen

atom and two hydrogen atoms. The next and almost equally important step was the discovery of the conservation of mass in the chemical process. For instance, when the element carbon is burned into carbon dioxide the mass of the carbon dioxide

is

equal to the

sum

carbon and the oxygen before the process.

of the masses of the It

was

this discovery

meaning to the concept of matter: indechemical properties matter could be measured by

that gave a quantitative

pendent its

of

its

mass.

During the following period, mainly the nineteenth century, a number of new chemical elements were discovered; in our time this number has reached one hundred. This development showed quite clearly that the concept of the chemical element had not yet reached the point where one could understand the unity of matter. It was not satisfactory to believe that there are many kinds of matter, qualitatively different and without

very

any connection between one another. In the beginning of the nineteenth century some evidence for

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER

15!

a connection between the different elements was found in the fact that the atomic weights of different elements frequently seemed to be integer multiples of a smallest unit near to the

atomic weight of hydrogen. The similarity in the chemical behavior of some elements was another hint leading in the same direction. But only the discovery of forces much stronger than those applied in chemical processes could really establish the connection between the different elements and thereby lead to a closer unification of matter.

These forces were actually found in the radioactive process discovered in 1896 by Becquerd. Successive investigations by Curie, Rutherford and others revealed the transmutation of elements in the radioactive process.

The

o-particles are emitted

in these processes as fragments of the atoms with an energy about a million times greater than the energy of a single atomic particle in a chemical process. Therefore, these particles could

be used as new atom.

The

of a-rays

tools for investigating the inner structure of the

was the nuclear model

important feature of of the

on the scattering atom in 1911. The most well-known model was the separation

result of Rutherford's experiments

atom into two

this

of the

distinctly different parts, the

atomic nucleus

and the surrounding electronic shells. The nucleus in the middle of the atom occupies only an extremely small fraction of the thousand space filled by the atom (its radius is about a hundred times smaller than that of the atom), but contains almost its entire mass. Its positive electric charge, which is an integer

determines the nummultiple of the so-called elementary charge, as a whole must be atom the electrons ber of the surrounding electrically neutral

and the shapes of their orbits.

This distinction between the atomic nucleus and the electronic shells at once gave a proper explanation of the fact that for


152

chemistry the chemical elements are the last units of matter and that very much stronger forces are required to change the ele-

ments into each other. The chemical bond between neighboring atoms is due to an interaction of the electronic shells, and the

An

electron energies of this interaction are comparatively small. that is accelerated in a discharge tube by a potential of only several volts has sufficient energy to excite the electronic shells to the emission of radiation, or to destroy the chemical

bond

in

a molecule. But the chemical behavior of the atom, though it consists of the behavior of its electronic shells, is determined by the charge of the nucleus. One has to change the nucleus if one wants to change the chemical properties, and energies about a million times greater.

this

requires

The nuclear model of the atom, however, if it is thought of as a system obeying Newton's mechanics, could not explain the stability of the atom. As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, only the application of quantum theory to this model through the work of Bohr could account for the fact that, for

example, a carbon atom after having been in interaction with other atoms or after having emitted radiation always finally

remains a carbon atom with the same electronic

This

stability

shells as before.

could be explained simply by those features of

quantum theory that prevent a simple objective description in space and time of the structure of the atom. In this way one finally had a first basis for the understanding of matter. The chemical and other properties of the atoms could be accounted for by applying the mathematical scheme of quantum theory to the electronic shells. From this basis one could try to extend the analysis of the structure of matter in two opposite directions. One could either study the interaction of atoms, their relation to larger units like molecules or crystals


153

or biological objects; or one could try through the investigation of the atomic nucleus and its components to penetrate to the final unity of matter. Research has proceeded on both lines dur-

ing the past decades and we shall in the f ollowing pages be concerned with the role of quantum theory in these two fields.

The

forces between neighboring forces, the attraction of opposite

atoms are primarily

electric

and the

repulsion of equal the nuclei and repelled

charges; the electrons are attracted by from each other. But these forces act not according to the laws of Newtonian mechanics but those of quantum mechanics.

This leads to two different types of binding between atoms. In the one type the electron of one atom passes over to the other one, for example, to this case

physicist calls ions, attract each other.

of

fill

up a nearly

both atoms are

and

finally

closed electronic shell. In

charged and form what the

since their charges are opposite they

In the second type one electron belongs in a way characteristic quantum theory to both atoms. Using the picture of the elec-

one might say that the electron goes around both nuclei spending a comparable amount of time in the one and in the other atom. This second type of binding corresponds to what

tronic orbit,

the chemists call a valency bond. These two types of forces, which

may

occur in any mixture,

cause the formation of various groupings of atoms and seem to

be ultimately responsible for all the complicated structures of matter in bulk that are studied in physics and chemistry. The formation of chemical compounds takes place through the formation of small closed groups of different atoms, each group of crystals being one molecule of the compound. The formation

due to the arrangement of the atoms in regular lattices. Metals are formed when the atoms are so tightly packed that their outer

is


154

and wander through the whole due to the spinning motion of the electron,

electrons can leave their shells crystal.

and

Magnetism

is

so on. all these cases the dualism between matter and force can be retained, since one may consider nuclei and electrons as

In still

the fragments of matter that are kept together by

means

of the

electromagnetic forces.

While in this way physics and chemistry have come to an almost complete union in their relations to the structure of matter, biology deals with structures of a more complicated and

somewhat

different type. It

is

true that in spite of the wholeness

of the living organism a sharp distinction between animate and inanimate matter can certainly not be made. The development of biology has supplied us with a great number of examples

where one can

see that specific biological functions are carried by special large molecules or groups or chains of such molecules, and there has been an increasing tendency in modern biology to

explain biological processes as consequences of the laws of physics and chemistry. But the kind of stability that is displayed

by the

living

organism

is

of a nature

somewhat

different

from

the stability of atoms or crystals. It is a stability of process or function rather than a stability of form. There can be no doubt that the laws of quantum theory play a very important role in the biological phenomena. For instance, those specific quantumcan be described only inaccurately by the of chemical valency are essential for the understanding of concept theoretical forces that

the big organic molecules and their various geometrical patterns; the experiments on biological mutations produced by radiation

show both the relevance of the statistical quantum-theoretical laws and the existence of amplifying mechanisms. The close analogy between the working of our nervous system and the

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER functioning of

modern

electronic

computers

stresses

155

again the

importance of single elementary processes in the living organism. Still all this does not prove that physics and chemistry will, together with the concept of evolution, someday offer a complete must description of the living organism. The biological processes

be handled by the experimenting scientist with greater caution than processes of physics and chemistry. As Bohr has pointed it may well be that a description of the living organism that could be called complete from the standpoint of the physicist cannot be given, since it would require experiments that interfere too strongly with the biological functions. Bohr has de-

out,

scribed this situation by saying that in biology we are concerned with manifestations of possibilities in that nature to which we

belong rather than with outcomes of experiments which

we can

ourselves perform. The situation of complementarity to which this formulation alludes is represented as a tendency in the

methods of modern biological research which, on the one hand, makes full use of all the methods and results of physics and chemistry and, on the other hand, is based on concepts referring to those features *of organic nature that are not contained in physics or chemistry, like the concept of life itself.

So far we have followed the analysis of the structure of matter from the atom to the more complicated structures consisting of many atoms; from atomic physics to the

in one direction:

to biology. Now we physics of solid bodies, to chemistry and have to turn to the opposite direction and follow the line of

research from the outer parts of the atom to the inner parts and from the nucleus to the elementary particles. It is this line which will possibly lead to

an understanding of the unity

Here we need not be tures

of matter.

afraid of destroying characteristic strucWhen the task is set to test the final

by our experiments.

PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY unity of matter we may expose matter to the strongest possible forces, to the most extreme conditions, in order to see whether

any matter can ultimately be transmuted into any other matter. The first step in this direction was the experimental analysis of the atomic nucleus. In the initial period of these studies, which filled approximately the first three decades of our century,

the only tools available for experiments on the nucleus were the a-particles emitted from radioactive bodies. With the help of these particles Rutherford succeeded in 1919 in transmuting nuclei of light elements; he could, for instance, transmute a nitrogen nucleus into an oxygen nucleus by adding the a-particle

and at the same time knocking out one was first This the proton. example of processes on a nuclear scale that reminded one of chemical processes, but led to the

to the nitrogen nucleus

artificial

transmutation of elements.

ress was, as is well

by means

known, the

of high-tension

The next

substantial prog-

acceleration of protons to energies sufficient to

artificial

equipment

cause nuclear transmutation. Voltages of roughly one million volts are required for this purpose and Cockcroft and Walton in their

first

decisive experiment succeeded in transmuting nuclei

of the element lithium into those of helium. This discovery

opened up an

entirely

new line

of research, which

may be called

nuclear physics in the proper sense and which very soon led to a qualitative understanding of the structure of the atomic nucleus.

The structure of the nucleus was indeed very simple. The atomic nucleus consists of only two kinds of elementary particles. The one is the proton which is at the same time simply the hydrogen nucleus; the other is called neutron, a particle which has roughly the mass of the proton but is electrically neutral. Every nucleus can be characterized by the number of protons

and neutrons

of

which

it

consists.

The normal carbon

nucleus.

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER for instance, consists of 6 protons

and 6

157

neutrons. There are

other carbon nuclei, less frequent in number (called isotopic to the first ones), that consist of 6 protons and 7 neutrons, etc. So

one had of the

reached a description of matter in which, instead different chemical elements, only three fundamental

finally

many

units occurred: the proton, the neutron and the electron. All matter consists of atoms and therefore is constructed from these

three fundamental building stones. This was not yet the unity of matter, but certainly a great step toward unification and

perhaps course

more important simplification. There was of a long way to go from the knowledge of the two

still

still

building stones of the nucleus to a complete understanding of its structure. The problem here was somewhat different from the

corresponding problem in the outer atomic shells that had been solved in the middle of the twenties. In the electronic shells the forces

between the

particles

were known with great accuracy,

but the dynamic laws had to be found, and were found in quantum mechanics. In the nucleus the dynamic laws could well be supposed to be just those of quantum mechanics, but the forces between the particles were not known beforehand; they

had to be derived from the experimental properties of the nuclei. This problem has not yet been completely solved. The forces have probably not such a simple form as the electrostatic forces in the electronic shells and therefore the mathematical difficulty of

computing the properties from complicated

forces

and the

But a inaccuracy of the experiments make progress difficult. has nucleus the of of the structure qualitative understanding definitely

been reached.

there remained the final problem, the unity of matter. these fundamental building stones proton, neutron and

Then Are

electron

final indestructible units of matter,

atoms in the sense


158

of Democritus, without any relation except for the forces that act between them or are they just different forms of the same

Can

kind of matter?

they again be transmuted into each other

possibly into other forms of matter as well? An experimental attack on this problem requires forces and energies concentrated on atomic particles much larger than those that have been neces-

and

sary to investigate the atomic nucleus. Since the energies stored up in atomic nuclei are not big enough to provide us with a tool for such experiments,, the physicists have to rely either on the forces in cosmic dimensions or on the ingenuity and skill of the engineers.

Actually, progress has been made on both lines. In the first case the physicists make use of the so-called cosmic radiation.

The

electomagnetic fields on the surface of stars extending over huge spaces are under certain circumstances able to accelerate

and nuclei. The nuclei, owing seem to have a better chance of remaining in the accelerating field for a long distance, and finally when they leave the surface of the star into empty space they have already traveled through potentials of several thousand million

charged atomic

particles, electrons

to their greater inertia,

There may be a further acceleration in the magnetic fields stars; in any case the nuclei seem to be kept within the space of the galaxy for a long time by varying magnetic fields, and finally they fill this space with what one calls cosmic radiation. This radiation reaches the earth from the outside and volts.

between the

consists of nuclei of practically all kinds, hydrogen and helium and many heavier elements, having energies from roughly a hundred or a thousand million electron volts to, again in rare cases, a million times this amount. When the particles of this

cosmic radiation penetrate into the atmosphere of the earth they atoms or oxygen atoms of the atmosphere or

hit the nitrogen


159

may hit the atoms in any experimental equipment exposed to the radiation.

The

other line of research was the construction of big accelerating machines, the prototype of which was the so-called cyclotron constructed by Lawrence in California in the early thirties. The underlying idea of these machines is to keep by

means

of a big magnetic field the charged particles going round in circles a great number of times so that they can be pushed

again and again by

electric fields

on their way around. Machines

reaching up to energies of several hundred million electron volts are in use in Great Britain, and through the co-operation of twelve European countries a very big machine of this type is now being constructed in Geneva which we hope will reach up to energies of 25,000 million electron volts. The experiments carried out by means of cosmic radiation or of the big accelerators

have revealed new

interesting features of matter. Besides the

three fundamental building stones of matter

and neutron

new

elementary particles

electron, proton

have been found which

can be created in these processes of highest energies and disappear again after a short time. The new particles have similar properties as the old ones except for their instability. Even the most stable ones have lifetimes of roughly only a millionth part

of a second,

and the lifetimes of

others are even a thousand times

smaller. At the present time about twenty-five different new elementary particles are known; the most recent one is the negative proton. These results

seem at

first

sight to lead

away from

the idea

of the unity of matter, since the number of fundamental units of matter seems to have again increased to values comparable to

number of different chemical dements. But this would not be a proper interpretation. The experiments have at the same

the


l6o

time shown that the particles can be created from other particles or simply from the kinetic energy of such particles, and they can again disintegrate into other particles. Actually the experiments

have shown the complete mutability of matter. All the elementary particles can, at sufficiently high energies, be transmuted into other particles, or they can simply be created from kinetic energy and can be annihilated into energy, for instance into we have here actually the final proof for the unity of matter. All the elementary particles are made of the radiation. Therefore,

same substance, which we may call energy or universal matter; they are just different forms in which matter can appear. If

we compare

this situation

with the Aristotelian concepts of

we can

say that the matter of Aristotle, which should be compared to our concept of is mere "potentia," energy, which gets into "actuality" by means of the form, when

matter and form,

the elementary particle

Modern

is

created.

of course not satisfied with only qualitaphysics tive description of the fundamental structure of matter; it must is

try on the basis of careful experimental investigations to get a mathematical formulation of those natural laws that determine

the "forms" of matter, the elementary particles and their forces. clear distinction between matter and force can no longer be

A

made

in this part of physics, since each elementary particle not only is producing some forces and is acted upon by forces, but it

same time representing a certain field of force. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. is

at the

All the attempts to find a mathematical description for the laws concerning the elementary particles have so far started from the quantum theory of wave fields. Theoretical work on theories of this type started early in the thirties.

But the very first


l6l

on this line revealed serious difficulties the roots of which lay in the combination of quantum theory and the theory of special relativity. At first sight it would seem that the two theories, quantum theory and the theory of relativity, refer to investigations

such different aspects of nature that they should have practically nothing to do with each other, that it should be easy to fulfill the requirements of both theories in the same formalism. A closer inspection, however, shows that the two theories do interfere at

one point, and that

it is

from

this point that all the difficulties

arise.

The

theory of special relativity had revealed a structure of space and time somewhat different from the structure that was generally assumed since Newtonian mechanics. The most char-

newly discovered structure is the exthat cannot be surpassed by any moving body or any traveling signal, the velocity of light. As a consequence of this, two events at distant points cannot have any immediate causal connection if they take place at such times that a light signal starting at the instant of the event on one point acteristic feature of this

istence of a

maximum velocity

reaches the other point only after the time the other event has happened there; and vice versa. In this case the two events may

be called simultaneous. Since no action of any kind can reach from the one event at the one point in time to the other event at the other point, the two events are not connected by any causal action.

For

this

reason any action at a distance of the type, say, of forces in Newtonian mechanics was not com-

the gravitational The theory had to patible with the theory of special relativity. from point to point, from one replace such action by actions infinitesimal neighborhood. The point only to the points in an of this type mathematical most natural expressions for actions

1


62

were the

differential equations for

waves or

fields that

were

in-

variant for the Lorentz transformation. Such differential equations exclude any direct action between "simultaneous" events.

Therefore, the structure of space and time expressed in the

theory of special relativity implied an infinitely sharp boundary between the region of simultaneousness, hi which no action

could be transmitted, and the other regions, in which a direct action from event to event could take place.

On

the other hand, in quantum theory the uncertainty relations put a definite limit on the accuracy with which positions

and momenta, or time and energy, can be measured simultaneously. Since an infinitely sharp boundary means an infinite accuracy with respect to position in space and time, the momenta or energies must be completely undetermined, or in fact arbitrarily high momenta and energies must occur with overwhelming probability. Therefore, any theory which tries to fulfill the requirements of both special relativity and quantum theory will lead to mathematical inconsistencies, to divergencies in the region of very high energies and momenta. This sequence of conclusions may perhaps not seem strictly binding, since any formalism of the type under consideration is very complicated and could perhaps offer some mathematical possibilities for

avoiding the clash between quantum theory and relativity. But so far all the mathematical schemes that have been tried did in fact lead either to divergencies,

And it

i.e.,

to

mathematical contradic-

the requirements of the two theories. difficulties actually came from the the was easy to see that

tions, or did not

fulfill all

point that has been discussed. The way in which the convergent mathematical schemes did

not

fulfill

the requirements of relativity or

in itself quite interesting. For instance,

quantum theory was

one scheme, when

in-


163

terpreted in terms of actual events in space

kind of time reversal;

it

and time, led to a would predict processes in which sud-

denly at some point in space particles are created, the energy of which is later provided for by some other collision process be-

tween elementary particles at some other point. The physicists are convinced from their experiments that processes of this type

do not occur in nature,

at least not

if

the two processes are

separated by measurable distances in space and time. Another mathematical scheme tried to avoid the divergencies through a

mathematical process which

is called renormalization; it seemed to the to a place in the formalism where infinities possible push they could not interfere with the establishment of the well-

defined relations between those quantities that can be directly observed. Actually this scheme has led to very substantial progress in quantum electrodynamics, since it accounts for some interesting details in the

understood before.

A

scheme, however, has

hydrogen spectrum that had not been analysis of this mathematical

closer

made

it

probable that those quantities

which in normal quantum theory must be interpreted as probabilities can under certain circumstances become negative in the formalism of renormalization. This would prevent the consistent use of the formalism for the description of matter. The final solution of these difficulties has not yet been found.

emerge someday from the collection of more and more accurate experimental material about the different elementary creation and annihilation, the forces between particles, their them. In looking for possible solutions of the difficulties one It will

should perhaps remember that such processes with time reversal as have been discussed before could not be excluded experimentally, of space

if

they took place only within extremely small regions outside the range of our present experimental

and time


164

equipment. Of course one would be reluctant to accept such processes with time reversal if there could be at any later stage of physics the possibility of following experimentally such events in the same sense as one follows ordinary atomic events. But here

the analysis of quantum theory and of relativity us to see the problem in a new light.

The

theory of relativity

is

may again help

connected with a universal constant

in nature, the velocity of light. This constant determines the relation between space and time and is therefore implicitly con-

tained in any natural law which must fulfill the requirements of Lorentz invariance. Our natural language and the concepts of classical physics can apply only to phenomena for which the

can be considered as practically infinite. in our experiments approach the velocity of light be prepared for results which cannot be interpreted in

velocity of light

When we we must

these concepts.

Quantum theory is connected of nature, Planck's for events in

quantum space and time

with another universal constant

of action. is

An objective

possible only

description to

when we have

deal with objects or processes on a comparatively large scale, where Planck's constant can be regarded as infinitely small. When our experiments approach the region where the quantum of action becomes essential we get into all those difficulties with the usual concepts that have been discussed in earlier chapters of this volume.

There must

exist

a third universal constant in nature. This

is

obvious for purely dimensional reasons. The universal constants determine the scale of nature, the characteristic quantities that

cannot be reduced to other quantities.

One

needs at least three

fundamental units for a complete set of units. This is most easily seen from such conventions as the use of the c-g-s system (centi-

QUANTUM THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER meter, gram, second system) by the physicists.

165

A unit of length,

one of time, and one of mass is sufficient to form a complete set; but one must have at least three units. One could also replace

them by velocity

units of length, velocity

and

necessary.

and mass; or by

units of length,

energy, etc. But at least three fundamental units are the velocity of light and Planck's constant of

Now,

action provide only two of these units. There must be a third one,

and only a theory which

contains this third unit can possibly

determine the masses and other properties of the elementary particles. Judging from our present knowledge of these particles the most appropriate way of introducing the third universal constant would be by the assumption of a universal length the value

which should be roughly 10~13 cm, that is, somewhat smaller than the radii of the light atomic nuclei. When from such three units one forms an expression which in its dimension corresponds

of

to a mass,

its

value has the order of magnitude of the masses of

the elementary particles. If we assume that the laws of nature do contain a third universal constant of the dimension of a length 13

and

of the order of

we would

again expect our usual concepts to in to regions space and time that are large as comapply only pared to the universal constant. We should again be prepared 10~

for

cm, then

phenomena

of

a

qualitatively

new

character

when we

in

our

and time smaller than the experiments approach of time nuclear radii. The phenomenon reversal, which has been discussed and which so far has only resulted from theoretical regions in space

considerations as a mathematical possibility, might therefore

belong to these smallest regions. If so, it could probably not be observed in a way that would permit a description in terms of the classical concepts. Such processes would probably, so far as

1


66

they can be observed and described in classical terms, obey the usual time order.

But

all

these problems will be a matter of future research in One may hope that the combined effort of ex-

atomic physics.

periments in the high energy region and of mathematical analywill someday lead to a complete understanding of the unity of

sis

matter.

The term "complete understanding" would mean

that

the forms of matter in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy would appear as results, as solutions of a closed mathematical scheme representing the natural laws for matter.

X.

Language and Reality

THROUGHOUT

in

Modern

the history of science

new

Physics

discoveries

and

new

ideas have always caused scientific disputes, have led to polemical publications criticizing the new ideas, and such criti-

cism has often been helpful in their development; but these conhave never before reached that degree of violence

troversies

which they attained after the discovery of the theory of relativity and in a lesser degree after quantum theory. In both cases the scientific problems have finally become connected with political issues, and some scientists have taken recourse to political methods to carry their views through. This violent reaction on the recent development of modern physics can only be understood when one realizes that here the foundations of physics have started moving; and that this motion has caused the feeling that the ground would be cut from science. At the same time it probably means that one has not yet found the correct language with which to speak about the new situation and that the incorrect statements published here and there in the enthusiasm about the

new

discoveries

have caused

all

kinds of misunderstanding. This

indeed a fundamental problem. The improved experimental astechnique of our time brings into the scope of science new

is

167

1


68

which cannot be described in terms of the common concepts. But in what language, then, should they be described? The first language that emerges from the process of scientific clarification is in theoretical physics usually a mathematical language, the mathematical scheme, which allows one to predict the results of experiments. The physicist may be satisfied when he has the mathematical scheme and knows how to use it for the interpretation of the experiments. But he has to

pects of nature

speak about his

results also to nonphysicists

who will not be satis-

fied unless some explanation is given in plain language, understandable to anybody. Even for the physicist the description in

plain language will be a criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached. To what extent is such a description at

Can one speak about the atom itself? This is a problanguage as much as of physics, and therefore some

all possible?

lem

of

remarks are necessary concerning language in general and scientific

language

specifically.

Language was formed during the prehistoric age among the human race as a means for communication and as a basis for thinking.

We know little about the various steps in its formation

;

but language now contains a great number of concepts which are a suitable tool for more or less unambiguous communication

about events in daily life. These concepts are acquired gradually without critical analysis by using the language, and after having used a word

sufficiently often

know what

means.

it

words are not so

we

think that

It is of course

clearly defined as they

seem

and that they have only a limited range

we

or

less

to

be at

first

of applicability.

sight

For

we can

speak about a piece of iron or a piece of wood, cannot speak about a piece of water. The word "piece"

instance,

but

we more

a well-known fact that the

does not apply to liquid substances. Or, to mention another ex-

LANGUAGE AND REALITY IN MODERN PHYSICS

1

69

ample: In discussions about the limitations of concepts, Bohr likes to tell the following story: "A little boy goes into a grocer's shop with a penny in his hand and asks: 'Gould I have a 3

penny's worth of mixed sweets? The grocer takes two sweets and hands them to the boy saying: Here you have two sweets. You can do the mixing yourself/ " more serious example of c

A

the problematic relation between words and concepts is the fact that the words "red" and "green" are used even by people who are colorblind, though the ranges of applicability of these terms must be quite different for them from what they are for other people.

This intrinsic uncertainty of the meaning of words was of course recognized very early and has brought about the need for as the word "definition" says for the setting of definitions, or boundaries that determine where the word

where

But

is

to be used

and

can be given only with the help of other concepts, and so one will finally have to rely on some concepts that are taken as they are, unanalyzed and undefined. not.

definitions

In Greek philosophy the problem of the concepts in language has been a major theme since Socrates, whose life was if we can follow Plato's artistic representation in his dialogues a continuous discussion about the content of the concepts in language and about the limitations in modes of expression. In order to

obtain a solid basis for scientific thinking, Aristotle in his logic started to analyze the forms of language, the formal structure of conclusions and deductions independent of their content. In this

way he reached a degree of abstraction and precision that had been unknown up to that time in Greek philosophy and he thereby contributed immensely to the clarification, to the establishment of order in our methods of thought. He actually created the basis for the scientific language.


I7O

On

the other hand, this logical analysis of language again

involves the danger of an oversimplification. In logic the attention is drawn to very special structures, unambiguous connections between premises and deductions, simple patterns of

reasoning,

and

all

the other structures of language are neglected.

These other structures may

arise

from

associations

between cer-

tain meanings of words; for instance, a secondary meaning of a word which passes only vaguely through the mind when the

word

is

heard

contribute essentially to the content of a word may cause many only half-

may

sentence.

The

conscious

movements

fact that every

mind can be used to represent some language much more clearly than by the

in our

part of reality in the use of the logical patterns. Therefore, the poets have often objected to this emphasis in language and in thinking on the logical pattern,

which

if

I interpret their opinions

correctly

We

can

make language less suitable for its purpose. may recall for instance the words in Goethe's Faust which Mephistopheles speaks to the young student (quoted from the translation by

Anna Swanwick)

:

Waste not your time, so fast it flies; will teach you time to win; Hence, my young friend, I would advise,

Method

With

college logic to begin.

will your mind be so well brac'd, In Spanish boots so tightly lac'd,

Then

That on

'twill

circumspectly creep, beaten track securely keep, Thought's Nor will it, ignis-fatuus like,

Into the path of error strike.

Then many a day they'll teach you how The mind's spontaneous acts, till now

LANGUAGE AND REALITY IN MODERN PHYSICS As eating and

iyi

as drinking free.

Require a process; one, two, three! In truth the subtle web of thought Is like

One

the weaver's fabric wrought,

treadle

moves a thousand

lines,

Swift dart the shuttles to and fro, Unseen the threads unnumber'd flow,

A thousand knots one stroke combines. Then forward

steps

your sage to show,

And prove to you it must be so; The first being so, and so the second. The third and fourth deduc'd we see; And if there were no first and second, Nor

would ever

third nor fourth

be.

This, scholars of all countries prize, Yet 'mong themselves no weavers rise.

Who would describe and study aught alive. Seeks

first

Then

are the

the living spirit thence to drive:

There only

lifeless

fragments in his hand, the spirit-band.

fails, alas!

This passage contains an admirable description of the structure of language and of the narrowness of the simple logical patterns.

On

the other hand, science must be based

upon language

as

the only means of communication and there, where the problem of unambiguity is of greatest importance, the logical patterns

must play their role. The characteristic difficulty at this point may be described in the following way. In natural science we try to derive the particular from the general, to understand the par-

phenomenon as caused by simple general laws. The general laws when formulated in the language can contain only a few simple concepts else the law would not be simple and

ticular

general.

From

these concepts are derived

an

infinite variety of


172 possible

phenomena, not only

precision with respect to every

qualitatively but with complete detail. It is

obvious that the con-

cepts of ordinary language, inaccurate and only vaguely defined as they are, could never allow such derivations. When a chain

from given premises, the number of poschain depends on the precision of the premises. Therefore, the concepts of the general laws must in natural science be defined with complete precision, and this can be of conclusions follows

sible links in the

achieved only by means of mathematical abstraction. In other sciences the situation may be somewhat similar in so far as rather precise definitions are also required; for instance, in law. But here the number of links in the chain of conclusions great, complete precision is not needed, and rather precise definitions in terms of ordinary language are suffi-

need not be very cient.

In theoretical physics we try to understand groups of pheintroducing mathematical symbols that can be

nomena by

correlated with facts, namely, with the results of measurements. For the symbols we use names that visualize their correlation

with the measurement. Thus the symbols are attached to the language. Then the symbols are interconnected by a rigorous system of definitions and axioms, and finally the natural laws are expressed as equations between the symbols. The infinite variety of solutions of these equations then corresponds to the infinite variety of particular phenomena that are possible in this part of

nature. In this

group bols

of

way phenomena

the mathematical scheme represents the between the sym-

so far as the correlation

and the measurements

goes. It

is

this correlation

which per-

mits the expression of natural laws in the terms of language, since our experiments consisting of actions

common and ob-

servations can always be described in ordinary language.

LANGUAGE AND REALITY

IN

MODERN PHYSICS

173

in the process of expansion of scientific knowledge the also new terms are introduced and the old language expands; Still,

ones are applied in a wider field or differently from ordinary language. Terms such as "energy," "electricity/' "entropy" are

obvious examples. In this way we develop a scientific language called a natural extension of ordinary language to added the fields of scientific knowledge. adapted

which may be

During the past century a number of new concepts have been introduced in physics, and in some cases it has taken considerable time before the scientists have really grown accustomed to their use.

was

The term

"electromagnetic field," for instance, which

some extent already present in Faraday's work and which formed the basis of Maxwell's theory, was not easily ac-

to

later

cepted by the physicists, who directed their attention primarily to the mechanical motion of matter. The introduction of the

concept really involved a change in scientific ideas as well, and such changes are not easily accomplished. Still, all the concepts introduced up to the end of the last century formed a perfectly consistent set applicable to a wide field of experience, and, together with the former concepts,

formed a language which not only the scientists but also the technicians and engineers could successfully apply in their work. To the underlying fundamental ideas of this language belonged the assumptions that the order of events in time is entirely independent of their order in space, that Euclidean geometry is valid in real space,

and that the events "happen"

time independently of

in space It

whether they are observed or not.

and was

not denied that every observation had some influence on the phenomenon to be observed but it was generally assumed that by doing the experiments cautiously this influence could be made arbitrarily small.

This seemed in fact a necessary condition for


174

the ideal of objectivity which was considered as the basis of natural science.

all

Into this rather peaceful state of physics broke quantum theory and the theory of special relativity as a sudden, at first

slow and then gradually increasing, movement in the foundations of natural science. The first violent discussions developed around the problems of space and time raised by the theory of

How should one speak about the new situation? Should one consider the Lorentz contraction of moving bodies as a real contraction or only as an apparent contraction? Should relativity.

one say that the structure of space and time was really different from what it had been assumed to be or should one only say that the experimental results could be connected mathematically in a corresponding to this new structure, while space and time, being the universal and necessary mode in which things appear

way

to us,

remain what they had always been? The real problem be-

many controversies was the fact that no language which one could speak consistently about the new situation. The ordinary language was based upon the old conthis language offered the only cepts of space and time and unambiguous means of communication about the setting up and the results of the measurements. Yet the experiments showed hind these existed in

that the old concepts could not be applied everywhere. The obvious starting point for the interpretation of the theory of relativity was therefore the fact that in the limiting case of

small velocities (small compared with the velocity of light) the practically identical with the old one. Therefore,

new theory was

in this part of the theory it was obvious in which way the mathematical symbols had to be correlated with the measurements and

with the terms of ordinary language; actually it was only through this correlation that the Lorentz transformation had


175

been found. There was no ambiguity about the meaning of the words and the symbols in this region. In fact this correlation was already sufficient for the application of the theory to the whole field of experimental research connected with the problem of Therefore, the controversial questions about the "real" or the "apparent" Lorentz contraction, or about the definition of the word "simultaneous" etc., did not concern the facts but

relativity.

rather the language. With regard to the language, on the other hand, one has gradually recognized that one should perhaps not insist too

much on

certain principles. It is always difficult to find general convincing criteria for which terms should be used in the lan-

guage and how they should be used. One should simply wait for the development of the language, which adjusts itself after some time to the new situation. Actually in the theory of special relativity this adjustment has already taken place to a large extent during the past

fifty years.

The

distinction

between "real" and

"apparent" contraction, for instance, has simply disappeared. The word "simultaneous" is used in line with the definition given by Einstein, while for the wider definition discussed in an earlier chapter the term "at a space-like distance" is commonly used, etc. In the theory of general relativity the idea of a non-Euclidean geometry in real space was strongly contradicted by some phi-

losophers who pointed out that our whole method of setting the experiments already presupposed Euclidean geometry,

up

In fact if a mechanic tries to prepare a perfectly plane surface, he can do it in the following way. He first prepares three surfaces of, roughly, the same size which are, roughly, plane. Then he tries to

ting

bring any two of the three surfaces into contact by putagainst each other in different relative positions. The

them


176

whole surface is a degree to which this contact is possible on the the surfaces can which with of measure of the degree accuracy his three surfaces with He will be satisfied be called

"plane." of them is complete everyonly if the contact between any two where. If this happens one can prove mathematically that Euclidean geometry holds on the three surfaces. In this way, it

was argued, Euclidean geometry

own measures. From the point

of

is

just

view of general

made

relativity,

correct

by our

of course, one

Euclidean can answer argument proves the validity of of our exdimensions the in geometry only in small dimensons, holds in this it with which perimental equipment. The accuracy for getting plane surfaces region is so high that the above process The out. carried be can always extremely slight deviations from that this

Euclidean geometry which

still

realized since the surfaces are

exist in this region will

made

not be

of material which

is

not

but allows for very small deformations and since the concept of "contact" cannot be defined with complete For surfaces on a cosmic scale the process that has precision. not work; but this is not a problem been described would

strictly rigid

just

of experimental physics.

for the physical interpretaAgain, the obvious starting point in scheme tion of the mathematical general relativity is the fact that the geometry is very nearly Euclidean in small dimensions;

the theory approaches the classical theory in this region. Therebetween the mathematical symbols and fore, here the correlation the measurements and the concepts in ordinary language

is

un-

about a non-Euclidean geometry ambiguous. Still, one can speak dimensions. In fact a long time before the theory of in

large even been developed the possibility of a general relativity had non-Euclidean geometry in real space seems to have been con-


177

sidered by the mathematicians, especially by Gauss in Gottingen. When he carried out very accurate geodetic measurements on a triangle

formed by three mountains

the Brocken in the Harz

Mountains, the Inselberg in Thuringia, and the Hohenhagen near Gottingen he is said to have checked very carefully

whether the sum of the three angles was actually equal to 180 degrees; and that he considered a difference which would prove

from Euclidean geometry as being possible. Actually he did not find any deviations within his accuracy of measurement. In the theory of general relativity the language by which we deviations

describe the general laws actually now follows the scientific language of the mathematicians, and for the description of the experiments themselves we can use the ordinary concepts, since

Euclidean geometry

is

valid with sufficient accuracy in small

dimensions.

The most

difficult

the language arises in

problem, however, concerning the use of

quantum

theory.

Here we have

at first

no

simple guide for correlating the mathematical symbols with concepts of ordinary language; and the only thing we know from

common

concepts cannot be applied the obvious starting point for Again the physical interpretation of the formalism seems to be the fact that the mathematical scheme of quantum mechanics approaches the start

is

the fact that our

to the structure of the atoms.

that of classical mechanics in dimensions which as

to the size of the atoms.

compared must be made with some there are

many

reservations.

But even

Even

this

are large

statement

in large dimensions

solutions of the quantum-theoretical equations

which no analogous solutions can be found in classical physics. In these solutions the phenomenon of the "interference of probabilities" would show up, as was discussed in the earlier chapters;

to


178

does not exist in

Therefore, even in the limit of large dimensions the correlation between the mathematical symbols, the measurements, and the ordinary concepts is

it

classical physics.

by no means trivial. In order to get to such an unambiguous correlation one must take another feature of the problem into account. It must be observed that the system which is treated by the methods of quantum mechanics is in fact a part of a much bigger system (eventually the whole world) ; it is interacting with this bigger system; and one must add that the microscopic properties of the bigger system are (at least to a large extent) unknown. This statement is undoubtedly a correct description of the actual situation. Since the system could not be the object of measurements and of theoretical investigations, it would in fact not belong to the

world of phenomena

if it

had no

inter-

actions with such a bigger system of which the observer is a part. The interaction with the bigger system with its undefined micro-

scopic properties then introduces a new statistical element into the description both the quantum-theoretical and the classical

under consideration. In the limiting case of the large dimensions this statistical element destroys the effects of the "interference of probabilities" in such a manner that now one

of the system

the quantum-mechanical scheme really approaches the classical one in the limit. Therefore, at this point the correlation between

the mathematical symbols of of ordinary language

is

quantum theory and the concepts

unambiguous, and

this correlation suf-

the interpretation of the experiments. The remaining problems again concern the language rather than the facts, since fices for

it

belongs to the concept "fact" that

it

can be described in ordi-

nary language. But the problems of language here are really serious. We wish to speak in some way about the structure of the atoms and not

LANGUAGE AND REALITY only about the "facts"

IN

MODERN PHYSICS

1

79

the latter being, for instance, the black

spots on a photographic plate or the water droplets in a cloud chamber. But we cannot speak about the atoms in ordinary

language.

The

analysis

ferent ways.

can

We

now be

carried further in

two

entirely dif-

can either ask which language concerning the

atoms has actually developed among the physicists in the thirty years that have elapsed since the formulation of quantum me-

Or we can

describe the attempts for defining a precise that language corresponds to the mathematical scheme. In answer to the first question one may say that the concept

chanics.

scientific

of complementarity introduced by Bohr into the interpretation of quantum theory has encouraged the physicists to use an am-

biguous rather than an unambiguous language, to use the classical concepts in a somewhat vague manner hi conformity with the principle of uncertainty, to apply alternatively different classical concepts which would lead to contradictions if used simultaneously. In this

way one

speaks about electronic orbits,

about matter waves and charge density, about energy and mo-

mentum,

etc.,

always conscious of the fact that these concepts

have only a very limited range of

applicability.

When this vague

and unsystematic use of the language leads into difficulties, the scheme and its physicist has to withdraw into the mathematical correlation with the experimental facts. This use of the language is in many ways quite satisfactory, since it reminds us of a similar use of the language in daily life

unambiguous

We

realize that the situation of complementarity is or in poetry. not confined to the atomic world alone; we meet it when we reflect about a decision and the motives for our decision or when

the choice between enjoying music and analyzing its structure. On the other hand, when the classical concepts are

we have


l8o used in

this

manner, they always retain a certain vagueness, they

the same statistical acquire in their relation to "reality" only classical of thermodynamics in its significance as the concepts statistical Therefore, a short discussion of these interpretation.

statistical

The

concepts of thermodynamics in

"temperature"

concept

may

be useful.

classical

thermodynamics

seems to describe an objective feature of reality, an objective life it is quite easy to define with the of matter. In daily property what thermometer of a help

we mean by stating that a piece of when we try to define certain has a matter temperature. But mean we are, even in could atom of an what the temperature classical physics, in

cannot correlate

a

much more

difficult position.

Actually 35

this

we

concept "temperature of the atom atom but have to connect it at least

well-defined property of the

with a

We

can correlate of it. partly with our insufficient knowledge statistical certain with expectations the value of the temperature about the properties of the atom, but it seems rather doubtful whether an expectation should be called objective. The concept is not much better defined than the "temperature of the atom" who bought mixed "mixing" in the story about the boy concept

sweets.

In a similar

way

in

quantum theory

all

the classical concepts

as well and just as little are, applied to the atom, just of the atom"; they are correlated defined as the "temperature

when

only in rare cases

with

statistical expectations;

tion

become the equivalent of

thermodynamics,

One might

it is difficult

perhaps

call

it

may the expecta-

certainty. Again, as in classical

to call the expectation objective.

an objective tendency or

possibility,

a

of Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, I "potentia" in the sense believe that the language actually used by physicists when they

in their minds similar speak about atomic events produces


IN

MODERN PHYSICS

l8l

notions as the concept "potential So the physicists have gradually become accustomed to considering the electronic orbits,

not as reality but rather as a kind of "potential The language has already adjusted itself, at least to some extent, to etc.,

But it is not a precise language in which one could use the normal logical patterns; it is a language that produces pictures in our mind, but together with them the notion that the pictures have only a vague connection with reality, that

this true situation.

they represent only a tendency toward reality. The vagueness of this language in use among the physicists has therefore led to attempts to define a different precise language which follows definite logical patterns in complete conformity

The result of Neumann and more recently by

with the mathematical scheme of quantum theory. these attempts

by

Birkhoff and

Weizsacker can be stated by saying that the mathematical scheme of quantum theory can be interpreted as an extension or is especially one fundamental which seems to require a modification. assumed that, if a statement has any mean-

modification of classical logic. It principle of classical logic

In

classical logic it

ing at

all,

must be

is

either the statement or the negation of the statement

correct.

Of

"here

is

a table" or "here

is

not a table,

59

or the second statement must be correct. "Tertium a non datur," third possibility does not exist. It may be that we do not know whether the statement or its negation is correct; but

either the

first

in "reality"

one of the two

is

correct.

In quantum theory this law "tertium non datur" is to be modified. Against any modification of this fundamental principle one can of course at once argue that the principle is assumed in common language and that we have to speak at least about our eventual modification of logic in the natural language. Thereto describe in natural Ianfore, it would be a self-contradiction

1


82

to natural language. guage a logical scheme that does not apply that one may distinguish out Weizsacker points There, however,

various levels of language. One level refers to the objects

A second level refers to

the electrons.

A

for instance, to the

third level

may

objects, etc. It

atoms or

statements about objects. about statements about

refer to statements

would then be

possible to

have different logical

levels. It is true that finally we have to patterns at the different and thereby to the classical go back to the natural language

But Weizsacker suggests that

logical patterns. may be in a similar sical physics is to

quantum theory.

Classical logic

contained as a kind of limiting case in latter

would

The then,

classical logic

manner a priori to quantum

constitute the

more general

quantum

logic, as clas-

would then be logic,

but the

logical pattern.

of the classical logical pattern shall, possible modification

first

refer to the level concerning the objects.

Let us con-

wall sider an atom moving in a closed box which is divided by a into two equal parts. The wall may have a very small hole so that the atom can go through. Then the atom can, according to be either in the left half of the box or in the right classical logic,

half.

There

is

no third

possibility:

theory, however, we "atom" and "box" at all

quantum words

which are in a strange way ties.

This

ments.

"tertium

have to admit

non datur." In if

we

use the

that there are other possibilities mixtures of the two former possibili-

results of our experinecessary for explaining the been scatcould, for instance, observe light that has

is

We

We

could perform three experiments: first the atom is (for instance, by closing the hole in the wall) confined to the left half of the box, and the intensity distribution of is measured; then it is confined to the right the scattered tered by the atom.

light

half

and again the

scattered light

is

measured; and

finally

the


IN

MODERN PHYSICS

183

atom can move

freely in the whole box and again the intensity distribution of the scattered light is measured. If the atom would

always be in either the

half or the right half of the box, the should be a mixture (according to the fraction of time spent by the atom in each of the two parts) of the two former intensity distributions. But this is in general not left

final intensity distribution

true experimentally. The real intensity distribution is modified by the "interference of probabilities"; this has been discussed before.

In order to cope with

this situation

Weizsacker has introduced

the concept "degree of truth." For any simple statement in an alternative like "The atom is in the left (or in the right) half of the box" a complex number is defined as a measure for its

"degree of truth." If the number is 1, it means that the statement is true; if the number is 0, it means that it is false. But other values are possible. The absolute square of the complex number gives the probability for the statement's being true; the sum of

the two probabilities referring to the two parts in the alternative (either "left" or "right" in our case) must be unity. But each pair of complex numbers referring to the two parts of the alternative represents, according to Weizsacker's definitions, a

"statement" which

is

certainly true

if

the numbers have just

these values; the two numbers, for instance, are sufficient for determining the intensity distribution of scattered light in our this experiment. If one allows the use of the term "statement" in folthe term the introduce can one "complementarity" by way that is not identical with statement Each definition: lowing

either of the

two

statements: "the

alternative statements

atom

right half of the box"

is

in our case with the

in the left half" or "the

is

called

complementary

atom

is

in the

to these state-

ments. For each complementary statement the question whether


184

atom

the

is left

or right

is

not decided. But the term "not de-

"Not cided" by no means equivalent to the term "not known." or left is atom known would mean that the right, only "really" is

5'

But "not decided" indicates a difa complementary statement. expressible only by details of which cannot the logical pattern,

we do not know where ferent situation,

it is.

This general be described here, corresponds precisely to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory. It forms the basis of a precise the structure of the atom. language that can be used to describe But the application of such a language raises a number of diffishall discuss only two here: the problems of which we the relation between the different "levels" of language and

cult

consequences for the underlying ontology.

In

classical logic the relation

language

is

"The atom the

between the different

levels of

a one-to-one correspondence. The two statements, is in is in the left half" and "It is true that the atom

left half,"

belong logically to different

levels.

In

classical logic

these statements are completely equivalent, i.e., they are either both true or both false. It is not possible that the one is true and

the other fake. But in the logical pattern of complementarity this relation is more complicated. The correctness or incorrectness of the first statement still implies the correctness or incorrectness of the second statement. But the incorrectness of the second state-

ment does not imply the

incorrectness of the

first

statement. If

the second statement is incorrect, it may be undecided whether the atom is in the left half; the atom need not necessarily be in

complete equivalence between the of a statewith two levels of language respect to the correctness this conFrom incorrectness. the ment, but not with respect to laws classical of the nection one can understand the persistence the right half. There

in

quantum

is still

can be derived theory: wherever a definite result

LANGUAGE AND REALITY in

IN

MODERN PHYSICS

185

a given experiment by the application of the classical laws the from quantum theory, and it will hold

result will also follow

experimentally.

The

final

aim

of Weizsacker's attempt

is

to apply the modified but these

logical patterns also in the higher levels of language,

questions cannot be discussed here. The other problem concerns the ontology that underlies the modified logical patterns. If the pair of complex numbers represents a "statement" in the sense just described, there should exist

a "state" or a "situation" in nature in which the statement

We

correct.

will use the

word

"state" in this connection.

is

The

complementary statements are then called "coexistent states" by Weizsacker. This term "coexistent" describes the situation correctly; it would in fact be difficult to

"states" corresponding to

call

them

"different states," since every state contains to

some

extent also the other "coexistent states." This concept of "state" would then form a first definition concerning the ontology of

quantum

theory.

One

sees at

once that

this

use of the

word

"state," especially the term "coexistent state," is so different from the usual materialistic ontology that one may doubt

whether one

is

using a convenient terminology.

On

the other

one considers the word "state" as describing some pohand, one may even simply replace the tentiality rather than a reality term "state" by the term "potentiality" then the concept of if

"coexistent potentialities" is quite plausible, since one potenother potentialities. tiality may involve or overlap All these difficult definitions

and

distinctions

can be avoided

if one confines the language to the description of facts, i.e., exwishes to speak about the perimental results. However, if one themselves one must either use the mathematical atomic

particles

scheme

as the only supplement to natural language or

one must

1

86


combine it with a language that makes use of a modified logic or of no well-defined logic at all. In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts.

XI.

The Role

of

Modern

Physics in the

Present Development of

Human

Thinking

THE

philosophical implications of modern physics have been discussed in the foregoing chapters in order to show that this most modern part of science touches very old trends of thought at

many points,

from a new

that

it

approaches some of the very old problems

is probably true quite generally that in the history of human thinking the most fruitful developments frequently take place at those points where two different lines of

direction. It

thought meet. These

may have their roots in

quite different parts of human culture, in different times or different cultural environments or different religious traditions; hence if they lines

actually meet, that is, if they are at least so much related to each other that a real interaction can take place, then one may hope

new and

interesting developments will follow. Atomic as a physics part of modern science does actually penetrate in our time into very different cultural traditions. It is not only taught

that

where

belongs to the traditional activity in the natural sciences, but it is also studied in the Far East, in countries like Japan and China and India, in

Europe and the Western

countries,

187

it

1


88

with their quite different cultural background, and in Russia, where a new way of thinking has been established in our time; a

new way

related both to specific scientific developments of the

Europe of the nineteenth century and to other entirely different traditions from Russia itself. It can certainly not be the purpose of the following discussion to make predictions about the probable result of the encounter between the ideas of modern physics

and the older traditions. But it may be possible to define the points from which the interaction between the different ideas

may begin. In considering this process of expansion of modern physics it certainly not be possible to separate it from the general

would

expansion of natural science, of industry and engineering, of medicine,

etc.,

that

is,

quite generally of

modern

civilization in

parts of the world. Modern physics is just one link in a long chain of events that started from the work of Bacon, Galileo and Kepler and from the practical application of natural science in all

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The connection between natural science and technical science has from the beginning been that of mutual assistance: The progress in technical science, the

improvement of the

tools,

the invention of

new

technical devices have provided the basis for more, and more accurate, empirical knowledge of nature; and the progress in the

understanding of nature and finally the mathematical formulation of natural laws have opened the way to new applications of this

knowledge in technical

science.

For instance, the invention

of the telescope enabled the astronomers to measure the motion of the stars more accurately than before; thereby a considerable

On

progress in astronomy and in mechanics was made possible. the other hand, precise knowledge of the mechanical laws was of the greatest value for the

improvement of mechanical

tools,

ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN

HUMAN THINKING

1

89

for the construction of engines, etc. The great expansion of this combination of natural and technical science started when one

had succeeded in putting some of the forces of nature at the disposal of man. The energy stored up in coal, for instance, could then perform some of the work which formerly had to be done

man

by

bilities

himself.

could

The

first

industries growing out of these new possibe considered as a natural continuation and

expansion of the older trades; at many points the work of the still resembled the older handicraft and the work in

machines

the chemical factories could be considered as a continuation of

the

work

in the dyehouses

and the pharmacies

of the older times.

new branches

of industry developed which had no counterpart in the older trades; for instance, electrical engineering. The penetration of science into the more remote parts

But

later entirely

of nature enabled the engineers to use forces of nature which in former periods had scarcely been known; and the accurate

knowledge of these

forces in terms of a mathematical formula-

tion of the laws governing them formed a solid basis for the construction of all kinds of machinery.

The enormous

success of this combination of natural

and

technical science led to a strong preponderance of those nations or states or communities in which this kind of human activity as a natural consequence this activity had to be even by those nations which by tradition would not

flourished,

taken up

and

have been inclined toward natural and technical sciences. The modern means of communication and of traffic finally comof technical civilization. Unpleted this process of expansion has fundamentally changed the conditions doubtedly the process of life

on our

whether one

and whether one approves of it or not, realize that it progress or danger, one must

earth;

calls it

has gone far beyond any control through

human

forces.

One

1


90

it as a biological process on the largest scale the human structures in the active whereby organism encroach on larger parts of matter and transform it into a state suited for

may

rather consider

the increasing

human

population. physics belongs to the most recent parts of this development, and its unfortunately most visible result, the invention of nuclear weapons, has shown the essence of this develop-

Modern

in the sharpest possible light. On the one hand, it has demonstrated most clearly that the changes brought about by the combination of natural and technical sciences cannot be

ment

looked at only from the optimistic viewpoint; it has at least partly justified the views of those who had always warned against the dangers of such radical transmutation of our natural conditions of

On

life.

the other hand, it has compelled even who tried to keep apart from these

those nations or individuals

dangers to pay the strongest attention to the new development, since obviously political power in the sense of military power rests upon the possession of atomic weapons. It can certainly not

volume

to discuss extensively the political implications of nuclear physics. But at least a few words may be said about these problems because they always come first into the

be the task of

this

minds of people when atomic physics It

is

is

obvious that the invention of the

mentioned.

new weapons,

especially of the thermonuclear weapons, has fundamentally changed the political structure of the world. Not only has the concept of indestates undergone a decisive change, since any not in possession of such weapons must depend

pendent nations or nation which in

is

some way on those very few nations that do produce

these

arms in large quantity; but also the attempt of warfare on a large scale by means of such weapons has become practically an absurd kind of suicide. Hence one frequently hears the optimistic


HUMAN THINKING

igi

view that therefore war has become obsolete, that it will not happen again. This view, unfortunately, is a much too optimistic

On

the contrary, the absurdity of warfare by oversimplification. means of thermonuclear weapons may, in a first approximation,

an incentive for war on a small scale. Any nation or group which is convinced of its historical or moral right to enforce some change of the present situation will feel that the use of conventional arms for this purpose will not involve any great risks; they will assume that the other side will certainly not have recourse to the nuclear weapons, since the other side being historically and morally wrong in this issue will not take the chance of war on a large scale. This situation would in turn induce the other nations to state that in case of small wars inflicted upon them by aggressors, they would actually have recourse to the nuclear weapons, and thus the danger obviously remains. It may quite well be that in about twenty or thirty years from now the world will have undergone so great changes that the danger of warfare on a large scale, of the application of all act as

political

technical resources for the annihilation of the opponent, will have greatly diminished or disappeared. But the way to this new state will

be full of the

one side

may

greatest dangers.

We must as in all former

what

looks historically or morally right to the look wrong to the other side. The continuation of

times, realize that

the status quo may not always be the correct solution; it may, on the contrary, be most important to find peaceful means of

adjustments to

new

situations,

and

it

may

in

many

cases

be

any just decision at all. Therefore, it is extremely war can be probably not too pessimistic to say that the great avoided only if all the different political groups are ready to difficult to find

renounce some of their apparently most obvious of the fact that the question of right or

rights

wrong may

in view

look essen-


192 tially different

from the other

point of view;

it is

attitude

This

side.

in fact only

is

certainly not a

new

an application of that human

which has been taught through many centuries by some

of the great religions. The invention of nuclear

problems for science and

weapons has

scientists.

also raised entirely

The

new

political influence of

become very much stronger than it was before World and this fact has burdened the scientist, especially the

science has

War

II,

atomic

physicist,

with a double responsibility.

He

can either

take an active part in the administration of the country in connection with the importance of science for the community; then

he

will eventually

have to face the responsibility for decisions of

enormous weight which go far beyond the small circle of research and university work to which he was wont. Or he may voluntarily

withdraw from any participation in

political de-

cisions; then he will still be responsible for wrong decisions which he could possibly have prevented had he not preferred the

quiet

life

of the scientist. Obviously

it is

the duty of the scientists

to inform their governments in detail about the

destruction that

unprecedented

would follow from a war with thermonuclear

weapons. Beyond that, scientists are frequently requested to participate in solemn resolutions in favor of world peace; but considering this latter demand I must confess that I have never been able to see any point in declarations of this kind.

may seem a welcome

Such resolutions

proof of goodwill; but anyone

who

speaks

in favor of peace without stating precisely the conditions of this

peace must at once be suspected of speaking only about that kind of peace in which he and his group thrive best which of course would be completely worthless. Any honest declaration for peace must be an enumeration of the sacrifices one is pre-


HUMAN THINKING

pared to make for its preservation. But as a rule the have no authority to make statements of this kind.

At the same time the

scientist

can do

his best to

193

scientists

promote

international co-operation in his own field. The great importance that many governments attach to research in nuclear physics nowadays and the fact that the level of scientific work is still very different in different countries favors international co-operation in this work. Young scientists of many different countries may

gather in research institutions in which a strong activity in the field of modern physics is going on and the common work on difficult scientific

one

problems will foster mutual understanding. In Geneva organization, it has even been pos-

case, that of the

reach an agreement between a number of different naa common laboratory and for constructing by a

sible to

tions for building

combined effort the expensive experimental equipment for research in nuclear physics. This kind of co-operation will certainly help to establish a common attitude toward the problems of

common

science

even beyond the purely

scientific

problems

among the younger generation of scientists. Of course one does not know beforehand what will grow out of the seeds that have been sown in this way when the scientists return into their old environments and again take part in their own cultural traditions.

But one can scarcely doubt that the exchange of ideas bescientists of different countries and between the dif-

tween young

ferent generations in every country will help to approach without too much tension that new state of affairs in which a balance is

reached between the older traditional forces and the inevitable

necessities of

which makes the

strong connection between different cultural traditions. the fact that the ultimate decisions about the value of a

first

This

is

modern life. It is especially one feature of science it more than anything else suited for establishing


194

special scientific work, about

what

is

correct or

wrong

in the

work, do not depend on any human authority. It may sometimes take many years before one knows the solution of a problem, before one can distinguish between truth and error; but finally the questions will be decided, and the decisions are made not by any group of scientists but by nature itself. Therefore, scientific ideas spread among those who are interested in science in entirely different way from the propagation of political ideas.

an

political ideas may gain a convincing influence among of people just because they correspond or seem to masses great

While

correspond to the prevailing interests of the people, scientific ideas will spread only because they are true. There are objective and final criteria assuring the correctness of a scientific state-

ment. All that has here been said about international co-operation and exchange of ideas would of course be equally true for any

part of

modern

science;

it is

by no means confined to atomic

physics. In this respect modern physics is just one of the many branches of science, and even if its technical applications the

arms and the peaceful use of atomic energy attach a special weight to this branch, there would be no reason for considering international co-operation in this field as far more important than in any other field. But we have now to discuss again those features of

modern

physics

which are

essentially different

from

the previous development of natural science, and we have for this purpose once more to go back to the European history of this

development that was brought about by the combination of natural

and technical

sciences.

has frequently been discussed among the historians whether the rise of natural science after the sixteenth century was in any It

way a

natural consequence of earlier trends in

human

thinking.

ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN It

HUMAN THINKING

1

95

may be

argued that certain trends in Christian philosophy led God, that they put God so far above the world that one began to consider the world without at to a very abstract concept of

the

also seeing God in the world. The Cartesian particalled a final step in this development. Or one may

same time

tion

may be

point out that

the theological controversies of the sixteenth century produced a general discontent about problems that could not really be settled by reason and were exposed to the political

all

struggles of the time;

that this discontent favored

problems which were entirely separated from the theological disputes. Or one may simply refer to the enormous activity, the new spirit that had come into the European societies

interest in

through the Renaissance. In any case during

this

period a

new

authority appeared which was completely independent of Christian religion or philosophy or of the Church, the authority of experience, of the empirical fact.

One may

trace this authority

back into older philosophical trends, for instance, into the philosophy of Occam and Duns Scotus, but it became a vital force of human activity only from the sixteenth century onward. Galileo did not only think about the mechanical motions, the

pendulum and the

he tried out by experiments, took place. This new activity motions these quantitatively, was in its beginning certainly not meant as a deviation from the falling stone;

how

traditional Christian religion.

kinds of revelation of God.

On the contrary, one spoke of two

The one was written in the Bible and The Holy Scrip-

the other was to be found in the book of nature.

had been written by man and was therefore subject to error, while nature was the immediate expression of God's intentions. However, the emphasis on experience was connected with a

ture

slow and gradual change in the aspect of reality. While in the Middle Ages what we nowadays call the symbolic meaning of a


ig6

was

some way its primary reality, the aspect of reality changed toward what we can perceive with our senses. What we can see and touch became primarily real. And this new concept

thing

in

of reality could

ment and

see

be connected with a new

how

things really are. It

activity

was

:

we can

easily

experi-

seen that this

meant the departure of the human mind into an immense field of new possibilities, and it can be well understood that the Church saw in the new movement the dangers rather than the hopes. The famous trial of Galileo in connection with his views on the Copernican system marked the beginning of a struggle that went on for more than a century. In this contro-

new

attitude

versy the representatives of natural science could argue that experience offers an undisputable truth, that it cannot be left to

any human authority

to decide

about what really happens in made by nature or in this sense

and that this decision is God. The representatives of the traditional religion, on the by other hand, could argue that by paying too much attention to the material world, to what we perceive with our senses, we lose nature,

the connection with the essential values of

human

life,

with just

beyond the material world. These two arguments do not meet, and therefore the problem could not be settled by any kind of agreement or decision. In the meantime natural science proceeded to get a clearer and wider picture of the material world. In physics this picture was to be described by means of those concepts which we nowadays call the concepts of classical physics. The world consisted of things in space and time, the things consist of matter, and matter can produce and can be acted upon by forces. The events follow from the interplay between matter and forces; every event is the result and the cause of other events. At the same time the human attitude toward nature changed from a contemplative that part of reality which

is


HUMAN THINKING

197

one to the pragmatic one. One was not so much interested in it is; one rather asked what one could do with it.

nature as

Therefore, natural science turned into technical science; every advancement of knowledge was connected with the question as

what

practical use could be derived from it. This was true not in only physics; in chemistry and biology the attitude was essenthe same, and the success of the new methods in medicine tially to

or in agriculture contributed essentially to the propagation of the new tendencies.

In

this

way,

finally,

extremely rigid frame

the nineteenth century developed an

for natural science

which formed not only

science but also the general outlook of great masses of people. This frame was supported by the fundamental concepts of classical physics, space, time,

matter and causality; the concept of

reality applied to the things or events that we could perceive by our senses or that could be observed by means of the refined tools

had provided. Matter was the primary of science was pictured as a crusade of reality. progress into world. Utility was the watchword of material the conquest the time. that technical science

The

On the other hand, this frame was so narrow and rigid that it a place in it for many concepts of our lanthat had always belonged to its very substance, for guage instance, the concepts of mind, of the human soul or of life.

was

difficult to find

Mind

could be introduced into the general picture only as a kind and when one studied the

of mirror of the material world;

of psychology, the scienproperties of this mirror in the science I if tists were always tempted may carry the comparison more attention to its mechanical than to its further to

pay

optical properties.

Even there one

tried to apply the concepts of

classical physics, primarily that of causality.

In the same way

life


ig8

was to be explained as a physical and chemical process, governed by natural laws, completely determined by causality, Darwin's concept of evolution provided ample evidence for this interpreta-

was especially difficult to find in this framework room for those parts of reality that had been the object of the traditional religion and seemed now more or less only imaginary. tion. It

Therefore, in those European countries in which one was wont to follow the ideas up to their extreme consequences, an open hostility of science toward religion developed, and even in the other countries there was an increasing tendency toward indifference toward such questions; only the ethical values of the Christian religion were excepted from this trend, at least for the time being. Confidence in the scientific method and in rational thinking replaced all other safeguards of the human mind.

Coming back now

to the contributions of modern physics, say that the most important change brought about by results consists in the dissolution of this rigid frame of con-

one its

may

cepts of the nineteenth century. been made before to get away

Of

course

many

had frame which

attempts

from this rigid seemed obviously too narrow for an understanding of the essential parts of reality. But it had not been possible to see what could be wrong with the fundamental concepts like matter, space, time and causality that had been so extremely successful in the history of science. Only experimental research itself, carried out with all the refined equipment that technical science

could

offer,

and

its

basis for a critical critical analysis

mathematical interpretation, provided the or, one may say, enforced the analysis

of these concepts,

and

finally resulted in

the

dissolution of the rigid frame.

This dissolution took place in two distinct stages.

The

first

was the discovery, through the theory of relativity, that even

ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN HUMAN THINKING

1

99

such fundamental concepts as space and time could be changed and in fact must be changed on account of new experience. This

change did not concern the somewhat vague concepts of space and time in natural language; but it did concern their precise formulation in the scientific language of Newtonian mechanics, which had erroneously been accepted as final. The second stage

was the

discussion of the concept of matter enforced

by the ex-

perimental results concerning the atomic structure. The idea of the reality of matter had probably been the strongest part in that rigid

had

frame of concepts of the nineteenth century, and this idea be modified in connection with the new ex-

at least to

perience. Again the concepts so far as they belonged to the natural language remained untouched. There was no difficulty in speaking about matter or about facts or about reality when

one had to describe the atomic experiments and their results. But the scientific extrapolation of these concepts into the smallest parts of matter could not be done in the simple way suggested

though it had erroneously determined the on outlook the general problem of matter. These new results had first of all to be considered as a serious

by

classical physics,

warning against the somewhat forced application of scientific concepts in domains where they did not belong. The application of the concepts of classical physics, e.g., in chemistry, had been a mistake. Therefore, one will nowadays be less inclined to assume that the concepts of physics, even those of quantum

can certainly be applied everywhere in biology or other We will, on the contrary, try to keep the doors open for the entrance of new concepts even in those parts of science where the older concepts have been very useful for the underthe standing of the phenomena. Especially at those points where theory,

sciences.

seems application of the older concepts

somewhat forced or


2OO

appears not quite adequate to the problem

we

will try to

avoid

any rash conclusions. Furthermore, one of the most important features of the de-

velopment and the analysis of modern physics

is

the experience

that the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than

the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena. This is in fact not surprising since the concepts of natural language are

formed by the

immediate connection with

reality; they represent reality. It is true that they are not very well defined and may therefore also undergo changes in the course of the centuries, just as reality

itself did,

but they never lose the immediate connection with

On

the other hand, the scientific concepts are idealizations; they are derived from experience obtained by refined experimental tools, and are precisely defined through axioms reality.

and

Only through these precise definitions is it posconnect the concepts with a mathematical scheme and to

definitions.

sible to

derive mathematically the infinite variety of possible in this field. But through this process of idealization definition the

cepts

still

immediate connection with

reality

phenomena and precise

is lost.

The

con-

correspond very closely to reality in that part of nature

which had been the object of the research. But the correspondence may be lost in other parts containing other groups of phenomena.

Keeping in mind the intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development, one after the experience of modern physics our attitude sees that toward concepts like mind or the human soul or life or God will be different from that of the nineteenth century, because these concepts belong to the natural language and have therefore

ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN immediate connection with

HUMAN THINKING

reality. It is

true that

we

201

will also

realize that these concepts are not well defined in the scientific

sense

and that

their application

may

lead to various contradic-

time being we may have to take the concepts, unanalyzed as they are; but still we know that they touch reality. It may be useful in this connection to remember that even in the tions, for the

most precise part of

science, in mathematics,

we

cannot avoid

using concepts that involve contradictions. For instance, it is well known that the concept of infinity leads to contradictions that have been analyzed, but it would be practically impossible to construct the main parts of mathematics without this concept.

The

general trend of

human

thinking in the nineteenth cen-

tury had been toward an increasing confidence in the scientific method and in precise rational terms, and had led to a general

skepticism with regard to those concepts of natural language which do not fit into the closed frame of scientific thought for

Modern physics has in many ways increased this skepticism; but it has at the same time turned it against the overestimation of precise scientific concepts, against instance, those of religion*

a too-optimistic view on progress in general, and

finally against

The skepticism against precise scientific conskepticism not that there should be a definite limitation for does mean cepts the application of rational tliinking. On the contrary, one may say that the human ability to understand may be in a certain itself.

sense unlimited. But the existing scientific concepts cover always only a very limited part of reality, and the other part that has

not yet been understood is infinite. Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown we may hope to understand, but have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the we

may

word "understanding." We know that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only


202 there that

we can be

certain to touch reality,

and hence we must

be skeptical about any skepticism with regard to

language and

its

this

natural

we may use these In this way modern

essential concepts. Therefore,

concepts as they have been used at all times. physics has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the human mind and reality.

This modern science, then, penetrates in our time into other parts of the world where the cultural tradition has been entirely different this

new

from the European activity in natural

civilization.

and

There the impact of must make

technical science

even more strongly than in Europe, since changes in the conditions of life that have taken two or three centuries in

itself felt

will take place there within a few decades. One should in many places this new activity must appear as a that expect decline of the older culture, as a ruthless and barbarian attitude,

Europe

on which all human happiness Such consequences cannot be avoided; they must be taken as one aspect of our time. But even there the openness of modern physics may help to some extent to reconcile the older traditions with the new trends of thought. For instance, the great scientific contribution in theoretical physics that has come from Japan since the last war may be an indication for a certain relationship between philosophical ideas in the tradition of the Far East and the philosophical substance of quantum theory. It may be easier

that upsets the sensitive balance rests.

to

adapt oneself to the quantum-theoretical concept of reality the naive materialistic way of

when one has not gone through thinking that

still

prevailed in

Europe in the

first

decades of this

century. Of course such remarks should not be misunderstood as

underestimation of the

done to old cultural

damage

traditions

that

may

an

be done or has been

by the impact of technical prog-

ROLE OF MODERN PHYSICS IN But since

HUMAN THINKING

203

whole development has for a long time passed human forces, we have to accept it as beyond one of the most essential features of our time and must try to

ress.

far

this

any control by

connect it as much as possible with the human values that have been the aim of the older cultural and religious traditions. It may be allowed at this point to quote a story from the Hasidic re-

There was an old

ligion:

whom

rabbi, a priest

famous for

his

wisdom,

A

man visited him in people came for advice. over all the that on around went him, deploring despair changes all the harm done by so-called technical progress. "Isn't all this

to

all

technical nuisance completely worthless," he exclaimed "if one considers the real values of life?" "This may be so," the rabbi

one has the right attitude one can learn from everything." "No," the visitor rejoined, "from such foolish things as railway or telephone or telegraph one can learn nothing replied,

"but

if

whatsoever." But the rabbi answered, "You are wrong. From the railway you can learn that you may by being one instant late miss everything. From the telegraph you can learn that every

word

counts.

And from

we

say here can be heard there." the rabbi meant and went away.

modern

Finally,

what understood what

the telephone you can learn that

The

visitor

science penetrates into those large areas of

our present world in which new doctrines were established only a few decades ago as foundations for new and powerful societies. There modern science is confronted both with the content of the doctrines, which go back to European philosophical ideas of the nineteenth century (Hegel and Marx), and with the phenomenon of uncompromising belief. Since modern physics must because of its practical applay a great role in these countries it can scarcely be avoided that the narrowness of the plicability,

doctrines

is felt

by those who have

really

understood modern


204

physics and its philosophical meaning. Therefore, at this point an interaction between science and the general trend of thought may take place. Of course the influence of science should not be

overrated; but

make

it

might be that the openness of modern science

even for larger groups of people to see that the doctrines are possibly not so important for the society as had been assumed before. In this way the influence of modern could

science

it

easier

favor an attitude of tolerance and thereby

may

may

prove valuable. the other hand, the

On

carries

phenomenon of uncompromising belief much more weight than some special philosophical no-

tions of the nineteenth century.

We cannot close our eyes to the

fact that the great majority of the people can scarcely have any well-founded judgment concerning the correctness of certain

important general ideas or doctrines. Therefore, the word "belief" can for this majority not mean "perceiving the truth of

something" but can only be understood as "taking this as the One can easily understand that this second kind

basis for life."

of belief

is

much

firmer,

is

much more

fixed

than the

first

one,

even against immediate contradicting exnot be shaken by added scientific therefore and can perience of the The history past two decades has shown by knowledge.

that

it

can

persist

many examples

that this second kind of belief

can sometimes be

upheld to a point where it seems completely absurd, and that it then ends only with the death of the believer. Science and history can teach us that for those

who

one cannot see

this

share

may become a great danger But such knowledge is of no avail, since could be avoided, and therefore such belief kind of belief

it.

how it

has always belonged to the great forces in human history. From the scientific tradition of the nineteenth century one would of course be inclined to hope that

all belief

should be based on a


HUMAN THINKING

205

rational analysis of every argument, on careful deliberation; and that this other kind of belief, in which some real or apparent

truth

simply taken as the basis for life, should not exist. It is true that cautious deliberation based on purely rational arguments can save us from many errors and dangers, since it allows is

new

situations, and this may be a necessary But remembering our experience in modern physics it is easy to see that there must always be a fundamental complementarity between deliberation and decision. In the prac-

readjustment to condition for

tical

life.

decisions of life

through

all

it

will scarcely ever

be possible to go

the arguments in favor of or against one possible

and one will therefore always have to act on insufficient The decision finally takes place by pushing away all the arguments both those that have been understood and others that might come up through further deliberation and decision,

evidence.

by cutting

off all further pondering.

The

decision

may be

the

same time complementary to deliberation; it excludes deliberation. Even the most important decisions in life must always contain this inevitable element of irrationality. The decision itself is necessary, since there must be something to rely upon, some principle to guide our actions. Without such a firm stand our own actions would lose all force. Therefore, it cannot be avoided that some real or apparent truth form the basis of life; and this fact should be acknowledged with regard to those groups of people whose basis is different from our own. Coming now to a conclusion from all that has been said about modern science, one may perhaps state that modern physics is result of deliberation,

but

it is

at the

but a very characteristic, part of a general historical that tends toward a unification and a widening of our process This process would in itself lead to a diminution world. present

just one,


2O6 of those cultural

and

political tensions that create the great

danger of our time. But

which

it is

accompanied by another process

acts in the opposite direction.

of people

become conscious of

The

fact that great masses

this process of unification leads to

an instigation of all forces in the existing cultural communities that try to ensure for their traditional values the largest possible role in the final state of unification. Thereby the tensions increase

and the two competing processes are so closely linked with each other that every intensification of the unifying process for inintensifies also the stance, by means of new technical progress struggle for influence in the final state, and thereby adds to the instability of the transient state. Modern physics plays perhaps

only a small role in this dangerous process of unification. But it helps at two very decisive points to guide the development into

a calmer kind of evolution.

First, it

shows that the use of arms

in the process would be disastrous and, second, through its openness for all kinds of concepts it raises the hope that in the final state of unification many different cultural traditions may live

different human endeavors into a between thought and deed, between activity

together

and may combine

new kind

of balance

and meditation.

Heisenberg Physics and Philosophy The Revolution In Modern Science

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