Pakistan faced a crisis of confidence and identity in December 1971 after the debacle in the war with India and the separation of East Pakistan. It lost more than half of its population and about 15 percent of its territory. Over 90,000 of its troops were made Prisoners of War and India also occupied some areas on the West Pakistan-India border and the Line of Control in Kashmir. It was the end of the original (1947) Pakistan and the beginning of a new Pakistan under difficult and troubled circumstances. However, the post-1971 Pakistan could not attain a break from the past with reference to political management and governance. Continuity and change have since marked the political scene of the country.
Political Continuity The most prominent continuity is the struggle for translating democratic and participatory norms into political institutions and processes. As in the past, ideological commitment to participatory governance, respect of civil and political rights, the rule of law, and fair and free elections was widely shared in the polity. However, these norms did not fully reflect in the institutions and processes that were established in the post-1971 period. At the operational level, democracy did not go beyond the formal level. Its quality was poor and it could not fully accommodate the participatory pressures. There were periods of civilian and constitutional rule (1972-1977, 1986-1999, 2002 to the present) but the partisan considerations and power orientations of the ruling parties often violated the spirit of democracy, although the democratic structure were retained. These governments performed poorly in four key areas of democracy: the basic civil and political rights and freedoms of individuals; the rule of law; checks against excesses by the institutions of the state, societal groups and individuals; and free and fair electoral process. The inadequacies in these areas were the main causes of failure of these institutions to cope with the crisis of legitimacy and persist over time. The second element of continuity pertained to the domineering role of the military establishment in politics and governance. These trends began to manifest in mid-1950s and the military assumed power by displacing a civilian government in a coup in October 1958. The military staged the 2nd coup in March 1969. Its role expanded in the post-1971 period, ruling directly for over 11years and 6 months ((July 1977-December 1985, October 1999November 2002). Even when the civilians were ruling the country and the military was on the sidelines, the top brass influenced the nature and direction of politics and policy making in the foreign policy and security domains. By 2004, the military has become a more assertive political actor and it has expanded its role to the major sectors of Pakistani state and society. The setting up of the National Security Council has provided a legal cover to the military’s role in governance and policymaking. Official interference in the electoral process is the third major political continuity from the pre-1971 period. The ruling elite often used bureaucratic apparatus and state resources for ensuring the success of the favourite candidates and the powerful local groups manipulated
the electoral process to their advantage in the 1950s and the 1960s. This practice continued in the post 1971 period. Almost every election in the post-1971 period produced complaints of official interference in the electoral process. There were complaints of selective official manipulation of the 1977 elections. Some of the instances of manipulation were so glaring that the opposition parties (Pakistan National Alliance) easily capitalised on them to launch street agitation that ultimately swept aside the Bhutto government and brought the military back to power. The 1985 elections were held on non-party basis which fragmented the political process. In all the subsequent elections, there have been complaints of active involvement of the Army/intelligence agencies. One may argue that official interference was exaggerated by the defeated candidates and parties. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan’s bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies function in a manner in the course of general elections that creates serious doubts about the credibility of the electoral process. The Election Commission has mostly been unable or unwilling to deal effectively with such complaints. Indeed, it has invariably leaned heavily towards Islamabad’s ruling elite. Consequently, all elections have evoked controversies about their credibility which the defeated candidates often invoke to reject the election results. The electoral process also loses credibility because of the availability of non-electoral path to power. The military regimes have regularly co-opted the political leaders and parties in order to establish civilian governments of their choice. The ambitious people join hands with the military rulers to assume positions of power and influence without going through the electoral process. Further, co-optation may also facilitate electoral success if one has to subsequently go through the electoral exercise. As long as the political leaders have the option of accessing power though non-electoral and non-democratic channels, elections become less relevant for power management. Another political continuity from the pre-1971 to post-1971 period relates to the weak and fragmented nature of the political forces. The political parties have weak organisational structure and lack internal democracy. Many parties rely heavily on the leader who runs it in a semi-dictatorial manner. Some political parties comprise a leader and a few vocal associates who do not have popular following or party organisation. The ruling parties invariably rely on the bureaucratic structure and state patronage to set up a widespread organisational network. A positive development during 1988-1999 was the development of a dominant two-party system. The electoral experience during these years brought forward two major political parties: Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. They had to build partnership with regional and smaller parties to rule. None of the major parties was able to rule effectively without cultivating partnership with the regional parties. This was a healthy development because the electoral process produced two major political parties that had to cultivate regional/local parties to stay in power. Such a culture of accommodation and
interdependence would have contributed to institutionalisation of democracy and participatory governance. However, the coup in 1999 and the policies of the Musharraf government to push these leading political parties to the periphery of the political system stifled this trend. Another example of continuity is the use of Islam for legitimacy and political mobilisation. Both the civil and military governments have invoked Islam for these purposes. General Ziaul Haq relied heavily on Islam and highly orthodox and conservative Islamic groups for seeking legitimacy for his military government and to deflect the participatory pressures.
Political Changes Political continuity was accompanied with a number of changes in the post-1971 period. The first major change was the beginning of a generational shift, replacing those who rose to political eminence in the immediate aftermath of independence. The PPP that assumed power in December 1971 obtained support mainly from the non-elite sections and marginal groups in the polity, although it cultivated some feudal and traditional elite. The generational change in the assemblies and governments became more visible in the post-1985 period. A pre-dominant majority of the current members of the national and provincial assemblies began their political careers at the provincial and national levels during the period of General Zia-ul Haq’s military rule and later. The second major change relates to a greater emphasis on territorial nationalism and cultural pluralism in Pakistan. The Pakistani state relaxed on monolithic nationalism, as advocated in the pre-1971 period, and adopted a more accommodating attitude towards regional and linguistic identities. Another significant change was the growing emphasis on the need to establish participatory government, provincial autonomy and rights, civil and political freedoms and good governance. Though these principles did not fully materialise, the repeated emphasis on these norms kept the military governments under pressures and contributed to their decision to return to civilian and constitutional rule.
Phases of Governance The post-1971 period can be divided into four major phases: 1972-77, 1977-88, 1988-1999, and 1999 to the present. The first phase, 1972-77, was dominated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed power on December 20, 1971, after General Yahya Khan resigned in the wake of Pakistan’s military debacle in East Pakistan. Bhutto adopted socialist agenda and nationalised key industries. His major achievement was the assertion of civilian supremacy over the military and the making of the 1973 parliamentary constitution. These successes could partly be attributed to Pakistan’s traumatic military defeat and the break up in December 1971.
The 1973 Constitution established liberal democratic and parliamentary institutions and processes. However, these could not acquire sustainability because Bhutto’s authoritarian and personalised governance did not let the institutions and processes grow in the democratic spirit as enshrined in the constitution. He introduced several amendments in the constitution that compromised civil and political rights and independence of judiciary and gradually closed the political system to his adversaries. He compromised his efforts to assert civilian supremacy over the military by using the latter in Balochistan to advance his political agenda. The second phase, 1977-88, witnessed the disruption of whatever was achieved in terms of constitutionalism and civilian institutions. Pakistan underwent the longest military rule in its history and the military government used Islamic orthodoxy and highly conservative groups to build support for itself and to undercut the political adversaries questioning the right of General Zia-ul Haq to rule the country under martial law. He returned the country to civilian rule after ensuring continuity of his rule by constitutional engineering, cooptation of a section of the political elite and holding a carefully regulated party-less elections. The demise of General Zia-ul Haq in August 1988 opened up the political system and enabled civilian leaders (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) to run the country for the next 11 years. It was a return to democratic rule, although the quality of democracy continued to be poor. The highly personalised and authoritarian style of governance of the civilian leaders did not allow the democratic institutions to take firm roots in the polity. The complaints of partisan use of state apparatus and resources and poor governance caused much alienation in the polity. The cut throat power struggle between the PPP and the PMLN caused sharp polarisation and undermined the basic requisites of democratic and constitutional governance. These civilian governments were also under pressure from the military that jealously guarded its professional and corporate interests from the sidelines. Democracy and its institutionalisation suffered another setback when, in October 1999, the military returned to power after dislodging the civilian government. This stalled the growth of civilian and democratic institutions and processes. Like the previous military regime, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf introduced a host of administrative, political, legal and constitutional changes and returned the country to civilian rule after ensuring continuity of policies and some key persons of his military regime. The constitution was amended through an executive order to bring it in line with the military regime’s political priorities. A carefully tailored civilian government has been ruling the country since November 2002 under General Pervez Musharraf’s tutelage, who combines Presidency with the office of Army Chief. Pakistani political system has not made sustainable strides in the direction of constitutionalism and participatory governance. Democratic institutions could never function continuously and long enough to enable these to make mid-course corrections and mature over time. Pakistan’s cyclical return to military rule after brief spells of civilian rule have
continued to cause political discontinuity. The military regimes uprooted civilian institutions and attempted to restart the political process after introducing a host of changes reflecting their military background and political agenda. Since the military has developed a permanent stake in exercise of power, viable and autonomous political institutions cannot grow in Pakistan. Furthermore, the civilian rulers also do not pay much attention to protecting basic civil and political rights and freedoms, the rule of law, constitutional restraints on the authority of the state. They often resort to highly partisan and non-judicious use of state power and resources, authoritarian political management and poor governance and a lack of respect for political adversaries. Given such a disposition of the civil and military rulers, democratic institutions and processes are unable to function over time to acquire maturity and salience. Politics and governance tend to be subservient to the whim and partisan interests of the people in power. Political institutions are unable to strike roots at the popular level and thus lack the requisite sustainability.
