CORDILLERA CAREERDEVELOPMENT COLLEGE College of Law Poblacion, Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet
POSITION PAPER FOR EJECTMENT (FORCIBLE ENTRY) AND DAMAGES
Submitted by: RICHARD P. DUMAPIS
Submitted to: ATTY. HARRIET N. ABYADANG ABYADANG
Republic of the Philippines MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF LA TRINIDAD FIRST JUDICIAL REGION BENGUET PROVINCE
ARVIN D. MAUNAHAN Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE No. 14654 -versus-
For: EJECTMENT (FORCIBLE ENTRY) AND DAMAGES
JANJAN D. MAKULANGAN Defendant x ------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF,
by
counsel
most
respectfully
submits
this
POSITION PAPER and avers:
TIMELINESS The Plaintiff thru counsel received an order from said Court dated December 30, 2012 requiring the Undersigned Counsel to file position paper within ten (10) days from receipt thereof or on or before January 7, 2013 hence said position paper is filed. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an action for Forcible Entry and Damages commenced by the Plaintiff Arvin D. Maunahan against the Defendant Janjan D. Makulangan before the Honorable Court. The subject matter of this action is a piece of land identified as Lot No. 2-C-24 covered with TCT No. 2354 with an area of 1,000 square meters situated at Wangal, LaTrinidad, Benguet. Plaintiff claims that the defendant through stealth and strategy usurped a portion of his property and constructed a two storey house therein when the plaintiff was on vacation. Defendant denied said allegation and interposed the defense that there is no case of forcible entry since he did not apply “FORCE” when he entered the subject property, that the plaintiff did
not suffer actual or moral damages, that plaintiff should be made to pay for the Attorney’s fees of the defendant and that the case should be dismissed because the same was not referred for Barangay Conciliation prior to filing in court. Both parties have presented their pieces of evidence. The case is now submitted for decision before the Honorable Court. STATEMENT OF FACTS The plaintiff is the lawful owner of a parcel of land evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed between him and the original owner Mr. Antonio H. Ambog. The parcel of land is situated at Wangal, La Trinidad Benguet covered by TCT No. 2354 with an area of 1,000 square meters. Attached is a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the land executed by the plaintiff and the seller as annex “A” and made an integral part hereof. Copy of the TCT No. 1434 is likewise attached as Annex “B” and made integral part of this position paper. 1.
2. The plaintiff built a house on and developed one-half of the property, leaving the other half idle with the intention of having it rented out at Twenty Pesos per square meter, the running rate of lease for undeveloped land at the place. 3. On 01 April 2011, the plaintiff went on a month long vacation.
Taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiff, herein defendant, surreptitiously occupied the remaining undeveloped half of the property and even built a two story house on said lot. Pictures of said structure is attached as Annex “C”. 4.
5. Upon his return from his month long vacation on 02 May 2011, plaintiff was surprised to see the new house within his property built and occupied by the defendant. On the same day, plaintiff filed a complaint of forcible entry with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and damages against herein defendant before the Municipal Trial Court. In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, defendant raised the following defense: 6.
a. That there is no basis for a Complaint for Forcible Entry because he did not apply “FORCE” when he entered the subject property; b. That the Plaintiff did not suffer actual or moral damages; c. That since the Plaintiff forced him to hire a lawyer to present him in court, Plaintiff should be made to pay him attorney’s fees; and d. That the Complaint of Arvin should be dismissed for failure to refer the case to Barangay Conciliation before filing in court. ISSUES Is Plaintiff in prior possession of the land in dispute? II. Is “FORCE” necessary in action of Forcible Entry? III. Did the Plaintiff suffer actual or moral damage? IV.Is non-compliance with the Barangay Conciliation Proceedings a jurisdictional defect that warrants dismissal of this case? I.
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS I.
Is Plaintiff in prior possession of the land in dispute?
The main issue in forcible entry cases is the physical possession of real property – possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or possession de facto over the real property. The questions to be resolved simply are these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897). As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto, the inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract between the parties, the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease contract has already expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of the landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the
ownership of the land and the building, their rights according to the Civil Code. In the instant case, the plaintiff took possession of the subject premises upon the execution of a Deed of Sale and has been in occupancy thereof since then up to the present. Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred .” (Ong Ching Po, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341). Article 531 of the statute is explicit, thus: “ Possession is acquired by the material possession of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will or by the proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such right.” The plaintiff, after having bought the land from the original owner has in fact developed, built a house and occupied the property. All these clearly show that even before the defendant’s intrusion of the vacant portion of the lot, plaintiff was already residing and is in actual possession of the property. In De la Rosa vs. Carlos (GR No. 147549, October 23, 2003), the Supreme Court held that “possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed to be in possession.” It is sufficient that the Plaintiff was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Moreover, the defendant did not raise the question of lawful possession since in his mind he knows who the lawful owner of the land is. II.
Is “FORCE” necessary in actions for Forcible Entry?
The provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are clear. Where a person unlawfully deprives another of his property, an ejectment for forcible entry case may be filed against the usurper who deprives another of possession of land or building by force, intimidation, or stealth or threats or strategy. Where the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession (Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565).
In Banez vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines (475 SCRA 13), the Supreme Court held that “the words- by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property to exclude another, who was in prior possession.” In Mediran vs Villanueva (37 Phil 752, 756), it was held that “the act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.” The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioner’s allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without his consent and authority. “Stealth” on the other hand, was defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission, while “strategy” connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property (Sumulong v. Court of Appeals , 232 SCRA 372). In Valdez vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 132424, May 2, 2006), it further explained that “if the possession of the defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated because the defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of the owner or rightful possessor, the defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the owners. It is therefore possession by stealth which is forcible entry.” It is clear that there are other forms of committing Forcible Entry other than using “FORCE”, but also by “STEALTH” and “STRATEGY”. In the instant case, the defendant, without the consent and permission of the plaintiff, clandestinely usurped portions of the latter’s property through stealth and strategy, entering and building a house on the vacant portion of the subject property, with clear intention of permanency. III.
Is the Plaintiff entitled for actual or moral damage?
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court states that a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. Section 17 of the Rule 70 further provides that if after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. Article 20 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that “Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same”. As a result of the clandestine intrusion of the defendant, depriving the plaintiff of his property hence the plaintiff suffered damages. He was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer to protect his rights and interest, hence defendant should be ordered to pay the amount of P20,000 to the plaintiff by way of attorney’s fees. Moreover, the provisions of Article 2200 of the Rules of Court clearly state that, indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. Prior to his vacation, plaintiff intended to rent out the 500 square meter portion of his lot at Twenty Pesos (Php 20.00) per square meter, however, the same did not materialize due to the unlawful intrusion of the defendant to the subject property. Hence, plaintiff suffered actual damage of Php 10,000.00. By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the defendant when he clandestinely usurped a portion of the plaintiff’s property and deliberately refused to vacate the aforesaid premises and by way of example or correction for the public good, plaintiff herein is duly entitled for the payment of exemplary damages in the amount of Php 20,000.00.
IV. Is non-compliance with the Barangay Conciliation Proceedings a jurisdictional defect that warrants dismissal of this case? Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides: Sec. 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. Section12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further states that cases should be referred for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement; they shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that, requirement shall have been complied with( Also Section 2, Rule18, Rules of Court). However, there are instances where the parties may go directly to court as provided by Section 412 (b) of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law as follows: 1) Where the accused is under detention; 2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; 3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and 4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. At the instant case, the complaint for ejectment filed by the plaintiff contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Under Section 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary procedure, and that all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. Additionally, it is also a firmly settled principle that the municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases (Heirs of Jacobo Bolus, et. al. vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Ricardo and Gliceria Jimenez, G. R. No. 107036, February 9, 1993). The rationale is that forcible entry cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Republic vs. Guarin, 81 SCRA 269). It has been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession" (Vda de Legaspi vs Avendaño, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977). It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is “time procedure” designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167). PRAYER WHEREFORE ,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that the instant ejectment suit be decided in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendant to: Permanently vacate the premises in question and give the immediate right of possession to the plaintiff; 2. Pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of Php 20,000; 3. Pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of Php 10,000.00; 4. Attorney’s Fees in the amount of P20,000; and 5. Pay the cost of this suit. 1.
Other such reliefs that are just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED La Trinidad, Benguet January 7, 2013
ATTY. RICHARD P. DUMAPIS Commission No. 124 - 2013 Notary Public for Benguet Province Until December 31, 2013 Dumapis and Associates, Room 204 RPD Building, Km. 4 La Trinidad Benguet PTR No. 134342; 1/4/2013; La Trinidad, Benguet Bar Roll No. A-564235; 8/15/2010 IBP Lifetime No. 68799; 8/24/2010; Baguio-Benguet MCLE Compliance No. I 47786 series of 2012; 8/22/2012
Copy furnished Atty. Brusco N. Talunan Counsel for the Defendant Talunan Law Office, 309 Lakay Building Km. 5 La Trinidad, Benguet By: Personal Delivery
Republic of the Philippines) Province of Benguet ) S.S. Municipality of La Trinidad ) VERIFICATION I, ARVIN D. MAUNAHAN , Filipino, of legal age and resident of Wangal, La Trinidad, Benguet, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that: I am the petitioner of the above titled case; that I have caused the preparation of the above brief and understood the contents thereof, and I hereby declare that all the allegations contained herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and the authentic records of the case. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of January 2013, at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines. ARVIN D. MAUNAHAN Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of January 2013, at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines, affiant is known to me personally and exhibiting to me his Driver’s License with number 788999, issued at Baguio City, Philippines on January 3, 2011. ATTY. RICHARD P. DUMAPIS Commission No. 124 - 2013 Notary Public for Benguet Province Until December 31, 2013 Dumapis and Associates, Room 204 RPD Building, Km. 4 La Trinidad Benguet PTR No. 134342; 1/4/2013; La Trinidad, Benguet Bar Roll No. A-564235; 8/15/2010 IBP Lifetime No. 68799; 8/24/2010; Baguio-Benguet MCLE Compliance No. I 47786 series of 2012; 8/22/2012 Doc No. 34; Page No. 28; Book No. 20; Series of 2012.
