Nordlinger, Eric (1977) Soldiers in Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
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Ch. 1: The Study of Praetorianism R ef ef er er t o in in te te rv rv en en ti ti on on is is t of of fi fi ce ce rs rs a s pr pr ae ae to to ri ri an an s ol ol di di er er s, s, t o co co ns ns ci ci ou ou sl sl y evoke Gibbons' analysis of Rome, in which increasing intervention of military in politics was both syumptom and cause of decline. "Praetorianism refers to a situaiton in which militayr officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force." T he he si si s t ha ha t t hi hi s i s a "c "c ha ha ra ra ct ct er er is is ti ti c a nd nd a di di st st in in ct ct iv iv e p he he no no me me ne ne no no n" n" . That is, that praetorian rule has many characteristics in common , and that there is a significant difference between this and civilian rule. I n L .A .A ., ., on o n ly ly C. C . R. R. an a n d M ex ex ha ha ve ve no n o t h ad ad pr pr ae ae to to ri ri an an si s i tu tu at at io io ns ns si s i nc nc e 1 94 94 5 Overall, appears that military have intervened in 2/3 of >100 non-Western states since 1945 As Janowitz notes, "presistent patterns of civil sup remacy are the deviant cases taht requrie special explanation" 1st coup has a permanent impact upon the rules of the game: military enters the political arena; even after military gives up power, civilian rulers have been "put on notice" T hr hr e e m o d e ls ls o f c i v i li li a n c o n t ro ro l : Traditional model: both military and civilian elites sprang from a common social elite, and there was little conflcit between them. [CAse of 17th and 18th C European monarchies?] Military leaders would have severely damaged their civilian perogatives through intervention T h i s mo mo d e l , of of co co u r s e , is is of of li li t t l e in in t e r e s t to to d a y . The liberal model: premised on differentiattion of elites; and of functions of the two: dual foundation, military must respect civilian rule, but civilians must also respect the military institution; eg not interfere with promotion, etc T h i s 2 n d p a rt rt of of th th e m od od el el ha ha s o ft ft e n b ee ee n t ra ra n sg sg re re s se se d: d: th th is is ha ha s l e d t o "defensive" military interventions P r ob ob le le m th th a t i t ca ca n ta ta ke ke m or or e th th a n a g en en er er a ti ti on on f or or t ra ra di di t io io n of of r es es pe pe c t for civilian rule to permeate armed forces... [and of course, the 1st coup negates that possibiltiy for a long time to come] P e ne ne tr tr a ti ti o n m od od e l: l: ci ci v il il i an an ru ru l er er s p e ne ne tr tr a te te th th e a rm rm e d f or or c es es wi wi t h political ideas and personnel. Case of Communist regimes M a o' o' s q u ot ot e h as as t w o p ar ar t s: s: " P ow ow er er gr gr ow ow s o ut ut o f t he he ba ba rr rr el el of of te te h g u n. n. O u r principle is that teh party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party." Fully 40% of Chinese military training is ideological! T an an za za ni ni a: a: se s e rv rv ic ic e i n t he he ar a r my my li l i mi mi te te d t o p ar ar ty ty me m e mb mb er er s. s. Model has been successful: only one coup attempt (unsuccessful) in states with this model. BUT: almost impossible to implement unless one is starting from scratch. Also can only be implemented where there is a single locus of power... otherwise the military would be penetrated by several sets of ideas and personnel.. Public rationales for praetorianism [P] I n te te re re s ti ti n g t ha ha t 2/ 2/ 3 of of L .A .A . co co un un t ri ri es es ' co co n st st it it u ti ti on on s gi gi v e m i li li ta ta r y s om om e explicit role as guardians of the constitution G e n. n. O ng ng an an i a o f AR AR G: G: p eo eo p le le h av av e ri ri gh gh t to to r es es is is t ty ty r an an ny ny , bu bu t si si nc nc e th th e y are unarmed they cannot do so, so military must do it on their behalf. Military will also often claim capacity to restore country to good economic and political health, claiming their unity, lack of partisan and class divisions, etc. will enable them to do this. Very occasionally, military proclaims plan for more far-reaching social change. G e ne ne ra ra l ly ly , up up o n t a ki ki ng ng p ow ow e r, r, m il il it it a ry ry w il il l an an no no u nc nc e d i n te te nt nt i on on t o h a nd nd i t back to civilians within a specified time period [Pinochet of course an
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Typology of P Common elements: bias against politicians and mass politica activity; defense of military's corporate interests; creation of authoritarian structures B ut di ffer ences : can dis tingu ish: i) Moderators: seek to retain veto power, in order to pre serve the status quo; will back up demands with coup threats; May engage in "displacement-type coups", quickly push a govt out of power and replace it with another, eg when popular sectors have managed to elect someone This is an unstable category; tends to pass into: ii) Guardians: govt control, to preserve status quo and /or correct certain deficiencies and malpractices iii) Rulers: more profound project: effect political and maybe socioeconomic change S e e r ul e rs in pe r ha ps 10 % of mi l it ar y i n te r ve n ti on s: m ay se ek t o c re at e mobilization structures Will seek to destroy existing power centres, and perhaps even traditioanl oligarchies, etc.; this may involve military in agra rian reform to destroy oligarchies' economic base I m po rt a nt t o n o te th a t t h er e is n ot al w ay s a p u re di s ti nc t io n be tw e en P rule and civilian rule: eg in Cuba, we have military occupying 1/2 of Central Committee seats; 1/3 in China D e f: Mi l it ar y r eg i me s " a re th o se in wh i ch so l di e rs ha v e s ei ze d p ow e r through the coup d'etat, officers or former officiers hold the highest govt positions, and they rely primarily upon the officer corps in retaining them, even though civilians play a greater or (most commonly) a lesser role." Ch. 6 C o u ps fr e q ue n t ly co n d em n e d b e c au s e t h ey re s p o nd me r e ly to co r p or a t e interests of army O n th e ot h e r h a nd , on e ca n fi n d j u st i f ic a t io n s : c o u ps t en d t o ac t ag a in s t govts with serious performance failures: corruption, violation of constitution "the military only act against less than legitimate governments" [???] I f t he y ac t o n b a s is o f c o rp o r at e in t er e s t, a re t he y mo r e se l f -i n te r e st e d than the civilians they replace? M o r eo v e r, t he s ol d ie r s u s u al l y s e e t h e ms e lv e as s er v i ng a h i g he r p u r po s e (so what???) B u t w e mu s t a l s o e v a lu a t e p e r fo r m an c e o f mi l it a r y i n po w er : wh i l e c i v il i a n govts tend to spread over the spectrum form high to lower performance, military govts almos t universally perform badly. Look at following criteria: 1. govt legitimacy: very few military govts have successfull y legitimized themselves 2. non-coercive rule 3. minimization of violence: military govts are even less successful than civilian ones in keeping conflict from turning into violence 4 . po p ul a r r e s po n si v e ne s s : m i l it a ry t en d to a ct o n b e h al f of m id d le - c la s s interests 5. economic change: GNP performance about the same; but military have rarely been able to bring about modernizing change M i l t g o v ts o ft e n t r y t o es t a bl i s h o p e n r e gi m e s u p o n l e a vi n g po w e r; t he o r y here is that they believe such a regime will be less able to challenge military interests than an authoritarian or mobilization regime I n ad d it i o n, m il i ta r y w i l l t e nd t o e x t ra c t g u ar a n te e s b e fo r e r e tu r n in g to the barracks
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S u ch o p en r e gi me s w il l g en er a ll y be c om pa t ib le w i th m i dd le - cl as s interests, esp. since military will generally have weakened popular mobilization and oligarchical power T y p es o f r e s tr i c ti o ns t he y wi l l p l a ce : "r e s tr i c ti o ns u po n th e k i n ds o f politic al papeals that may be made by the competing parties; the exclusion of 'objectionable' parties and leaders from the electoral process; and the promulgation of electoral laws and arrangements that are advantageous to 'acceptable' political parties." BUT: The " 'iron surgeons' regularly cut in teh wrong places": destroy parties, etc. Thus, no civilian infrastructure in place c i v il i a n g o v ts ca n ha v e e v e n m o r e s e ri o u s p r o bl e m s u p o n t a ki n g p o we r because the military have often left them with fucked up situations " t h e m o s t f r e qu e n t s e qu e l to m il i t ar y co u p s a n d g o v t i s mo r e o f th e sa m e " in L.A., 70% of military who turned power over seized it anew shortly; on average within 6 yrs. O n e fa c to r h er e , a s no t e d a b ov e , i s th a t t h e 1 s t c o u p w e ak e n s, f or a lo n g time to come, the civilian ethic. M i l it a r y a l s o k n o w t h a t t h ey c an c ar r y i t o f f a g a in , ha v i ng d on e i t on c e On the other hand, they may be hesitant, after 1st experience in govt: among other things, this often threatens unity of office corps Also, civilians in power may now tread warily, avoid provoking military
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